Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 19STCV15834, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 19STCV15834    Hearing Date: March 1, 2024    Dept: 52

Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant City of Los Angeles moves for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff Richard Owens’s first amended complaint.

1st through 3rd Causes of Action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for these causes of action.  Defendant argues otherwise because plaintiff has not identified, named, and served any individual City employee as a defendant.  Defendant cites no authority supporting its premise that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a plaintiff cannot proceed directly against a public entity on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as a matter of law because there is no vicarious liability for such claims.”  (Motion, pp. 3-4.) 

Defendant’s reliance on Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662 is misplaced.  There, the Supreme Court stated, “Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”  (Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 677.)  The Supreme Court held the petitioners, former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and former FBI Director Robert Mueller (id. at p. 666), “may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents” (id. at p. 677).  The Court did not consider whether the United States itself could be liable.  Applying the rule here would mean that, for example, the City’s mayor or chief of police could not be vicariously liable for rank-and-file police officers’ alleged excessive force.

Defendant also cites Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 (Monell).  That was the very case first holding that a municipality can itself be liable under section 1983.  “Local governing bodies … can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where … the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”  (Id. at p. 690.) 

The Supreme Court’s holding that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” (Monell, supra, at p. 691) means the statute does not “impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor” (ibid.).  “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.  Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”  (Id. at p. 694.)

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges the City’s policies and customs inflicted the injury upon him.  It alleges, “The Officer Defendants and any other involved officers acted pursuant to expressly adopted official policies or longstanding practices or customs of the City of Los Angeles.  These include policies and longstanding practices or customs” concerning seizing individuals without probable cause, using excessive force, and warrantless entries on vehicles.  (¶¶ 16, 27, 38.)  It further alleges the City’s “official policies and/or longstanding practices or customs, including but not limited to its training policies, caused the deprivation of [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”  (¶¶ 20, 30, 41.)    

Defendant provides no authority that pleading a cause of action under section 1983 requires naming as defendants the individual City employees who acted pursuant to the City’s alleged illegal policies. 

6th Cause of Action: Battery

            Defendant contends plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for this cause of action because he has neither named a specific City employee as a defendant nor identified the employee who committed the alleged battery.  Defendant cites authority requiring that the plaintiff identify the employee—but not that he must do so in the operative pleading, nor that he must name the employee as a defendant.  They rely on two cases, neither of which were decided on the pleadings.

First, Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 944 stated, “[I]n order for vicarious public entity liability to attach, a public employee, either named as a defendant or at least ‘specifically identified’ by the plaintiff, must have engaged in an act or omission giving rise to that employee’s tort liability.”  There, the Court of Appeal affirmed an order granting summary judgment.

Second, Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1113 stated, “[U]nless the employee is identified, the trier of fact will not be able to determine if the elements needed to assert vicarious liability have been proved.  [Citation.]  Thus, the doctrine clearly contemplates that the negligent employee whose conduct is sought to be attributed to the employer at least be specifically identified, if not joined as a defendant.”  That case was an appeal after a jury verdict.  At this stage, there is no trier of fact.    

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is not required to identify the specific officers who committed the alleged battery.  Plaintiff also is not required to join any specific officers as a defendant. 

Defendant further argues plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing that the police officers used unreasonable force.  In an action for battery against a policer officer, the “[p]laintiff must prove unreasonable force as an element of the tort.”  (Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272.) 

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this element.  The first amended complaint alleges, “[T]he Officer Defendants used unreasonable and excessive force when they unlawfully restrained Mr. Owens, forced him on the ground used their knees to place significant pressure on his back and twisted his arms in extremely painful positions.”  (¶ 23.)  It further alleges, “Defendant Officers used unreasonable force when placing Mr. Owens on the ground after he offered no resistance at all.”  (¶ 63.)

Disposition

Defendant City of Los Angeles’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.