Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 19STCV15834, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV15834 Hearing Date: March 21, 2023 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling
Plaintiff Richard Owens’s Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories
Plaintiff Richard Owens purportedly moves to compel
defendant City of Los Angeles to serve responses to interrogatories. Plaintiff labeled this motion a “motion to
compel responses to interrogatories … [Pitchess motion].” A
motion to compel responses to interrogatories is only appropriate when “a
party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely
response.” (CCP § 2030.290.) Defendant did serve timely responses to the
interrogatories. This is not a proper motion
to compel responses.
The substance of the relief requested takes precedence
over the motion’s label. (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1011; Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573,
1577.) Plaintiff moves the court
to “obtain and review the documents in question” (though he does not identify
any such documents) “and order Defendant to answer the subject questions.” (Motion, p. 8.) In substance, this motion is either a Pitchess
motion or a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories.
Pitchess Motion
When construed as a Pitchess motion, plaintiff’s
motion is defective. Such a motion
“shall include all of the following: (1) Identification of the proceeding
in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or
disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the
governmental agency that has custody and control of the records, and the time
and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records
or information sought.
(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure
sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in
the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental
agency identified has the records or information from the records.” (Evid. Code, § 1043(b).)
Plaintiff’s motion did not “identify the peace or custodial
officer whose records are sought” and did not include “[a] description of the
type of records or information sought.” Because
he did not do so, he did not give defendant sufficient notice of whose records or
what types of records or information plaintiff seeks. Though plaintiff’s motion includes an
affidavit showing good cause for discovering information in general (Tabone
Decl., ¶¶ 2-3), it does not explain what protected records or information he
seeks. Counsel’s declaration states,
“The relevant questions, responses, and good cause for requiring answers are
contained of [sic] a separate statement filed concurrently herewith.” (Id., ¶ 5.) That does not adequately describe what information
plaintiff wants. If the court granted
this motion, defendant would not know what information and records to provide
to the court to review in camera. Moving
for “answers” to interrogatories is appropriate when moving to compel further
responses to interrogatories—not for a Pitchess motion.
Further
Responses
When construed as a motion to compel further responses
to interrogatories, the motion is procedurally defective. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300
provides for a motion to compel further responses after “receipt of a response
to interrogatories.” Defendant responded
to plaintiff’s form and special interrogatories. (Tabone Decl., Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff filed a separate statement
providing the interrogatories, the responses, and arguments for compelling
further responses. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1345.)
Plaintiff waived any right to compel further responses
because he did not timely file this motion.
“Unless
notice of [a motion to compel further responses] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental
verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the
propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the
propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the
interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.300(c).) The 45-day deadline “renders the court without authority
to rule on [late] motions to compel other than to deny them.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
Defendant served verified responses to plaintiff’s
form interrogatories and special interrogatories on September 20, 2022. (Tabone Decl., Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff served and filed this motion on
February 22, 2023—well over 45 days later.
The court has no authority to compel defendant to provide further
responses to the interrogatories.
Plaintiff also did not include the required
declaration showing he met and conferred to informally resolve this dispute. A motion to compel further responses “shall
be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1).) Rather than such a declaration, the
declaration of plaintiff’s counsel states doing so was unnecessary. (Tabone Decl., ¶ 6.)
A motion to compel further responses was the correct
way to seek some, if not all, of the information plaintiff asked for by his
interrogatories. For example, form
interrogatory No. 12.4 asked defendant to identify photographs or videos of the
incident when the police stopped plaintiff.
Defendant made various objections, including based on Penal Code
sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1040 and 1043. Those objections are meritless. Photographs or videos of the police stopping
a citizen are not “personnel records” under Penal Code section 832.8. Plaintiff’s remedy for these meritless
objections, however, was to timely move to compel further responses and seek an
order overruling the objections.
Sanctions
In its opposition, defendant seeks monetary sanctions
against plaintiff and his counsel. “The
court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney
who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to
interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted
with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
of the sanction unjust.” (CCP §
2030.300(d).)
Plaintiff unsuccessfully made a motion to compel
further responses to interrogatories. The
court finds, however, that he acted with substantial justification. Though he was unsuccessful, plaintiff in good
faith sought information, much of which would have been discoverable if he had
properly employed the applicable procedures.
Sanctions would also be unjust in the circumstances because, though
plaintiff labeled this a “motion to compel responses to interrogatories” and cited
the Discovery Act’s provisions on interrogatories, he reasonably believed this
was a Pitchess motion. That procedure does not provide for monetary
sanctions against one who makes an unsuccessful motion.
Disposition
Plaintiff’s motion is denied.