Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV25856, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV25856 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 Dept: 52
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
Defendants
Christian Williams and Jorge Trejo move for summary judgment of this action by
plaintiff D.E., a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, Brittany
Dominguez. In the alternative, Williams
and Trejo move for summary adjudication of each cause of action and of
plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
Defendant City of Los Angeles filed a brief stating it joins in the
motion.
Summary of Allegations and Evidence
Plaintiff’s
complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) “battery by peace officer – deadly
force”, (2) battery, (3) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane
Act”), and (4) negligence. All four
causes of action arise from the death of plaintiff’s father, Enrique Ruiz.
On December 26, 2021, officers Williams
and Trejo of the Los Angeles Police Department responded to an emergency call. They arrived at a gas station, where they
encountered Enrique Ruiz. The record
includes video recordings of the entire incident from multiple cameras. (Def. Exs. E, F, G; Ouchi Decl., Exs. A, C,
G, H, I, J.) The parties do not dispute
the videos’ authenticity.
The videos show the officers arrived at
the gas station at 18:09:57. (Def. Ex.
E, Trejo Camera.) The recording from Trejo’s
body-worn camera shows that as he exited the passenger side of the patrol car,
Enrique Ruiz exited a car. (Id., 18:10:05.) At his deposition, Trejo testified that the
decedent was initially about 30 feet away from him. (Ouchi Decl., Ex. F, Trejo Depo., p. 64.) Four people, including Fire Department
employees, stood within about 10 feet of the decedent’s car, then backed away
as the decedent exited his car. (Trejo Video,
18:10:05 – 07.) The decedent’s clothes
were drenched with blood. (Ibid.) In his right hand, he held a knife by end of
the handle, with the blade pointing down.
(Ibid.) Both officers drew
their firearms and yelled at the decedent to “drop the knife” or “put the knife
down.” (Id., 18:10:05 – 28; Def.
Ex. F., Williams Video, 18:10:04 – 28.)
Enrique Ruiz did not drop the knife. He stood near his car, faced the officers
with his arms stretched out to each side, and took four small, slow steps
toward them. (Def. Ex. G, Car Video, 18:10:12
– 28.) He then turned about 45 degrees
to his right, faced the officers again, then took a few more small, slow
steps. (Id., 18:10:28 – 46.) He turned 90 degrees to his right, then
slowly turned back to face the officers.
(Id., 18:10:48 – 56.) The
decedent then slowly walked towards the officers until he was right in front of
their vehicle. (Id., 18:10:56 –
18:11:16.) As he approached them, both
officers repeatedly yelled at him, “don’t move,” “stop,” and “get down.” (Trejo Video, 18:10:55 – 18:11:14.) At his deposition, Trejo testified that he
Ruiz said “ ‘Shoot me’ ” as he approached.
(Def. Ex. D, Trejo Depo., p. 89.)
The officers then shot the decedent, and he fell to the ground. (Car Video, 18:11:18 – 20.)
Throughout the encounter, Enrique Ruiz
held the knife with its blade pointing down.
As Ruiz approached the officers, the blade’s edge was pointed behind him
and away from the officers. (Car Video,
18:11:04-18.) The videos further show
that Enrique Ruiz never raised his right arm (which held the knife) at an angle
more than about 30 degrees above parallel to the ground.
Legal Standard for Summary Adjudication
A defendant moving
for summary adjudication of a cause of action must show “that one or more
elements of the cause of action… cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to the cause of action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a
triable issue of at least one material fact.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
849.)
Legal Standards for Battery and Negligence Claims Against Police Officers
For
negligence claims, Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622 (Hayes)
established that police officers’ “preshooting
conduct is included in the totality of circumstances surrounding an officer’s
use of deadly force, and therefore the officer’s duty to act reasonably when
using deadly force extends to preshooting conduct.” (Id. at p. 632.) The Court of Appeal has applied that standard
to other negligence claims against police officers. (See, e.g., Golick v. State of California
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1141; Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 909, 935–936.)
A different standard applies to battery claims. “A state law battery claim is a counterpart
to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace
officer’s use of force was unreasonable.”
(Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 527.) Such claims “ ‘are analyzed under the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.’ ” (Ibid.)
As persuasive authority explains, Hayes “carefully
cabined its ruling to state negligence law”, which “ ‘is broader than federal
Fourth Amendment law, which tends to focus more narrowly on the moment when
deadly force is used.’ ” (Galindo v.
City of San Francisco (N.D. Cal. 2024) 718 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1141.) In contrast with the rule stated in Hayes,
“when considering whether a particular incident violated the Fourth Amendment”
as required for battery, “courts ‘generally focus[ ] on the tactical conduct at
the time of shooting ... though a prior constitutional violation may
proximately cause a later excessive use of force.’ ” (Id. at p. 1135.)
