Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 19STCV39800, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling
Please notify Department 52 via email at smcdept52@lacourt.org and indicate that the parties are submitting on the tentative ruling. Please provide the attorney's name and represented party. Please notify the opposing side via email if submitting on the Court's tentative ruling.
Case Number: 19STCV39800 Hearing Date: September 27, 2023 Dept: 52
Plaintiff Terry Records’ Motion
for Attorney Fees
Plaintiff
Terry Records moves for $596,030 in attorney fees from defendants ALF
Management Group, Inc. and Hakop Chichyan.
In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the court ordinarily
begins with the lodestar, that is, “the number of hours reasonably expended
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may rely on its own experience and
knowledge in determining the reasonable value of attorney fees. (Id. at p. 1096; accord Taylor v.
Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249.)
Basis
for Attorney Fees
A
prevailing party can only recover attorney fees when authorized by contract,
statute, or law. (CCP §
1033.5(a)(10).) Plaintiff claims
attorney fees under three statutes: Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.6,
Labor Code section 218.5, and Labor Code section 226. Only the third statute applies.
Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.6 provides, “[A] court after reviewing the evidence in the principal case
may award attorney’s fees to a person who prevails on a claim for implied
indemnity.” Plaintiff did not prevail on
a claim for implied indemnity. Plaintiff
prevailed on only one of his causes of action: failure to provide accurate wage
statements under Labor Code section 226.
He prevailed as cross-defendant to the cross-complaint, but the
cross-complaint made no claim for implied indemnity. Plaintiff brought his own cross-complaint for
indemnification but did not prevail on it.
Labor Code section 218.5,
subdivision (a) provides, “In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages,
fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund contributions, the court
shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.” Though plaintiff brought this action in part
for nonpayment of wages, he did not prevail on any cause of action arising from
unpaid wages. He therefore cannot
recover attorney fees under this statute.
Plaintiff may only recover attorney
fees under Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e)(1). “An employee suffering injury as a result of
a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to” provide accurate wage
statements “is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff prevailed on his cause of action
under Labor Code section 226 and is therefore entitled to recover reasonable
attorney fees.
Hours
and Apportionment
Plaintiff
claims 1,059 hours of attorney fees: 375 hours by Timothy Donahue, 565 hours by
Steve Basinger, and 119 hours by an unnamed legal assistant.
In
calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed
by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each
task was reasonable. (Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
775, 793.) Moreover, “a prevailing party generally may not recover
for work on causes of action on which the party was unsuccessful.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342.) However, “attorney’s
fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue
common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they
are not allowed.” (Abdallah v. United
Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111, internal quotes and
alterations omitted.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged 10 causes of
action. Plaintiff also filed a
cross-complaint for three more causes of action: indemnification, apportionment
of fault, and violation of Labor Code section 2802. Plaintiff succeeded on only one cause of
action: the sixth cause of action for failure to provide accurate wage
statements in violation of Labor Code section 226. For that claim, the only substantial dispute
was whether plaintiff should have been classified as an employee or an
independent contractor. The same issue
was also common to several other causes of action.
The other causes of action primarily concerned
matters irrelevant to the sixth cause of action. The issues of wrongful termination,
discrimination, retaliation, and failing to pay wages are not intertwined with
plaintiff’s sixth cause of action. Plaintiff’s
ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress had no
overlapping issues with plaintiff’s successful cause of action.
Although plaintiff succeeded on only one of
the thirteen causes of action he brought, he argues against apportionment on
the grounds that “[d]efendants do not and cannot parse out a percentage of
attorney fees for one claim or the other.”
(Reply, p. 2.) Defendants cannot
parse out a percentage because plaintiff provided no explanation of the hours
counsel spent on any task except this attorney fee motion. Plaintiff merely gives vague descriptions of tasks
done (Donahue Decl., ¶¶ 2-6) and states the total hours each attorney worked (id.,
¶¶ 7-8). Apart from this motion,
plaintiff does not disclose the number of hours his lawyers spent on any
particular task. As a matter of equity,
plaintiff should not benefit from his withholding of information the court
needs to adjudicate his motion. (See
Civ. Code, § 3517 [“No one can take advantage of his own wrong”].)
For this motion, plaintiff claims a total of 41
hours of attorney fees. (8/28/23 Donahue
Decl., ¶ 2; 9/20/23 Donahue Decl. ¶ 6.)
That is excessive. This motion
was simple. The memorandum of points and
authorities is only 11 pages. About four
pages are basic statements of the law on attorney fees, which are not tailored
to this case. The memorandum also makes
ad hominem attacks on defendant Chichyan.
The court did not consider these irrelevant arguments in deciding the
merits of this motion.
Plaintiff’s failure to provide any details about
the remaining 1,024 hours his lawyers allegedly spent working on this case warrants
reducing the lodestar. A “court may, in
its discretion, reduce an award of attorney fees if the attorney’s bills are
too vague to allow the court to determine if the hours spent on a case were
justifiable.” (Minser v. Collect
Access, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 781, 797 [affirming award of all fees
claimed for 53 total hours].) Providing
only a declaration stating the total number of hours each attorney worked on
unspecified tasks is wholly inadequate.
