Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV05815, Date: 2025-04-28 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV05815 Hearing Date: April 28, 2025 Dept: 52
Defendant Chong Park’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Defendant
Chong Park moves for summary judgment of this action by plaintiff Dana M.
Dorsett aka Dana Moon.
Legal
Standard
A defendant
moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication of a cause of action must
show “that one or more elements of the cause of action… cannot be established,
or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of at least one material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) When a defendant
meets its initial burden as to only one element of a claim, the plaintiff “need
only present evidence establishing a triable issue on the specific element the
[defendant] challenges.” (Swanson v.
Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954.)
Summary
of Allegations
In this action, plaintiff seeks to
enforce a judgment entered in her favor against defendant Howard Park in
2011. (Comp., ¶¶ 8-15, Ex. A.) Plaintiff alleges Howard Park fraudulently
transferred his assets to several other defendants, including his son Chong
Park (the moving party). Specifically,
plaintiff alleges Chong Park owns real properties at 216 East 25th St. in Long
Beach (id., ¶ 22) and 1251-1253 Browning Blvd. in Los Angeles (id.,
¶ 23). She further alleges Chong Park
owned property at 15125 Butler Ave. in Compton before transferring it to
co-defendant JHL Development, Inc. (Id.,
¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges Howard Park “purchased
these properties in his son, Daughter, and his son’s company names with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud the collection of” the judgment. (Id., ¶ 33.)
Discussion
Triable
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment of this action. Claims for fraudulent transfer are governed
by the Uniform Voidable Transactions
Act (UVTA), which “permits defrauded creditors to reach property in the hands
of a transferee.” (Lo v. Lee
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1071.) “Under
the UVTA, ‘a transfer of assets made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer, if
the debtor made the transfer (1) with an actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud any creditor, or (2) without receiving reasonably equivalent value in
return, and either (a) was engaged in or about to engage in a business or
transaction for which the debtor's assets were unreasonably small, or (b)
intended to, or reasonably believed, or reasonably should have believed, that
he or she would incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became
due.’ ” (Ibid.)
Chong Park contends plaintiff cannot establish the
threshold element of a transfer from Howard Park to Chong Park. The UVTA “broadly defines ‘transfer’ to mean ‘every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or other
encumbrance.’ ” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 811, 817.)
Assuming Chong Park meets his initial burden on
summary judgment, plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to demonstrate a
triable issue of material fact. At Chong
Park’s deposition, his testimony indicates a striking lack of knowledge about
the three subject properties—including how and when he acquired them and even
whether he owned them. This permits an
inference that Chong Park acquired them via a scheme orchestrated by Howard
Park.
Regarding
the property at 216 East 25th Street in Long Beach, plaintiff directly asked Chong
Park, “Did you purchase that property?”
(Opp. Ex. G, C. Park Depo., 91:9.)
He answered, “I don’t know exactly.”
(Id., 91:14.) Chong Park also
testified he did not know when he purchased it, how much he paid for it, or the
amount of the loan. (Id., 91:6-8,
99-100:17.) He answered that he could
not estimate either when he purchased it (id., 99:16-18) or how much it
cost (id., 100:6-13). Chong Park
further testified: “Q. Did your father handle all the finances related to this
property on 25th Street? [Objection.]
A. Initially that was the case, but I’m not sure. … Q.
Well, right now who is handling the finances?
A. I don’t know.” (Id.,
101:16-23.)
When
asked if he could estimate when he purchased the property on 25th Street, Chong
Park testified: “A. … I don’t have an
estimate. I have not asked any questions
related to that. Q. Asked questions to
whom? A. Oh, well, that could be my
father or anyone who is related to that.
I don’t know who that is, but --.”
(Opp. Ex. G, Chong Depo., 99:17-22.)
Chong Park has provided no explanation of why, if he legitimately
purchased this property, he would need to ask his father or someone else about
when he did that.
