Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 21STCV38565, Date: 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV38565 Hearing Date: January 10, 2023 Dept: 52
Defendants
New Residential Mortgage LLC and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s
Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint
Defendants
New Residential Mortgage LLC and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company demur to
the third amended complaint of plaintiffs Kenya Portillo, as administrator of
the Estate of Hector Portillo, and Kenya Portillo, as an individual.
The
third amended complaint alleges the following causes of action, numbered 1-5 in
the caption but not numbered consecutively in the body:
1 (caption)/1 (body): Violation
of Civil Code § 2923.5 (pre-default notice)
2/4: Violation of Civil
Code § 2923.7 (single point of contact)
3/6: Violation of Civil
Code § 2924.10 (notice of receipt of application to modify loan)
4/7. Unfair business
practices
5/8.
Cancellation of instruments
The court’s order refers to the
causes of action by their consecutive numbers as in the caption.
1st
Cause of Action: Civil Code § 2923.5
Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient
facts for the first cause of action.
Civil Code section 2923.5 requires a mortgage servicer to “contact the
borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the
borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure” (Civ. Code, § 2923.5(a)(2)) before recording a notice of default. Plaintiffs allege defendants recorded a
notice of default without first contacting them to assess the borrower’s
financial situation and explore ways to avoid foreclosure. (3AC, ¶¶ 31-32.)
This
cause of action, however, requires a “material violation” of the homeowner’s
bill of rights. (Civ. Code, §
2924.19(a)(1) & (b).) Furthermore,
“[a] mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not
be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied prior to the
recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale.”
(Civ. Code, § 2924.19(c).)
“A material violation is one that affected the
borrower’s loan obligations, disrupted the borrower’s
loan-modification process, or otherwise harmed the borrower.” (Billesbach v. Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 830, 837 (Billesbach).) “Absent
any meaningful harm to” the borrower, the defendants’ “uncured violations [a]re
not material.” (Id. at p. 846.) Examples of
immaterial violations include “failure to initiate contact” when the “borrower had opportunity to
discuss financial situation and foreclosure alternatives” (id. at p. 845) and dual-tracking when later remedied by properly evaluating
and acting on a pending loan-modification application (id. at pp. 846-847).
In Billesbach, after the plaintiff sued, the mortgage servicer “postponed
the foreclosure sale, provided [him] with a single point of contact,
communicated with him about foreclosure alternatives, reviewed his
loan-modification application, and ultimately offered him a trial-period
modification plan. [Fn.] These
curative measures satisfied the HBOR’s purpose to ensure that borrowers have a
meaningful opportunity to obtain loss-mitigation options.” (Billesbach, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.) “[W]hen an otherwise valid notice is recorded
in violation of the HBOR’s requirements, the notice is not void, and the
violation may be cured without recording a new notice.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs allege the notice of default and
election to sell was recorded on July 16, 2018.
(3AC, ¶ 15, Ex. D.) Plaintiffs
allege defendants “failed to send any written notifications in respect to any
foreclosure alternatives before recording a Notice of Default.” (Id., ¶ 31.) If that
failure to provide notice resulted in a material violation (and was not cured),
it would be an actionable violation of Civil Code section 2923.5.
But no notice of trustee’s sale was recorded until September
2, 2021. (3AC, ¶ 16, Ex. E.) Then, plaintiffs submitted a complete loan
modification application on September 29, 2021.
(Id., ¶ 17, Ex. F.)
On October 5, 2021, an agent for New Residential Mortgage, LLC “advised
that the loan modification application file is in review.” (Id., ¶ 21.)
Thus, the alleged violation occurred three years before defendants
attempted to sell the property via nonjudicial foreclosure. Defendants then reviewed the loan
modification application. Plaintiffs
allege no further efforts toward nonjudicial foreclosure since October 5,
2021.
As in Billesbach, defendants have given plaintiffs a meaningful
opportunity at mitigating their losses.
Defendants’ conduct both rendered any violation immaterial and
effectively corrected and remedied any violation prior to recording the
trustee’s deed upon sale.
In the opposition, plaintiffs argue New Residential
Mortgage “caused damages to Plaintiffs in that Plaintiffs had to pay additional
interest & late charges, and fees, and will ultimately lose their home.” (Opp., p. 3.)
Of those things, the third amended complaint alleges only that
plaintiffs “incurred additional and unnecessary late penalties.” (3AC, ¶ 65.)
Plaintiffs do not argue or establish that doing so would constitute a
“material violation,” which is the relevant standard under the HBOR.
And assuming plaintiffs “will ultimately lose their
home,” that is not enough. Plaintiffs
must allege facts showing causation: that they will lose their home because
defendants failed to write to them before recording the notice of default in
2018—now over four years ago.
2nd
Cause of Action (Civ. Code, § 2924.7) and 3rd Cause of Action (Civ. Code, § 2924.10)
Plaintiffs
cannot bring the second and third causes of action because the court already
sustained demurrers to them without leave to amend. Defendants New Residential Mortgage LLC and
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company demurred to the entire second amended
complaint, including its third cause of action for violation of Civil Code §
2923.7 and fifth cause of action for violation of Civil Code § 2924.10. On October 6, 2022, the court sustained the
demurrer to those third and fifth causes of action without leave to amend. (Minute order, p. 6.)
Plaintiffs’
third amended complaint, however, alleges the same two causes of action again—but
numbered differently. A plaintiff cannot
simply renumber the same causes of action after the court sustained a demurrer to
them without leave to amend.
4th
Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practices
Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts
for this cause of action. “Unfair
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200.) “[U]nlawful, unfair, or fraudulent” acts are
three separate types of violation. (Drum
v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 253.)
