Judge Armen Tamzarian, Case Number: 21SMVC01617, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 21SMVC01617, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Please notify Department 52 via email at smcdept52@lacourt.org and indicate that the parties are submitting on the tentative ruling. Please provide the attorney's name and represented party. Please notify the opposing side via email if submitting on the Court's tentative ruling.

Case Number: 21SMVC01617 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 52

Defendants Tower Goal, Ltd.’s, Future Land, Ltd.’s, and International Asia Holdings, LLC’s Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants Tower Goal, Ltd. (Tower), Future Land, Ltd. (Future), and International Asia Holdings, LLC (International) each move for summary judgment of this action by plaintiffs Donoco Investments, LLC (Donoco) and Donald Okada.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiffs make one objection to defendants’ evidence. The objection is overruled.

Defendants make 43 objections to the declaration of Donald Okada. Objection Nos. 2, 3, and 30-32 are sustained. Objection Nos. 1, 4-29, and 33-43 are overruled.

Defendants make 19 objections to the declaration of Brandon Rosenberg. All 19 objections are overruled.

Defendants make 13 objections to the declaration of Maria Ajhar Thompson. All 13 objections are sustained.

Defendants make 18 objections to the declaration of Jeff Voorheis. All 18 objections are overruled.

Legal Standard

A defendant moving for summary judgment must show “that one or more elements of the cause of action… cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of at least one material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Courts use a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

1. Trespass

“The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)

A. Tower Goal, Ltd.

Triable issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ trespass claim against Tower. Tower attempts to negate the second element: entry on plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact. Plaintiffs hired a licensed land surveyor, Jeff Voorheis, to survey the property in September 2023. (Voorheis Decl., ¶¶ 1-6.) Voorheis determined the boundary lines of Donoco’s property and the locations of fences and other structures on it. (Id., ¶¶ 7-9.) Voorheis states there are two fences on the property: one entirely on the Donoco property and one partially on the property that “then extends south on the Tower Goal Property about a thousand feet along the Tower Goal boundary line.” (Id., ¶ 15.) Donald Okada testifies that neither he nor his affiliated entities that have owned the Donoco property put any fence there. (Okada Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.)

Plaintiffs also present evidence that Sang Hoon Lee—who states he is the only employee or agent Tower has ever had (Lee Decl., ¶ 3)—testified at deposition that someone named Javier Castillo moved a fence on Tower’s property (Thompson Decl., Ex. A, Lee Depo., 26:23-27:4) after Castillo “asked me if he could move it and I made the decision myself” to do so (id., 29:5-6).

From this evidence, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Tower owns the fence. “Where … the plaintiff seeks to prove an essential element of her case by circumstantial evidence, she cannot recover merely by showing that the inferences she draws from those circumstances are consistent with her theory. Instead, she must show that the inferences favorable to her are more reasonable or probable than those against her.” (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 483.) According to Voorheis, the fence is on property belonging to two entities: Donoco and Tower. Donoco did not put it there. An inference that Tower put it there is more likely than a contrary inference that someone who owns neither property did. This evidence suffices to show a triable issue of fact on whether Tower entered plaintiffs’ property.

B. Future Land, Ltd. and International Asia Holdings, LLC

Triable issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of the first cause of action against Future and International. They meet their initial burden of showing plaintiffs cannot establish the second element: entry on plaintiffs’ land. They do so via declarations from Future’s officer and manager Jaewon Bang and Sang Hoon Lee, an officer and manager of Tower and International, that they are the entities’ sole employees or agents, and they have never entered plaintiffs’ property, never placed a fence on plaintiffs’ property, and never authorized anyone else to do so. (Bang Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3, 6-12; Lee Decls., ¶¶ 1, 3-10.)

Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to establish triable issues of material fact. Okada owns Lot 47, “a 1 foot by 42 strip of land” that divides the end of the public road, Kirkland Drive, from the Tower property. (Okada Decl., ¶ 7.) Tower therefore “cannot gain access to its property from Kirkland Drive without trespassing over Lot 47.” (Ibid.) Okada testifies that in March 2021, he “witnessed 3 to 4 people, dressed in similar clothing (dark pants and light shirts), which appeared to be a uniform, performing landscape work on both the IAH Property and the Tower Property. One man was working trimming tall hedges behind the house on Lot 33, with one or two other people near him. Another worker dressed the same way was on the Tower Goal side of Fence Two.” (Id., ¶ 22.) He then “observed one worker walking down the concrete drainage swale located on the Donoco Property to cross to the Tower Property.” (Id., ¶ 24.) Okada also “noticed one of the workers locking the gate at the terminus of the swale at the bottom of Kirkland Drive, at Lots 33 and 47, and who appeared to be making his way across the swale to the Tower Property and Future Property. The worker had to have crossed my lot, Lot 47, in order to get to the gate.” (Ibid.)