Regarding
the property at 1251-1253 Browning Boulevard, Chong Park testified: “Q. Have
you ever purchased a property on 1251 to 1253 Browning Boulevard? A. Yes. Q. What did you hear of
it? A. To my understanding, from a few
years ago, if -- I mean, the building was my name, so I am the one who manage. Q. Okay. How did you acquire your name on the
title? [Objections.] A. The thing is, I’m not sure.” (Opp. Ex. G, C. Park Depo., 103:13-104:1.) He further testified: “Q. How much did you
pay for this Browning Boulevard property? A. I’m not sure. … Q. Do you have an estimate? A. I don’t know. Q. Who did you purchase it from, the Browning
Boulevard property? A. I don’t
know. Q. You have no idea? A. I don’t know. … Q.
Were you involved in the purchase of this property? A. Except for the fact that I got a loan from
a bank, you know, financing, nothing else.”
(Id., 107:16-108:24, objections omitted.)
Regarding
the property at 15125 Butler Ave. in Compton, Chong Park testified: “Q. [D]o you
know who purchased -- … whose name is in the title of this Butler Avenue
property? A. I don’t know. Q. Do you know anything about the purchase of
this Butler Avenue property?
[Objection.] A. I don’t know.” (Opp. Ex. G, C. Park Depo., 114:4-13.) “Q. When -- did JHL purchase the Butler
Avenue property? A. I don’t know the
detail. Q. Other than the fact that this
property is under your name, do you know anything else about the Butler
property? A. I don’t know.” (Id., 150:24-151:5.)
The
gravamen of Chong Park’s testimony is that he knows almost nothing about any of
the real property he purchased or owned.
He even testified that, though he sees his father “[m]ore than four to
five days a week” (Opp., Ex. G, 110:3), he does not know where his father
lives, including if he lives or ever lived at the building on Browning
Boulevard (id., 109:10-24, 110:4-9).
Plaintiff
also presents other evidence implicating Howard Park is the equitable owner of
these real properties. Private
investigator Jaeis Chon testifies that Howard Park called him in October
2021. (Opp. Ex. J, Chon Decl., ¶ 3.) Chon states, “Park told me that he needed to
evict his tenants from his buildings in Long Beach and Gardena
properties. Park told me that the
buildings’ titles are in his children’s names.”
(Id., ¶ 5, italics added.)
Based
on this testimony, a trier of fact could reasonably infer, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Howard Park provided the funds used to purchase these
real properties in Chong Park’s name.
The record supports a reasonable inference that Chong Park knows so
little about the properties because his father used him as an instrument to
evade creditors.
Chong
Park argues plaintiff has no evidence of a transfer to him from his
father. He relies on Scholle v.
Finnell (1916) 173 Cal. 372 (Scholle), which is distinguishable. It was an appeal after court trial (id.
at p. 376), not summary judgment. The
California Supreme Court applied a deferential standard of review to the trial
court’s findings of fact: “[E]ven if we concede the probative force of the
various matters insisted upon by the appellant, it still remains that there was
at the least a substantial conflict of evidence upon the point, and that the
finding of the trial court, evidencing its view of the preponderance of the
evidence, is beyond our power of review.”
(Id. at p. 379.)
As
to the plaintiff creditor’s claim regarding livestock and machinery, the father
did not intentionally transfer it; instead it “was unlawfully taken by the
defendants and converted to their own use.”
(Scholle, supra, 173 Cal. at p. 378.) As to the claim for company stock, the father
never owned it, and instead the son purchased it from someone else for $20,000. (Ibid.) Assuming there was any evidence suggesting
the father funded that transaction to evade creditors, the California Supreme
Court held substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of
fact. (Id. at pp. 378-379.)
On
this motion for summary judgment, the relevant standard is whether there is a
triable issue of material fact. Defeating
a motion for summary judgment does not require direct evidence. The opposing party can do so via
circumstantial evidence. (Collin v.
CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 592.) Plaintiff meets that burden.
Discharge
of Debt in Bankruptcy
In his reply brief, Chong Park asserts
Howard Park’s debt to plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy. (Reply, pp. 4-5.) Generally, a party moving for summary
judgment cannot make new arguments or present new evidence for the first time
on reply. (Pereda v. Atos Jiu
Jitsu LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 759, 766; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(b)(4).) Moreover, Chong Park presents
no evidence supporting this assertion.
But if Howard Park’s debt to plaintiff was discharged, there may be
conclusive evidence subject to judicial notice that would establish plaintiff
cannot succeed in this action.
Disposition
Defendant Chong Park’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.