Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV30058, Date: 2024-10-11 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV30058    Hearing Date: October 11, 2024    Dept: 52

Defendant Sandra Mariana Vidal’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Defendant Sandra Mariana Vidal moves for summary adjudication of plaintiffs Sima Ashrafi and Mohammad Ali Nateghi’s fifth cause of action for assault and seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Evidentiary Objections

            Defendant makes nine objections to plaintiffs’ evidence.  Objection Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 9 are sustained.  Objection Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are overruled.

Legal Standard

Summary adjudication should be granted where there are no triable issues of fact and the moving party shows that a cause of action must be decided in her favor as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.)  Courts use a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)   

5th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            Triable issues of material fact preclude summary adjudication of this cause of action.  Its elements are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (Hughes).)  “Whether the defendant’s conduct was outrageous and whether the plaintiff’s emotional distress was severe are generally questions of fact.”  (Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 51.) 

A. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

The record includes sufficient evidence to permit a trier of fact to conclude defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.  “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” ’ ”  (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051.)  This cause of action requires “outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.”  (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.) 

It is undisputed that plaintiffs have an easement over part of defendant’s property.  (UMF Nos. 1-3.)  Plaintiffs present evidence that defendant “entered into the front yard (‘Easement Area’) of [their] home” and “destroy[ed] everything in [their] front yard including knocking down [their] privacy wall, ripping out the flowers, lighting, and irrigation system.”  (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 4; see also Nateghi Decl., ¶ 3.)  Ashrafi testifies Vidal “shut my husband and I out from the Easement Area by blocking access with a line of large pots” and “made it clear that my front yard was now hers.”  (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 6.)  She further testifies, “Vidal entered into the Easement Area through my front gate not only once but multiple times over the course of a few weeks.”  (Id., ¶ 7.)  “Each time Vidal would come into my front yard, she proceeded to yell at me and scared me with the aggressive way she was acting.”  (Ibid.) 

A reasonable trier of fact could find Vidal’s conduct was extreme or outrageous.  Defendant argues interference with plaintiffs’ property rights is insufficient for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Defendant’s reliance on Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222 is misplaced.  There, the court stated, “[M]ere monetary or transitory emotional distress is insufficient to constitute severe emotional distress.”  (Id. at p. 231.)  Plaintiffs do not claim mere monetary harm.  The property involved is an interest in real property.  Though they have an express easement rather than a fee interest in the subject property, they considered it to be their own front yard.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude defendant acted outrageously by suddenly taking over that space while also yelling at Ashrafi multiple times over a span of weeks.  And, as discussed below, plaintiffs present evidence of more than transitory emotional distress.          

B. Reckless Disregard

Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact over whether defendant intentionally caused or acted with reckless disregard of causing emotional distress.  “As a general rule, California law recognizes that ‘every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.’ ”  (Gomez v. Acquistapace (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 740, 746.)  Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements that Vidal acted with reckless disregard of the emotional distress they suffered (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 5; Nateghi Decl., ¶ 4) are not admissible.  The evidence in the record, however, permits a factfinder to reach that conclusion.  Ashrafi testifies that Vidal yelled at her several multiple times as she took over the easement area that had been plaintiffs’ front yard.  One can reasonably infer that Vidal’s actions would naturally cause emotional distress and that Vidal acted with reckless disregard of that likely consequence.

C. Severe Emotional Distress

            Finally, whether plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress is a triable issue of material fact.  “Generally, a plaintiff may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless the distress suffered has been severe.  [Citation.]  A plaintiff, however, may recover for emotional distress alone without any resulting physical disability.”  (Hailey v. California Physicians’ Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 452, 476.)  This cause of action requires “serious” emotional distress, meaning “where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377–1378.)  Adequate distress includes “complete disruption of life and diagnosis of depression” and “anxiety, tightness in chest, heart palpitations, panic attacks, depression, insomnia, and diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder.”  (Id. at p. 1377.)

            Ashrafi testifies Vidal made her “frightened and afraid” such that she was “fearful to be in [her] own home.”  (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 5.)  She testifies she felt “in fear of [her] physical safety.”  (Id., ¶ 7.)  She “had to go to therapy regularly” with a therapist.  (Id., ¶ 8.)  Ashrafi also states, “[A]fter a particularly stressful altercation with Vidal, I fell down and hit my head and had to be rushed to the hospital.”  (Ibid.) 

Ashrafi testifies her therapist “has since diagnosed [her] with anxiety and depression.”  (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 8.)  Ashrafi’s therapist testifies, “I diagnosed Mrs. Ashrafi with a ‘adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood’ as a result of the stress from ‘ongoing dispute with the neighbor’ Sandra Mariana Vidal.”  (Vartanian Decl., ¶ 5.)  At her deposition, Ashrafi testified she was still seeing see her therapist.  (Ex. C, Ashrafi Depo., 96:15-17.)  She also testified she had never seen a mental health professional before these events.  (Id., 98:5-13.) 

Nateghi similarly testifies he was “fearful that Vidal was going to physically hurt” him.  (Nateghi Decl., ¶ 4.)  He was “very scared” and in “fear of [his] safety.”  (Ibid.)  Nateghi states he “had to go to therapy regularly.”  (Id., ¶ 5.)  Nateghi’s therapist testifies she “diagnosed Mr. Nateghi with anxiety and depression as a result of the stress from [the] ongoing dispute with his neighbor Sandra Mariana Vidal.”  (Vartanian Decl., ¶ 7.)

