Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV09201, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV09201 Hearing Date: July 28, 2022 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling:
Defendant Megna T Shirt
Manufacturing Company, Inc.’s Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint
Defendant
Megna T Shirt Manufacturing Company, Inc. moves to strike one portion of the
first amended complaint: the request for “[l]ate charges and interest on all
past due amounts, per Lease terms.”
(FAC, ¶ 19.i.) Courts may strike
a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of
the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
431.10, subd. (b)(3).)
Los
Angeles Municipal Code § 49.99.3
Defendant contends plaintiff T-A
Fashion (USA), LLC cannot recover interest or late fees under Municipal Code §
49.99.3, which provides, “[N]o Owner shall endeavor to evict or evict a tenant
of Commercial Real Property for non-payment of rent during the Local Emergency
Period if the tenant is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. These circumstances
include loss of business income due to a COVID-19 related workplace closure, child
care expenditures due to school closures, health care expenses related to being
ill with COVID-19 or caring for a member of the tenant's household or family
who is ill with COVID-19, or reasonable expenditures that stem from
government-ordered emergency measures. …
No Owner shall charge interest or a late fee on rent not paid under the
provisions of this article.”
This section only prohibits interest
or late fees on unpaid rent “under the provisions of this article.” It only applies “if the tenant is unable to
pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Why defendant was unable to pay rent cannot
be ascertained from the face of the first amended complaint. It merely alleges defendant did not pay its
rent.
Interest
Plaintiff may recover interest in
this action. Generally, “[a] person who
is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by
calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a
particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day.” (Civ. Code, § 3287(a).) Defendant cites no authority that the general
provision does not apply to unlawful detainer actions. The general rule applies to unlawful detainer
actions. (See, e.g., Chambers v. Security
Commercial & Sav. Bank (1920) 46 Cal.App. 32, 34 [trial court
erred by not including interest in unlawful detainer judgment].)
Defendant’s
reliance on McFarland v. Carpenter (1936) 18 Cal.App.2d 205, 214 is
misplaced. There, the court held
interest was not recoverable because “the amount of damages… was unliquidated.” (Ibid.) “The amount of damages was not based on a
fixed or agreed monthly rental for the property” and the amount “could not be
computed except from testimony which was adduced showing the reasonable rental
value thereof.” (Ibid.) The court thus applied the general rule under
Civil Code § 3287.
Here,
the damages are based on a fixed amount: monthly rent due under the parties’
lease agreement. The amount can be made
certain by calculating rent according to the lease.
Late
Fees
The
allegations of the complaint suffice to recover late fees as damages. Defendant contends the late fee provision is
void. “[A] provision in a contract
liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the
party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was
unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was
made.” (Civ. Code, § 1671(b).)
The
lease provides, “Lessee hereby acknowledges that late payment by Lessee of Rent
will cause Lessor to incur costs not contemplated by this Lease, the exact
amount of which will be extremely difficult to ascertain. Such costs include, but are not limited to,
processing and accounting charges, and late charges which may be imposed upon
Lessor by any Lender.” (FAC, Ex. 1,
Lease, ¶ 13.4.) If the lessee does not
pay rent within 5 days after it is due, “Lessee shall immediately pay to Lessor
a one-time late charge equal to 10% of each such overdue amount or $100,
whichever is greater. The parties hereby
agree that such late charge represents a fair and reasonable estimate of the
costs Lessor will incur by reason of such late payment.” (Ibid.)
The
lease defines “rent” to include these late fees. “All monetary obligations of Lessee to Lessor
under the terms of this Lease (except for the Security Deposit) are deemed to
be rent.” (Lease, ¶ 4.1, p. 3.)
The
court cannot decide at this stage that the late fee was unreasonable under the
circumstances when the parties entered the contract. “The California Supreme Court has recognized
that it is essentially a factual question whether the parties reasonably
estimated foreseeable damages under the prevailing circumstances [citations]
that becomes a question of law when the facts are undisputed and susceptible of
only one reasonable interpretation.” (Krechuniak
v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 713, 723 (Krechuniak).) Under Civil Code § 1671(b), defendant bears
the burden of showing the late fee was unreasonable under the
circumstances.
Defendant
argues whether the late fee is valid is a legal question that can be resolved
on the pleadings. It relies on Jade
Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 635, 646: “ ‘Whether an amount to be paid upon breach is to be
treated as liquidated damages or as an unenforceable penalty is a question of
law.’ ” (Citing Harbor Island
Holdings v. Kim (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 790, 794.) But both Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. and
Harbor Island Holdings were appeals after summary judgment or
adjudication. They were not decided on
the pleadings. The facts appearing on
the face of the first amended complaint are not “susceptible of only one
reasonable interpretation.” (Krechuniak,
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.)
The court therefore cannot decide this issue on a motion to strike.
Disposition
The
motion to strike is denied.
Defendant
Megna T Shirt Manufacturing Company, Inc. is ordered to answer within 5
calendar days.