Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 21STCV40972, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV40972    Hearing Date: February 16, 2023    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:   

Defendant Brick Resurrection on Cherokee’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant Brick Resurrection on Cherokee moves for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff Farrah Fazal’s first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

1st Cause of Action: Negligence

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to constitute negligence.  Defendant argues the complaint does not allege facts establishing a duty of care.  “The general rule in California is that ‘[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person....’ ”  (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 771.)  “[I]n the absence of a statutory provision establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts should create one only where ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ”  (Ibid.)

            Plaintiff alleges defendant “is the owner, agent of the owner and/or manager of” the property she leased.  (Comp., ¶ 2.)  She alleges defendant “owned, managed and exercised possession and control of The Unit and the property at all relevant times.”  (¶ 7.)  Defendant was plaintiff’s landlord.  A landlord owes a duty to its tenants.

            Defendant argues the complaint makes only conclusory allegations that it owned and managed the property.  The complaint attaches the lease agreement, which provides, “OWNER: Brick Resurrection on Cherokee.”  (Comp., Ex. 1, p. 1.)  Several other portions of the lease and addenda provide that Brick Resurrection on Cherokee is the “landlord” or “lessor.”

4th Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

            Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Her complaint does not allege defendants breached any express term of the lease.  It does not purport to do so.  For this cause of action, the complaint alleges, “Implied in every contract is the Implied Warranty of Habitability and the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.  As discussed above, Defendants are in breach of the implied warranty of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.”  (¶ 42.)  Plaintiff separately alleges those causes of action.  The fourth cause of action is therefore “duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory.”  (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135 (Award).)  Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a separate cause of action for breach of contract. 

In her opposition, plaintiff argues defendant breached paragraph 13 of the lease, which provides, “OWNER will take reasonable measures to assure all LESSEE’s peaceful possession of their individual apartments and the shared common areas.”  (Comp., Ex. 1, p. 4.)  The complaint, however, left defendant to guess which express term it allegedly breached.  Moreover, this express term to assure “peaceful possession” is just another way of saying the same thing plaintiff alleges in her causes of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.  (See Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.)  

5th Cause of Action: Nuisance

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.”  (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.)  “ ‘A nuisance in many, if not in most, instances, especially with respect to buildings or premises, presupposes negligence.’ ”  (Ibid.)  A complaint does not state a separate cause of action for nuisance when it “ alleges no additional facts in support of the nuisance claim.”  (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.)

            Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for nuisance alleges the same facts and seeks the same damages as her first cause of action for negligence.  In this cause of action, the complaint alleges defendant permitted “harmful conditions on the premises” that “interfered with Plaintiff’s comfortable enjoyment of The Unit” (¶ 46), so plaintiff was “forced to live with uninhabitable living conditions – as indicated above – during her ongoing tenancy” (¶ 48).  The alleged nuisance, “as indicated above,” arises from the same factual allegations: that plaintiff’s unit was infested with cockroaches and ants (¶¶ 11-14) and had water damage (¶ 15).

6th Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

            Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that defendant did something “to deprive [plaintiff] of the benefits of the contract.” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 76.)  But when the allegations “rely[] on the same alleged acts” and “simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.”  (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.) 

This cause of action is superfluous.  It merely duplicates the causes of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.  In this cause of action, the complaint explicitly invokes the covenant of quiet enjoyment: “Defendants impliedly covenanted that Plaintiff would have the quiet enjoyment and possession of The Unit.  A partial expression of the Defendants covenant of quiet enjoyment is found in California §1927, which guaranteed Plaintiff against rightful assertion of a paramount title by any third party.  The statute provides that the lease bound the Defendants to secure to Plaintiff the quiet possession of The Unit.”  (¶ 55.)  

This cause of action also relies on the same factual allegations of cockroaches, ants, and water damage.  (¶¶ 11-15.)  It is “duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory.”  (Award, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1135.) 

7th Cause of Action: Violations of Civil Code §§ 1940.2, 1941.1, and Health and Safety Code § 17920.3

            In her opposition, plaintiff agreed to withdraw this cause of action.  The court will therefore grant judgment on the pleadings on it.

Disposition

            Defendant Brick Resurrection on Cherokee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to the complaint’s first cause of action.  Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action with 20 days’ leave to amend.