At his deposition, Nateghi testified, “[A]t night[], I had nightmares.  I would wake up right in the middle of the night.”  (Ex. C, Nateghi Depo., 52:22-23.)  “I had developed a problem.  I mean, every morning when I woke up, I would start crying.”  (Id., 55:11-12.)  Nateghi further testified that his therapist recommended medication and his family doctor prescribed him two medications: venlafaxine and trazodone. (Id., 54:18-56:4.)

On this record, the court cannot conclude there is no triable issue of fact on whether plaintiffs’ emotional distress was severe enough.  Their symptoms may not have been severe as, for example, the plaintiffs in Wong v. Jing or in Kelley v. The Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 200-201.  But both plaintiffs received mental health treatment.  A licensed practitioner diagnosed both plaintiffs with mental health conditions.  There is evidence their emotional distress persisted for over a year after their interactions with Vidal in 2021.  A reasonable trier of fact could conclude plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as required for this cause of action.

7th Cause of Action: Assault

            Defendant meets her burden of showing she is entitled to summary adjudication of this cause of action.  “The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.”  (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668–669.)

            Defendant presents evidence showing plaintiffs cannot establish the first two elements.  “ ‘[M]ere words, however threatening, will not amount to an assault.’ ”  (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1604 (Plotnik).)  The record shows only that plaintiffs were afraid because of defendant’s mere words and because of actions that, though aggressive, did not threaten imminent physical contact. 

            At her deposition, Ashrafi testified: “Q.  Can you describe what she did to make you feel like she was attacking you?  A. By bringing four, five workers, gardeners with saws and tools and making all those changes to a garden that was my soul, my love.  I cannot -- I don’t know how [to] describe it.”  (Ex. C, Ashrafi Depo., 60:4-9.)  “Q. So it sounds like to me, and correct me if I’m wrong, but it sounds like you’re saying that her attacks were her making changes and the gardeners making changes with tools to your garden; is that correct?  [¶¶] A. This – this was an emotional attack with all that noise and all that -- [interruption by interpreter].”  (Id., 60:10-21.)  “Q. Did you ever see her raise her arm up in a way that made you feel like she was about to hit you or something of that nature?  A. We never really understood what she’s saying.  As soon as she would raise her voice, we would just get inside.”  (Id., 64:5-10.) 

Defendant’s counsel asked Ashrafi multiple times to explain how Vidal “attacked” her.  Ashrafi testified only that Vidal destroyed her garden (and related property) and yelled at her.  An “emotional attack” is not an assault. 

Ashrafi’s declaration matches her deposition testimony.  She testifies Vidal destroyed things in plaintiffs’ front yard (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 4), yelled at Ashrafi (id., ¶¶ 5, 7), and asserted control over the front yard (id., ¶¶ 6-7).  She does not state Vidal committed any act that can be interpreted as intending to cause or threatening imminent physical contact with Ashrafi.

Ashrafi also presents a video she “took showing Vidal and her workers coming into the Easement Area and destroying” plaintiffs’ front yard.  (Ashrafi Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 2.)  Throughout the video, Vidal is on the phone, holding it up near her face.  At first, Vidal stands several yards away, with her back to Ashrafi.  Vidal walks farther away from Ashrafi, then turns so that Ashrafi is at about a 45-degree angle from her.  Vidal never faces Ashrafi or speaks to her. 

The video also shows two workers were present.  (Ashrafi Decl., Ex. 2.)  One uses a pickaxe in dirt several yards away from Ashrafi.  The other worker stands farther away, holding a shovel with one hand, with the shovel’s blade touching the ground.  The workers then move a large trampoline near Ashrafi.  They did not approach or threaten Ashrafi.  They happened to have tools but did nothing with them other than using the tools for work or leaning on them.  Nothing in this video would permit a trier of fact to find Vidal intended to cause imminent physical contact with Ashrafi. 

Plaintiff Nateghi also cannot prove that he reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner.  Nateghi was not present or near Vidal during any of plaintiffs’ encounters with her.  At deposition, Nateghi testified, “Q. Has Ms. Vidal ever acted aggressively towards you, specifically?  A. Personally, to me?  Q. Yes.  A. No.  I always stayed away from her.  No.”  (Ex. C, Nateghi Depo., 48:5-9.)  In his declaration, Nateghi never states he directly interacted with Vidal or that she did anything to him that could constitute assault.  (Nateghi Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.)

The evidence in the record is significantly less threatening than in Plotnik, where the Court of Appeal held there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment against defendants for assault.  The court reasoned that the defendants “aggressively approached [plaintiff] and threatened to both beat and kill him and the family dog.  But [plaintiff] did not testify that either [defendant] displayed a weapon, took a swing at him, or otherwise attempted to touch him.”  (Plotnik, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604.)  The defendants’ “actions and words were aggressive and threatening, and while their behavior might support relief on some other ground, neither committed an act that could or was ‘inten[ded] ... to inflict immediate injury on’ ” plaintiff.”  (Ibid.)

Here, the record similarly shows plaintiffs cannot prove that defendant committed any act intended to inflict or threatening to inflict immediate harmful contact or any act that would cause plaintiffs to reasonably fear immediate harmful contact.

Disposition

Defendant Sandra Mariana Vidal’s motion for summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is denied.  Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for assault is granted.