Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 20STCV33037, Date: 2023-02-21 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV33037 Hearing Date: February 21, 2023 Dept: 52
Plaintiff
Olivia McCabe’s Motion to Strike and Tax Costs Claimed by Defendant ADP, Inc.
Plaintiff Olivia McCabe moves to strike or tax defendant
ADP, Inc.’s memorandum of costs. Generally,
a prevailing defendant “is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in
any action.” (CCP § 1032(b).) But in actions brought under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), “a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and
costs unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so.” (Gov. Code, §
12965(c)(6).) This “exception to the
mandatory award of litigation costs under section 1032, subdivision (b),
implements a clear legislative goal of encouraging potentially meritorious FEHA
suits.” (Roman v. BRE Properties,
Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1062 (Roman).)
Plaintiff’s action against ADP was not frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless. Under FEHA,
a court may only award costs to the prevailing defendant when “the
plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective
basis for believing it had potential merit.”
(Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61
Cal.4th 97, 99–100.) “In making this
determination, the court ‘should exercise caution to avoid “hindsight bias.” ’
” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution
Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 951.)
Though the court ultimately sustained ADP, Inc.’s
demurrer without leave to amend, plaintiff’s action was not frivolous or
groundless. Plaintiff had an objective
basis for believing the action had potential merit. The court’s ruling on ADP’s
demurrer to the third amended complaint turned on whether plaintiff alleged
sufficient facts to make ADP liable for aiding and abetting the employer’s
violations. (Gov. Code, § 12940(i); see Smith
v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 146.) Plaintiff made sensible arguments that ADP could
be liable under that theory. The
question had no easy answer. Reasonable
minds could disagree.
Plaintiff also had evidence suggesting an ADP
employee was unusually involved in her employer’s decision making. In her deposition, defendant Vandana Madkan
testified ADP employee Krista Zimmerman “is our HR, you know, advisor and
liaison for the office with ADP.” (Moorhead
Decl., Ex. 3, Madkan Depo., 110:5-8.) When
plaintiff requested a medical leave of absence and submitted a doctor’s note,
Madkan “immediately turned [the note] over to Krista Zimmerman.” (Id., 125:4-7.) Before terminating plaintiff, Madkan “turned
to the expertise of Krista at ADP as to what to do.” (Id., 108:23-24.) She testified Zimmerman ultimately told her “[Y]es,
you can go ahead and fire Olivia McCabe.”
(Id., 107:7-9.) Madkan
further testified she understood Zimmerman’s advice as telling her “to fire
Olivia for the absences instead of the performance issues because it’s
cleaner.” (Id., 241:13-18.) This evidence supports an objective basis for
believing the action against ADP had potential merit.
ADP argues that, because plaintiff also brought
other causes of action, FEHA’s heightened standard does not apply to all costs. “Although section 1032, subdivision (b), also
serves an important purpose, relieving a party whose position was vindicated in
court of the basic costs of litigation, when those costs have not been
increased by the inclusion of additional theories of liability to the primary
FEHA claim asserted, the express public policy of Government Code section
12965, subdivision (b), controls.” (Roman,
supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) This
rule “should apply to any other cause of action that is intertwined and
inseparable with the FEHA claims.” (Id.
at p. 1062, fn. 20.) “Unless the FEHA
claim was frivolous, only those costs properly allocated to non-FEHA claims may
be recovered by the prevailing defendant.”
(Id. at p. 1062.)
ADP’s chief defense—which resulted in the judgment
in its favor—applied equally to FEHA claims and Labor Code claims. The defense was that ADP did not employ
plaintiff and was not liable under any other theory in this action arising from
plaintiff’s employment. That defense
cannot be separated or apportioned between the FEHA claims and the non-FEHA
claims. The different elements of each
cause of action had little importance.
The key issue was whether ADP could be liable at all, not whether plaintiff
alleged sufficient facts for the substance of those violations. The same theories that could have made ADP
liable for the Labor Code violations and other causes of action could have also
made ADP liable under FEHA.
Assuming plaintiff’s other causes of action against
ADP can be separated from the FEHA claims, none of ADP’s costs can be allocated
solely to non-FEHA claims. ADP’s costs
were not increased because plaintiff included those additional theories of
liability against it.
ADP claims two categories of costs. First, it claims $1,129.23 in filing and
motion fees. None of those filings or
fees can be separated from the FEHA claims.
The plurality of this category is ADP’s first appearance fee—which would
be required even if plaintiff alleged only FEHA claims. ADP incurred fees for various non-substantive
documents such as a stipulation to continue the trial and a notice of remote
appearance. ADP also claims fees for
filing papers in support of its demurrers (plus the proposed judgment), which
were no greater because of plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims. Finally, ADP incurred fees for filing papers
regarding discovery disputes: oppositions to plaintiff’s motions to quash
subpoenas and papers for ADP’s informal discovery conference on a dispute with
co-defendant Madkan Dermatology PC. These
discovery disputes involved at least some issues arising from the FEHA claims,
such as plaintiff’s damages or the extent of ADP’s involvement with Madkan Dermatology. Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims did not cause ADP
to file these papers and did not increase ADP’s costs.
Second, ADP claims $6,351.25 in deposition costs for
the depositions of plaintiff Olivia McCabe and defendant Vandana Madkan. As ADP argues in its opposition to this
motion, Madkan’s “testimony allegedly served the basis for bringing ADP into
this action under aiding and abetting/joint employer theories. There is no legitimate dispute that these
depositions are reasonably necessary for ADP to defend itself in this
action.” (Opp., p. 7.) McCabe and Madkan may be the two most
important witnesses in this case.
Deposing them would be necessary regardless of whether plaintiff alleged
non-FEHA claims. Plaintiff’s other
causes of action against ADP did not increase ADP’s deposition costs.
Disposition
Plaintiff
Olivia McCabe’s motion to strike and tax costs claimed by defendant ADP, Inc.
is granted. The court hereby
strikes the entire memorandum of costs filed by defendant ADP, Inc. on December
1, 2022.