Plaintiffs
allege sufficient facts for an unlawful business practice. The law “covers a wide
range of conduct” and “embraces anything that can properly be called a business
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143, internal quotes and citations omitted.) The statute “ ‘borrows’ violations from other
laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive
practices.” (Ibid.)
Though plaintiffs do not
allege an actionable violation of Civil Code section 2923.5, they allege a violation. They allege New Residential Mortgage, LLC and
Deutsche Bank recorded a notice of default without first contacting them to
assess their financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. (3AC, ¶¶ 29-32.) Assuming the allegations are true, that was
unlawful.
Plaintiffs also allege
sufficient facts under the fraudulent prong of the unfair competition law. For that prong, “[t]he test is whether the
public is likely to be deceived.” (Prata v. Superior Court (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1146.) Plaintiffs allege the declaration of compliance attached
to the notice of default (3AC, Ex. D, p. 4) is a lie. That declaration claims that the servicer
contacted the borrower at least 30 days before recording the notice—which
plaintiffs allege never occurred. (3AC,
¶¶ 29-32.) The public would likely be
deceived when a mortgage servicer’s employee signs a false declaration of
compliance with the HBOR.
Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts for standing. A plaintiff must be “a person who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the
unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17204.) “[T]o bring a UCL
action, a private plaintiff must be able to show economic injury caused by
unfair competition.” (Zhang v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 372.) “There are innumerable ways in which economic
injury from unfair competition may be shown. A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction
more, or acquire in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have;
(2) have a present or future property interest diminished; (3) be deprived
of money or property to which he or she has a cognizable claim; or (4) be
required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would
otherwise have been unnecessary.” (Kwikset
Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 323.)
Plaintiffs allege, “As a consequence of the Defendant’s
practice in this regard,” i.e., not following procedures required under HBOR, “Plaintiff
suffered damages by (1) spending numerous hours and resources in providing NEW RES AND
DBNTC with updated financial documents that was pointless (2) loss of income
due to borrower’s loss of hours at work in order to facilitate NEW RES AND
DBNTC’s repetitive request for unnecessary documents, (3) incurred additional
and unnecessary late penalties; (4) higher arrears that are no longer
affordable to Plaintiff.” (3AC, ¶ 65.)
Incurring unnecessary late penalties and higher arrears is
an economic injury. That injury constitutes
diminishing a present property interest, depriving plaintiffs of money to which
they have cognizable claims, and making the transaction (their loan) cost more
money than it otherwise would have.
When liberally construed,
the third amended complaint adequately alleges causation. It alleges defendants failed to contact them
about options to avoid foreclosure before requiring the notice of default in
2018. One can infer that, had defendants
contacted them as required, plaintiffs could have done something between 2018
and 2021 to avoid the late penalties and higher arrears they incurred.
5th
Cause of Action: Cancellation of Written Instruments
Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient
facts for this cause of action. “A written instrument, in respect to which
there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause
serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his
application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.” (Civ. Code, § 3412.) Cancellation requires: “(1) the instrument is
void or voidable due to, for example, fraud; and (2) there is a reasonable
apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial
alteration of one's position.” (U.S.
Bank National Assn. v. Naifeh (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.)
Plaintiffs seek to cancel the notice of default
recorded in 2018 and the notice of trustee’s sale recorded in 2021. They fail to allege any basis under which
those instruments are void or voidable. They
allege defendants violated the HBOR’s requirement of contacting the borrower
before recording a notice of default. But
that does not make either of the notices void or voidable. “[W]hen
an otherwise valid notice is recorded in violation of the HBOR’s requirements,
the notice is not void, and the violation may be cured without recording a new
notice.” (Billesbach, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.) As discussed above, any HBOR violation
resulting in the recording of the notice of default or notice of trustee’s sale
was not material and was remedied or cured.
In the opposition, plaintiffs argue the instruments
should be cancelled because otherwise “entities without any actual interest
will move to foreclose their home.”
(Opp., p. 10.) The third amended
complaint does not allege defendants have no actual interest in the
property. The attached exhibits show
that, via an assignment from the previous trustee, Deutsche Bank acquired an
interest in the deed of trust secured by the property. (3AC, Ex. D.)
Leave
to Amend
After a successful demurrer, where “there is a reasonable possibility
that the defects can be cured by amendment, leave to amend must be granted.” (Stevens
v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) The plaintiff bears the burden of
“demonstrat[ing] how the complaint can be amended.” (Smith
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700,
711.) “Leave to amend should be denied
where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no
liability exists under substantive law.” (Lawrence
v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)
As discussed above, the court
already sustained demurrers without leave to amend to what are now numbered the
second and third causes of action.
Plaintiffs show no reasonable
possibility of amending the complaint to cure the first or fifth causes of
action. Plaintiffs already amended the
complaint three times. They allege
defendants reviewed their completed loan modification application. They allege no violation of the HBOR that
defendants did not cure by reviewing that application. As in Billesbach, the “curative measures satisfied the HBOR’s
purpose to ensure that borrowers have a meaningful opportunity to obtain
loss-mitigation options.” (Billesbach,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p.
846.) Plaintiffs do not show any
possibility of establishing the instruments they seek to cancel are void or
voidable as required for cancellation.
Disposition
Defendants New Residential Mortgage
LLC’s and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s demurrers to the first,
second, third, and fifth causes of action are sustained without leave to
amend. The demurrer to the
fourth cause of action is overruled.
Defendants
New Residential Mortgage LLC and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company are ordered
to answer within 20 days.