Plaintiff provides no authority on the
evidence required to substantiate a fee award subject to apportionment for
unsuccessful claims. Though “an award of
attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of
detailed time records” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375), the cases affirming such awards have fewer hours
claimed and more limited proceedings. In
Raining Data Corp., the trial court awarded attorney fees to a defendant
who prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Id.
at p. 1367.) In Weber v. Langholz
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587, the Court of Appeal stated, “Although a fee request
ordinarily should be documented in great detail, it cannot be said in this
particular case that the absence of time records and billing statements
deprived the trial court of substantial evidence to support an award.” There, “the number of hours was between 90
and 103.” (Ibid.) Here, by contrast, plaintiff is required to
provide greater detail because he is claiming his lawyers spent more than 1000
hours litigating the case through trial.
Left with so little data, the court must rely
on its familiarity with the case, which it developed by reviewing numerous
court filings, presiding over many pretrial hearings, and presiding over a
non-jury trial. The court concludes
plaintiff’s counsel reasonably performed the following compensable tasks:
drafting the complaint, interviewing and communicating with their client,
propounding and responding to written discovery, preparing for and attending
depositions, conducting legal research and drafting briefs, corresponding with
opposing counsel and engaging in settlement discussions, attending pre-trial
conferences, preparing for and attending the five-day trial, preparing a
memorandum of costs, and filing this motion and attending this hearing. Much if not most of the time spent on those
tasks was devoted to issues completely unrelated to plaintiff’s sole successful
cause of action for failure to provide accurate wage statements. Upon consideration of Donahue’s declaration
in support of this motion, the court’s familiarity with the case, and the
totality of circumstances, the court finds that plaintiff should be awarded 150
hours of attorney time working on plaintiff’s sole successful cause of action
and the present motion.
This leads to another difficult question: How should
the court allocate those 150 hours among the two lawyers who worked on the
case? Plaintiff provides a minimal
explanation of the work done by Steve Basinger.
Plaintiff asserts Basinger “handled most of the pleadings, the depositions
and one of the mediations.” (Motion, p.
4.) Basinger did not appear
on plaintiff’s behalf during the trial and his name generally does not appear
on plaintiff’s papers. Because plaintiff did not provide any
breakdown of the time spent on particular tasks, the fairest way to determine
how many hours each attorney worked is to apply the proportion of hours
plaintiff’s counsel claimed: 40% for Donahue and 60% for Basinger. The court thus finds plaintiff reasonably
incurred a total of 60 compensable hours by Timothy Donahue and 90 compensable
hours by Steve Basinger.
The
court will not award any of the 119 hours plaintiff claims for the legal
assistant. “[P]urely clerical or
secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who
performs them.” (Missouri v. Jenkins
by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.) Plaintiff’s motion asserts the legal
assistant “[a]ssist[ed] with discovery, filing, and serving documents,
scheduling with the client and all scheduling matters.” (Motion, p. 4.) Except for “[a]ssisting with discovery,”
these are all clerical tasks. Nothing in
the record shows the legal assistant did work justifying recovery of attorney
fees at any hourly rate.
Hourly
Rate
Plaintiff claims hourly rates of
$790 for Timothy Donahue and $500 for Steve Basinger. For hourly rates, “the trial court is in the
best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v.
Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436.) Courts may rely on their “own knowledge and
familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and
reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the
litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys
regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other
cases.” (Id. at p. 437, citations
omitted.)
Plaintiff
submitted evidence regarding hourly rates of other attorneys in other
cases. The court does not find that evidence
persuasive.
The court has some information about
attorney Donahue’s credentials. He has been
in civil practice nearly 40 years. Based
on the court’s observations during the trial and at hearings, Mr. Donahue has some
expertise in employment law. The court
has almost no evidence regarding attorney Basinger’s credentials. The court has only been informed that
Basinger “has more than 10 years of experience as an attorney.” (Donahue Decl., ¶ 7.)
This case did not involve novel or
complex factual or legal questions. Based
on plaintiff’s counsel’s credentials, the court’s experience and knowledge of
the legal market, and the court’s observations of plaintiff’s counsel and its
review of plaintiff’s briefs throughout this case, the court concludes the
reasonable hourly market rates are $600 for Timothy Donahue and $400 for Steve
Basinger.
Adjusted
Lodestar
After
reducing the hours and rates as discussed above, the court awards plaintiff a
total of $72,000 in attorney fees: $36,000 for 60 hours by Donahue at $600 per hour
plus $36,000 for 90 hours by Basinger at $400 per hour.
Disposition
Plaintiff
Terry Records’ motion for attorney fees is granted in part. Plaintiff Terry Records shall recover $72,000
in attorney fees from defendants
ALF Management Group, Inc. and Hakop
Chichyan.