Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV04713, Date: 2024-05-29 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV04713    Hearing Date: May 29, 2024    Dept: 52

Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLC’s Motion for Entry of Judgment

Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLC moves to enter judgment against defendants Nine Eleven Movie, LLC, Martin Sprock, and Sprockefeller Pictures, LLC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.  

Evidentiary Objections

            Plaintiff makes four objections to the declaration of Martin Sprock, five objections to the declaration of Martin Guigui, and six objections to the declaration of Ryan Johnson.  All objections are overruled.

Authority to Enter Judgment

            The court has the power to enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.  Defendants argue otherwise because the parties did not stipulate to entry of judgment.  Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6(a) provides, “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court... for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”  The statute requires a stipulation “for settlement of the case,” not for entry of judgment, per se.  If the parties stipulate for settlement, the court may enter judgment pursuant to the settlement’s terms. 

            The parties agreed in writing to settle the case.  (Trauben Decl., Ex. A.)  The agreement provides, “[I]n accordance with the Dismissal and Stipulation re Jurisdiction, the Court in the Action will retain continuing jurisdiction over this Action for the purpose of enforcing any and all terms of this Agreement, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.”  (Id., ¶ 7.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 therefore applies and empowers the court to enter judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement’s terms.             

            The terms relevant to entry of judgment are that defendants agreed to make two payments: $90,000 and $360,000.  (Trauben Decl., Ex. A, § 2.A.)  As an alternative to the second payment, defendants were required to propose an investment in a film titled Big Finish.  (Id., § 2.B.)  The agreement provides, “Plaintiff agrees to review the Proposal in good faith and, in his sole and complete discretion, may elect to cause the Second Payment to be re-directed as a “’last in, first out’ investment into the film the Big Finish, the full terms of which will be negotiated in good faith.  For the avoidance of any doubt, the decision to accept the Second Payment or redirect that payment into the prospective film Big Finish is completely within the sole and absolute discretion of Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s approval, if any, to redirect the Second Payment must be in writing.  Absent Plaintiff’s written approval in this regard, Defendants must pay Plaintiff the Second Payment within sixty (60) calendar days of the Effective Date in accordance with paragraph 2(A)(ii).”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff has not exercised the option to redirect the second payment as an investment into the film Big Finish.

Waiver or Estoppel

Defendants contend the court should deny the motion based on the doctrines of waiver or equitable estoppel.  Defendants present insufficient evidence to apply either doctrine.  Even if defendants met their burden of proof, they fail to establish waiver or estoppel of the relevant right: entry of judgment for $360,000.  Defendants argue plaintiff “waived timing provisions and writing requirements in the Settlement Agreement” (Opp., p. 7) and “should be estopped from enforcing the proposal deadline” (id., p. 9).  They contend plaintiff delayed demanding the $360,000 payment and continued to discuss the film investment as an alternative to that payment.

This argument conflates the matter of entry of judgment pursuant to the agreement with the question of whether defendants breached the agreement.  Whether a party breached the settlement agreement is “not relevant to the entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6.”   (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 796.)  “ ‘[A] party moving for the entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach of contract to support relief under the statute.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The agreement’s deadlines are only relevant to the issue of breach.  As discussed above, plaintiff had sole discretion under the settlement agreement to accept the investment as an alternative to the $360,000 payment.  (Trauben Decl., Ex. A, § 2.B.)  Continuing to discuss the investment after the deadline does not mean they waived the right to the $360,000 payment or the right to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. 

Even if plaintiff never clearly indicated it rejected the investment option before filing this motion, that is not a basis to deny this motion.  Plaintiff has now unequivocally rejected that option.  It is entitled to judgment of $360,000 plus prejudgment interest.

Disposition