Brandon Rosenberg was also at Donoco’s property with Okada in March 2021. (Rosenberg Decl., ¶ 5.) He testifies he “saw several workers performing landscaping work on the adjoining properties all dressed alike in dark pants” and “saw some of them cross between the adjoining properties.” (Id., ¶ 7.)

From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could infer that these workers acted at defendants’ behest and entered Donoco’s property and Okada’s property. The inferences favoring plaintiffs are more reasonable than those favoring defendants. People generally do not perform landscaping on others’ property without permission. An inference that defendants directed these landscapers to work at their properties is more probable than a contrary inference that they were strangers to defendants. Okada and Rosenberg saw the workers cross between the adjoining properties, which are separated by Donoco’s property. The more probable inference is therefore that the workers entered Donoco’s property. Finally, an inference that at least one of the workers crossed Lot 47 is more probable than the contrary inference that they got from Tower’s property to a gate on the other side of Lot 47 without crossing Lot 47.

2. Quiet Title

All three defendants are entitled to summary adjudication of this cause of action. Plaintiff Donoco brings a cause of action for quiet title to its real property with respect to both ownership and an easement. (Comp., ¶¶ 24-27.) A quiet title action’s purpose “ ‘is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he [or she] may be entitled to.’ … The quiet title plaintiff must” allege “the adverse claims the plaintiff seeks to adjudicate.” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 524.) “An element of a cause of action for quiet title is ‘[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.’ ” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802.)

Each defendant presents evidence it does not claim any interest adverse to Donoco’s interest in the subject property. Tower’s officer and manager Sang Hoon Lee states: “Tower does not claim, and has never claimed, to have any right, title, or interest in the Donoco Easement beyond those rights and interests expressly granted to Hutton’s assigns in the Heilman Deed and those rights and interests expressly granted in the Pattin Deed. Tower does not claim, and has never claimed, to have a right to any use of the Donoco Easement beyond the uses expressly granted to Hutton’s assigns in the Heilman Deed and those uses expressly granted in the Pattin Deed. … Tower does not claim, and has never claimed, to have a right to use the Donoco Easement to access adjoining properties. Tower does not claim, and has never claimed, to have any right, title, or interest in the Donoco Property. Tower does not claim, and has never claimed, to have a right to use any of the Donoco Property.” (Lee Decl. ISO Tower, ¶¶ 9-10, 12-14.)

Sang Hoon Lee is also an officer and manager of defendant International Asia Holdings, LLC. (Lee Decl. ISO International, ¶ 1.) Lee provides substantively identical testimony on behalf of International: that it does not and has never claimed any interest in the subject property beyond the easement expressly granted in the Heilman Deed and Pattin Deed. (Id., ¶¶ 11-16.)

Future, meanwhile, presents testimony from officer and manager Jaewon Bang. Bang states Future does not claim and has never claimed any right to the subject property or the easement over it. (Bang Decl., ¶¶ 13-17.)

Donoco purports to dispute these facts via the entire declarations of Donald Okada, Jeff Voorheis, and Brandon Rosenberg. (E.g., Opp. to Tower Separate Statement, Nos. 68-69.) A trial court generally has “no obligation to undertake its own search of the record ‘backwards and forwards to try to figure out how the law applies to the facts’ of the case.” (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934.) The evidence plaintiffs cite concerns only trespass. It does not establish that any defendant claims real property rights adverse to plaintiffs’ title.

Donoco makes only a conclusory argument that trespass constitutes “de facto claiming an adverse interest” in real property. It does not. Donoco presents no authority for that proposition. Trespass is a tort concerning one person’s entry onto another’s real property. Quiet title is a statutory cause of action to determine parties’ rights to property. Trespass and quiet title may overlap via the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive easement—but defendants are presently disclaiming any right to the Donoco property beyond the recorded easement.

3. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff Donoco brings a cause of action for declaratory relief against each defendant. Defendants argue this cause of action cannot stand on its own because it derives from plaintiffs’ first two causes of action. The court is not granting summary adjudication of the first cause of action. It therefore also cannot grant summary adjudication of the third cause of action for declaratory relief.

Disposition

The court hereby grants summary adjudication of plaintiff Donoco Investments, LLC’s second cause of action in favor of defendants Tower Goal, Ltd., Future Land, Ltd., and International Asia Holdings, LLC. The court hereby denies summary adjudication of the first and third causes of action against each defendant.