Negligence
Triable
issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of plaintiff’s fourth
cause of action for negligence. A
reasonable juror could find that, under the totality of circumstances,
including the officers’ preshooting conduct, the officers negligently used
deadly force against Enrique Ruiz. After
Ruiz exited his vehicle, approximately 50 seconds passed before he advanced
towards the officers. The videos show
that for those 50 seconds before Ruiz got close to them, the officers did
nothing other than aim their firearms at Ruiz and yell at him to drop the knife
and to stop moving.
The record includes evidence that the officers had
less lethal weapons with them. At his
deposition, Williams testified he “was equipped with a 40-millimeter
less-lethal launcher along with OC [pepper] spray,” a “baton,” and his
“TASER.” (Ouchi Decl., Ex. E, Williams
Depo., 12:21-13:1.) Trejo testified at
deposition that the officers’ “patrol unit was equipped with a 40mm [foam
bullet launcher] and a TASER on [his] person.”
(Ouchi Decl., Ex. F, Trejo Depo., 10:9-10.) A reasonable trier of fact could find the
officers breached their duty of care to Ruiz as required for negligence.
Defendants rely on Villalobos v. City
of Santa Maria (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 383 (Villalobos). There, the court stated:
The following
factual summary is based on our personal observation of the video: At the video’s
42-minute, 37-second mark, an order is given. In response to the order, officers lift their
less-than-lethal rifles and take aim at decedent, who is still standing in
front of the sign and holding the knife.
The distance between decedent and the officers appears to be between 30
and 40 feet. Decedent sees the officers
taking aim and makes a “go ahead” gesture with his left hand. The officers fire several times, striking
decedent in the torso with projectiles. Decedent
grabs the knife with both hands and jumps up and down three times. Each time he lands on the ground, he
forcefully stabs himself in the abdomen. Decedent then appears to slash his
throat with the knife. He falls down,
gets up, and charges full speed toward the officers. The knife is clearly visible in his right
hand. The officers fire several rounds of live ammunition. Decedent collapses in the street a few feet
away from the officers.
(Id. at pp.
386–387.)
Villalobos
is factually distinguishable for at least two reasons. First, the officers did use less-lethal
weapons that fire 40mm rubber projectiles (85 Cal.App.5th at p. 386) on the
decedent before resorting to lethal firearms.
Here, the officers never tried anything between verbal commands and
lethal firearms. Second, in Villalobos,
the decedent “charge[d] full speed toward the officers” (id. at p. 387),
which the court later also described as “decedent ran toward the officers” (id.
at p. 391). Here, the decedent’s
movements could not reasonably be characterized as running, charging, or moving
at “full speed.” As plaintiff argues, the decedent’s movements toward
the officers could reasonably be characterized as lethargic and unsteady. One could also reasonably describe decedent’s
movements as shambling or stumbling.
Defendants
further rely on the following dicta from Smith v. City of Hemet (9th
Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 689, 704 (Smith): “[W]here a suspect threatens an
officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in
using deadly force.” This broad
generalization was unnecessary to the court’s holding. The Smith court acknowledged, “[A]s no
party to this case asserts that the use of deadly force would have been
appropriate here, the issue is actually only whether the use of [a police
canine] constituted deadly force.” (Ibid.) To the extent Smith broadly
generalizes that the police may use deadly force whenever a suspect threatens
an officer with a knife, it is unpersuasive.
Moreover, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Enrique Ruiz
was not an imminent threat because he never raised the knife at the officers,
he approached them with the blade’s edge pointing away from them, and he
approached them slowly and shakily.
Defendants’
reliance on Hart v. City of Redwood City (9th Cir. 2024) 99 F.4th 543 (Hart)
is unpersuasive because it too is factually distinguishable. There, the suspect “was holding the knife
towards the officers as he approached them.” (Id. at p. 549, italics in original.) In contrast, Enrique Ruiz was holding the
knife with the blade pointed down and the edge pointed away from the officers.
In
Hart, the court stated, “[W]hether [the suspect’s] pace was specifically
a run or a brisk walk is immaterial given he crossed the yard to within close
range of the officers in less than 5.9 seconds.” (99 F.4th at p. 550.) The record showed that, shortly after the
officers arrived and announced their presence, the suspect “began moving
towards the officers” and “went from his starting position across the yard to
where he eventually ended up only a few feet from the officers in less than 5.9
seconds.” (Id. at p. 546.) The court referred to his movement as
“rapidly approach[ing]” the officers. (Id.
at p. 554.) Here, Enrique Ruiz’s pace
was at most a slow walk. No reasonable
person could describe his movement as rapid, brisk, or running. And approximately 70 seconds elapsed between
when he got out of his vehicle until he arrived at his final position close to
the officers’ car.
Defendants
additionally cite Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 334 (Martinez). The Martinez
court described the undisputed facts this way: “The deputies responded to a
call that an Hispanic man high on PCP was walking about brandishing a knife. Martinez, whom every witness agreed seemed to
be high on alcohol and/or drugs, crossed a busy intersection in complete
disregard to oncoming traffic, shouting at the deputies that he was the one
they were looking for. The knife,
although moved about in different positions, was in his hand at all times. Martinez kept coming toward the deputies
despite their attempts to talk to Martinez and their repeated admonitions that
he drop the knife. The deputies
retreated as Martinez advanced, with Martinez shouting that they should shoot
him or he would kill them. When Martinez
closed to within 10 or 15 feet of the deputies, he was also nearing the
handcuffed taggers, the store owner and others.
