Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 20STCV49367, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV49367    Hearing Date: March 11, 2024    Dept: 52

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Santos Laguna, S.A. de C.V. (Santos) moves to exclude evidence regarding “FLSA’s purported intent to seek Santos’s consent to assign the International Agreement to Grupo Lauman or its affiliates, including Altener.”  (Mot., p. 1.)  Santos argues “Defendants’ recent assertion that they would have requested Santos’s consent to before assigning the International Agreement to Grupo Lauman has no evidentiary support because it is not true, and because it directly contradicts Defendants’ consistently held position since at least 2021.”  (Ibid.)

            The motion fails because it is not “directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence.” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2007) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1675.)  The court cannot “rule in a vacuum” without reference to particular evidence and simply make a general declaration about a disputed issue.  (Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670.)  Such a ruling would not provide “any meaningful guidance for the parties or witnesses” regarding what evidence is excluded.  (Ibid.)

            Moreover, the motion improperly seeks an order essentially summarily adjudicating a disputed issue regarding whether a certain assertion by defendants is “true.”  “Although trial courts may exercise their inherent powers to permit non-traditional uses of motions in limine [Citation], when used in such fashion they become substitutes for other motions, such as summary judgment motions, thereby circumventing ‘procedural protections provided by the statutory motions or by trial on the merits; they risk blindsiding the nonmoving party; and, in some cases, they could infringe a litigant’s right to a jury trial.’  [Citation].”  (Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 376.)  For this reason, Local Rule 3.57(b) provides: “A motion in limine may not be used for the purpose of seeking summary judgment or the summary adjudication of an issue or issues.  These motions may only be made in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and applicable court rules.”

            Santos contends that defendants previously took a contradictory position and made contradictory statements about “FSLA’s purported intent to seek Santos’s consent.”  If a percipient witness called by defendants makes a statement at trial that is inconsistent with a previous statement, Santos may impeach that witness’s credibility.  Any inconsistency in the testimony of defendants’ witnesses goes to the weight to the evidence, not its admissibility. 

            To the extent Santos argues that defendants are taking inconsistent positions in their legal arguments, Santos has cited no authority to support the exclusion of evidence under the present circumstances.  With certain exceptions not applicable here, parties may assert inconsistent, alternative positions.  (See Tiffany Builders, LLC v. Delraihim (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 536, 543 [“Briefing commonly, and acceptably, argues in the alternative”].)

            The motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Date:   March 11, 2024