Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV15248, Date: 2023-10-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15248    Hearing Date: October 20, 2023    Dept: 52

Plaintiffs Susana Castro and Jose Silva’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration   

Plaintiffs Susana Castro and Jose Silva move the court to reconsider its order granting defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Wish Automotive III, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration.  The court issued that order on February 6, 2023. 

Plaintiffs assert they move the court to reconsider its order under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(c).  (Motion, pp. ii, 1-2, 7-9; Reply, p. 3.)  That subdivision provides, “If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.”  The statute’s plain language does not permit a party to make such a motion.  “Unless the requirements of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008 are satisfied, any action to reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with the court on its own motion.”  (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.)

Instead, a party’s motion to reconsider an order granted by the court must abide by the restrictions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a), including that the motion must be made “within 10 days” of the order.  (Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 312 (Cox) [“A trial court may not grant a party’s motion for reconsideration that does not comply with section 1008”].)  Plaintiff’s motion is untimely.  A court may, however, reconsider an order on its own motion, even in conjunction with a party’s motion for reconsideration.  (In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1308-1309; Cox, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 314 [trial court implicitly exercised its inherent authority and “did not grant defendant’s motion on the merits, but only the relief sought by that motion”].) 

The court concludes the new authority plaintiffs rely on does not constitute a change in law.  Section 1008(c) “does not define what constitutes a ‘change of law,’ and its terminology gives the court very broad power.”  (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106 (Farmers).)  Plaintiffs rely on new cases by the Court of Appeal: Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (Ford, review granted July 12, 2023, S279969), Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 958 (review granted Sept. 20, 2023, S281237), and Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614 (Kielar). 

These new cases did not and could not overturn Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (Felisilda).  These decisions “disagreed with Felisilda.”  (Kielar, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)  But Felisilda remains good law.  Moreover, these decisions did not rely on new authority.  (See Wilson v. La Jolla Group (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 897, 921 [“trial court was not required to find that” new cases “were ‘new law’ for purposes of reconsideration,” where they “relied on long-standing … principles”].)  They instead disagree with Felisilda based on pre-existing authority about equitable estoppel.  (See Ford, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1334-1336.)

Assuming the cases disagreeing with Felisilda constitute a change of law, the court declines to exercise its discretion to reconsider its order compelling arbitration.  When applying Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(c), “the court may consider a number of factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion, including the importance of the change of law, the timing of the motion, and the circumstances of the case.”  (Farmers, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 107.) 

Rather than constituting binding precedent, these new decisions only “permit[] trial courts to make a choice between the conflicting decisions.”  (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)  The court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration eight months ago.  Reconsidering that order now would undermine the purpose of arbitration “ ‘ “as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.” ’ ”  (Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 25.)  Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes it should not exercise its discretion to reconsider its order. 

Jurisdiction

            Defendants also raise a serious jurisdictional issue.  “Once a court grants the petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration.  This vestigial jurisdiction over the action at law consists solely of making the determination, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, of whether there was an award on the merits … or not” and over other limited subjects.  (Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796.) 

Based on this authority, defendants argue the court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider its order compelling arbitration.  The court need not and does not reach the issue.

Disposition

Plaintiffs Susana Castro and Jose Silva’s motion for reconsideration is denied.