At that point, when Martinez kept coming, the deputies fired.” (Id. at p. 344.)
The
court held summary judgment was appropriate though “Martinez merely held the
knife at his waist or with the blade pointed skyward.” (47 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) “This did not render Martinez any less of a
threat, given his stated intention to kill the deputies and his steady advance
despite repeated warnings that he stop.”
(Ibid.)
Martinez is also distinguishable. Here, there was no indication Enrique Ruiz
was inebriated. He did not cross a busy
intersection to aggressively greet the officers. For 50 seconds, he hardly moved. Ruiz did not threaten to harm the officers or
state any intention other than wanting the officers to shoot him. And as he approached the officers, he was not
moving toward any other bystanders. The totality
of the circumstances are different enough that the court cannot conclude, as a
matter of law, that no reasonable trier of fact could find officers Trejo and
Williams were negligent in using deadly force.
Battery
Triable
issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of plaintiff’s first and
second causes of action for battery. For
the reasons discussed above, Enrique Ruiz’s conduct was far less than
threatening than that of the suspects in the cases defendants cite. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that, even when the officers fired their weapons, Enrique Ruiz did not pose an
imminent threat that justified deadly force.
The court further notes that determining whether
force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (Graham
v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396.)
It is not clear what crime, if any, the officers
suspected Enrique Ruiz committed. The
“incident recall” printout from the officers’ mobile computer includes the
following note from before they arrived: “'FD [fire deartment] stated susp had
slit his throat, unk if susp is armed w/knife.”
(Ouchi Decl., Ex. D, p. 1.) The
record thus includes evidence that the primary purpose of dispatching the
officers to the scene was to protect Enrique Ruiz from himself. The video shows Ruiz was not fleeing or
resisting arrest, per se. He slowly walked
toward the officers while holding a knife pointed down and said “Shoot
me.” He successfully goaded the officers
into doing so. A reasonable trier of
fact could conclude the officers used excessive force under the totality of the
circumstances.
Tom Bane Civil Rights Act
Triable
issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of plaintiff’s third
cause of action for violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. “ ‘The elements of a Bane Act claim are
essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim [for excessive force]
with the added requirement that the government official had a “specific intent
to violate” a constitutional right.’ ” (Chinaryan
v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2024) 113 F.4th 888, 907 (Chinaryan).) “An officer acts with the requisite specific
intent if ‘the right at issue [is] clearly delineated and plainly applicable
under the circumstances of the case,’ and the officer ‘commit[s] the act in
question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his
enjoyment of the interests protected by that right.’ ” (Ibid.)
Chinaryan
continues: “The officer need not ‘recognize the unlawfulness of his act’ if he ‘acted
in “reckless disregard” of the constitutional right.’ ” (113 F.4th at p. 907.) “In most cases, … the existence of specific
intent for a Bane Act claim is a question that is ‘properly reserved for the
trier of fact.’ ” (Ibid.) The court held triable issues precluded
summary judgment. (Id. at p.
908.) The court reasoned, in part, that
“[t]he officers’ refusal to exercise discretion to use less intrusive measures
when warranted would support a finding that they acted with reckless disregard
for plaintiffs’ rights.” (Ibid.)
As
discussed above, at the beginning of the officers’ encounter with Enrique Ruiz,
he held a knife but stood about 30 feet away, hardly moving, for 50
seconds. The officers made no effort to
subdue him other than yelling commands and ultimately shooting him with deadly
firearms. On this record, defendants did
not meet their burden of showing no reasonable trier of fact could conclude
they acted with reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional right to be
free from excessive force.
Punitive Damages
Defendants are not entitled to summary adjudication of plaintiff’s claim
for punitive damages. A defendant may move for summary adjudication of a “claim
for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code” regarding punitive
damages. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) To recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must
prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
On summary adjudication, “ ‘the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
[clear and convincing] evidentiary burden.’ ” (American Airlines, Inc. v.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.)
“[A]lthough the ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard is a stringent one,
it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive
damages at summary judgment.” (Ibid.) “Summary judgment or summary adjudication
‘ “ ‘on the issue of punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury
could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice,
fraud or oppression.’ ” ’ ” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1150, 1159.)
Based on the evidence discussed
above, the court cannot conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find
clear and convincing evidence of malice.
“ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause
injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.
(c)(1).) For a notably long period of
nearly a minute, as the decedent stood almost entirely still, the officers took
no efforts to subdue him. They simply
yelled at him and pointed firearms at him.
A reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that
defendants engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard
of Enrique Ruiz’s safety.
Disposition
Defendants’
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is denied.