Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV14870, Date: 2023-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV14870    Hearing Date: April 17, 2023    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jane Doe 1’s Motion to Compel Discovery of Personnel Records of Sheriff’s Deputy Daniel Acquilano

Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 moves for an order compelling defendant County of Los Angeles to produce eight categories of peace officer records.

Generally, peace officer personnel records are confidential and are not disclosed in any civil proceeding.  (Pen. Code, § 832.7.)  Penal Code § 832.8(a)(5) defines “personnel records” to include “[c]omplaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties.”

Motions for discovery of these records must include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.”  (Evid. Code, § 1043(b)(3).) 

The “ ‘good cause’ requirement has two components.  First, the movant must set forth ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  The function of this requirement is to ‘exclude[ ] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.’  [Citation.]  If the movant shows that the request is ‘relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.’ ”  (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 41.)  “Second, the ‘good cause’ requirement obliges the movant to articulate ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ”  (Id. at p. 42.)

A plaintiff’s “initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard.    Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.”  (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086 (Haggerty) internal quotes and alterations omitted.)  “[T]he relevancy of an investigation of the incident that is the basis for the lawsuit is ‘self-evident.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1087.)

Specific Categories of Records

            Plaintiff seeks discovery of the following categories of records:

(1) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO’s PERSONNEL FILE.”

(2)  “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any complaints and/or grievances about and/or relating to Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO whether formally filed or informally made.”

(3) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any disciplinary actions relating to Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO.”

(4) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any allegation, formal or informal, of misconduct, use of force, excess force, inappropriate, unprofessional, unethical, biased, prejudicial, discriminatory, retaliatory, or criminal behavior, or dishonesty, by Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO.”

(5) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to the hiring process for defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO, including but not limited to, any background checks conducted on defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO.”

(6) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to the decision to place defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO at LHS during the time period of the INCIDENT.”

(7) “Any and all DOCUMENTS requested by any entity, party, or individual pursuant to a Public Records Act request regarding any use of force by Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO.”

(8) “Any and all DOCUMENTS memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to Defendant DANIEL ACQUILANO’s use of force trainings.”

            Plaintiff does not show good cause for disclosing categories one and six.  The first category, Acquilano’s entire personnel file, is overly broad.  A peace officer’s personnel file may include a wide array of immaterial information, such as  performance evaluations, pay records, time records, and information about work-related injuries.  The other requested categories include the material information that may be in Acquilano’s personnel file. 

            Plaintiff does not show good cause for disclosing the sixth category of records, documents regarding the decision to place Acquilano at Lancaster High School.  Plaintiff “did not demonstrate a plausible factual scenario indicating the relevance” of these records.  (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 662.)  As plaintiff’s counsel states in his declaration, the gravamen of this action is that plaintiff alleges Deputy Acquilano used excessive force against her and that he did so because of her race or color.  (Goldstein Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7.)  Plaintiff also alleges the County negligently hired, retained, supervised, and trained Acquilano.  But plaintiff’s moving papers and supporting declaration do not address or explain the materiality of records on the decision specifically to assign Acquilano to Lancaster High School, as opposed to any other assignment available to Deputy Sheriffs. 

            Plaintiff shows good cause for discovering parts of categories two and three.  Plaintiff meets her burden with respect to documents about complaints or grievances and disciplinary actions against Acquilano related to the use of force and to discrimination or bias.  Acquilano’s use of force and his intent in using force are central issues in this case.  As written, however, these categories include any complaints or grievances and any disciplinary actions.  Such broad categories would include immaterial information.  For example, a citizen’s complaint that Deputy Acquilano was driving unsafely would have no relevance to this action.  Similarly, a disciplinary action against Acquilano for something like being late to work or taking excessive lunch breaks would be immaterial.  The court will order limited disclosure of these categories: complaints and disciplinary actions regarding use of force, bias, or discrimination.

Similarly, plaintiff shows good cause for disclosing part of category four.  “The information sought must . . . be ‘requested with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that [the moving party] is engaging in a “fishing expedition.” ’ ”  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 85.)  This category includes documents related to allegations of “misconduct” and “inappropriate, unprofessional, unethical” conduct.  Including these generic terms would constitute an improper fishing expedition.  Moreover, these terms are so vague that they would provide insufficient guidance on what records the County should provide for in camera review.  The court will order limited disclosure of this category by striking the terms “misconduct,” “inappropriate,” “unprofessional,” and “unethical.” 

Plaintiff shows good cause for the fifth and eighth categories of documents.  Plaintiff alleges the County negligently hired and trained Acquilano.  Records about the hiring process and use of force training are material.  Plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable belief that the County possess such information.   

Finally, plaintiff shows good cause for the seventh category of records: documents requested under the Public Records Act about Acquilano’s use of force.  This category is appropriately limited to information on use of force, which is a core issue in this case.        

Protective Order

            With its opposition, the custodian of records for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department submitted a proposed protective order to limit the disclosure of any confidential records or information produced.  Plaintiff states she “is amenable to [the] proposed protective order pertaining to all documents produced in connection to this Motion.”  (Reply, p. 5.) 

The court finds a protective order appropriate.  The court will sign the proposed protective order.

Disposition

Plaintiff Jane Doe 1’s motion to compel discovery of personnel records of Deputy Sheriff Daniel Acquilano is granted in part. 

Defendant County of Los Angeles is ordered to present the court with all documents in the following categories within 30 days:

(a) Documents memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any complaints or grievances regarding defendant Daniel Acquilano’s use of excessive force, bias, or discrimination;

(b) Documents memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any disciplinary actions against defendant Daniel Acquilano involving use of excessive force, bias, or discrimination;

(c) Documents memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to any allegation, formal or informal, of use of force, excess force, biased, prejudicial, discriminatory, retaliatory, or criminal behavior, or dishonesty, by defendant Daniel Acquilano;

(d) Documents memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to the hiring process for defendant Daniel Acquilano, including but not limited to background checks conducted on him;

(e) Documents requested by any entity, party, or individual pursuant to the Public Records Act regarding any use of force by defendant Daniel Acquilano; and

(f) Documents memorializing, discussing, mentioning or relating to defendant Daniel Acquilano’s use of force trainings.

The court will hold an in camera hearing to review the records on _________________ at 10:00 a.m.