Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV34344, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34344    Hearing Date: March 21, 2023    Dept: 52

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

            Defendants Gallery Department LLC (Gallery), Josue Thomas, and Sylvia Lewis demur to all nine causes of action alleged by plaintiff Jennifer Ann Pelletier. 

Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of three exhibits.  Defendants assert they are emails involving plaintiff.  They are improper extrinsic evidence at this stage.  “On a demurrer a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. …  The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.”  (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113–114.)

            Defendants rely on a footnote in Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285, fn. 3, which has been strongly criticized.  “In Ingram, the appellate court took judicial notice of a letter and media release (which were substantially the same)” issued by a district attorney’s office regarding the results of an investigation into potential Brown Act violations by public officials.  The documents had not been attached to the operative complaint.  However, unlike in this case, the complaint had ‘excerpted quotes from the letter and summarized parts of it in some detail.’  Even more significantly, the appellant in Ingram had not opposed the court taking judicial notice of the documents.  The appellate court appears to have accepted the appellant’s concession that such material was properly the subject of judicial notice without undertaking an independent analysis as to the propriety of taking judicial notice.”  (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 836, fn. 14.)

Here, plaintiff objected to taking judicial notice of these exhibits.  Moreover, these exhibits are not documents publicly disclosed by government officials.  They are not “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”  (Evid. Code, § 452(h).)

Defendants also rely on a footnote in Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 798, 800, fn. 1.  That case is distinguishable because it concerned the interpretation of a contract—not the truth of any facts—and because that contract was required by law to be filed with the Public Utilities Commission, which would make it a public record capable of accurate determination by resort to the Public Utilities Commission under Evidence Code section 452(h).

Defendants argue that plaintiff omitted a crucial part of the text message attached to plaintiff’s August 18, 2022, email.  The alleged omitted portion is unfavorable to plaintiff.  Defendants contend that by omitting the critical portion of the text, plaintiff is distorting the context and gist of the message.  The court agrees that if in fact the text message attached as Exhibit A to defendants’ request for judicial notice is genuine, plaintiff has not been frank.  But at this stage in proceedings, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true, even if it later turns out that plaintiff has not provided the court with a candid and complete description of this text.

Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are denied.

Summary of Factual Allegations

In 2019, Gallery hired plaintiff as a personal assistant.  (Comp., ¶ 9.a.)  In September 2021, Gallery “knowingly hired a convicted pedophile,” “Ross Jay Curtis” as “a Warehouse Assistant.”  (¶ 10.a.)  “Curtis was allowed to work closely with Pelletier and other women.  Immediately, Pelletier felt uncomfortable by Curtis, who would try to find ways to inappropriately get Pelletier’s attention throughout the day.”  (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges two interactions with Curtis in September 2021.  First, after plaintiff brought her male partner to a work party, Curtis later told her, “Your partner wasn’t what I was expecting.  I was expecting a tall, chiseled jaw, model guy.”  (Comp., ¶ 10.b.)  Second, Curtis later told her, “ ‘I was kicked out of the marines for consensual relationships.  I was the girl’s superior officer and they ganged up on me and got me kicked out because they didn’t like being bossed around by me. … I used to be a big dog and cheated a lot, but I am a changed person.’ ”  (Id., ¶ 10.c.)

Plaintiff complained to a superior that Curtis made “inappropriate” statements that made her “uncomfortable.”  (Comp., ¶ 11.a.)  The same day, defendant Josue Thomas approached plaintiff to discuss the situation.  (¶ 11.b.)  Defendants took no further action.

Plaintiff further alleges that in November 2021, she “was promoted to artistic personal assistant.  Although Pelletier did not have to interact with Curtis on a daily basis, Pelletier was still left alone with Curtis in a warehouse or storage unit or while setting up an art studio for Thomas, which made Pelletier continue to feel uncomfortable.  Shortly thereafter, Curtis began texting Pelletier about issues unrelated to work.”  (Comp., ¶ 11.c.)

Next, plaintiff alleges two interactions with Curtis in December 2021 and January 2022.  First, he sent her a text message stating, “ ‘If you are sick, I pray you recover quickly.  You matter to us and we need you.’ ”  (Comp., ¶ 12.a.)  Second, at the workplace, he said to her, “ ‘How are you doing?  Did you have a fever?  I know how to put down the fever.  I can break your fever if you have one.  You can call me, and I can tell you how.  You strip the person down naked and put ice packs in their armpits, thighs, stomach, and all the crevices and put them in an ice bath.”  (¶ 12.b.)

In June 2022, plaintiff “was promoted to Development Coordinator and began to work downtown again with Curtis.”  (Comp., ¶ 12.c.)  He “tried to get [her] attention at every opportunity he could.  Throughout the workday, Curtis would inappropriately stare at [her].”  (Ibid.)  On July 1, Curtis sent her a text message “checking in on her because she was not her ‘happy go lucky self.’ ”  (¶ 12.d.)  On July 7, he approached plaintiff and stated, “ ‘Hey, I just want to check in on you.’  During their interaction, guns were brought up and Curtis said, ‘I can tell you guns don’t kill people, murderers do.  I would know because I was in prison with murders [sic] for ten years.’ ”  (¶ 12.e.)  As Curtis left, he “began explaining that his father was in jail for the rest of his life and he (Curtis) experienced sexual abuse by his father as a young child.  Curtis continued, ‘It was really hard.  I really loved him.’ ”  (Ibid.)

On July 9, plaintiff learned that Curtis was “convicted for sex crimes with underage girls.”  (Comp., ¶ 13.b.)  She told two superiors about his “criminal background,” and both responded they already knew about it.  (¶¶ 13.b-c.)  Plaintiff contacted another superior, Oscar Ayala, “and explained everything to him.”  (¶ 13.d.)  On July 11, a vice president of the company, Sylvia Lewis, contacted plaintiff, who “explained her concerns and the incidents with Curtis that made her uncomfortable.”  (¶ 13.e.)  Lewis stated “she would investigate Pelletier’s concerns” and soon “hired a third-party human resources consultant, Pierre Towns” to investigate.  (¶¶ 13.e-f.)  On July 12, plaintiff spoke to Towns and “described the various incidents she had with Curtis and the number of comments he made that made her feel uncomfortable.”  (¶ 14.b.)  Towns stated Curtis “ ‘is creating a hostile work environment, but I don’t think it’s sexual harassment.’ ”  (Ibid.) 

Gallery fired Curtis on July 15.  (Comp., ¶ 14.c.)  On July 16 or 17, Lewis told plaintiff Curtis was fired.  (¶ 14.d.)  Plaintiff told Lewis, “ ‘All the girls are distressed’ ” about the situation, and Lewis replied “ ‘We are going to hire extra security to ensure everyone is safe.’ ”  (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges that on August 18, she “unexpectedly received a threatening text message from Curtis, which read: ‘Hey Jenn, I’m sure you are aware that I was terminated on July 15th right as I walked into work.  My gut tells me that it [m]ay have had something to do with the conversation you and I had about abortion and my being locked up before.  It sucks that I lost my job for that reason.  …  I sincerely hope I am wrong about why I was fired.’ ”  (Comp., ¶ 15.a., ellipsis in original.)  Plaintiff emailed Lewis and Thomas about the text message, writing she was scared to go to work and did not feel comfortable being at the office.  (¶¶ 15.b-c.)  

The complaint further alleges, “After a conversation with Thomas on or around August 19, 2022, Pelletier began working from home.”  (¶ 15.d.)  Shortly afterward, she asked Gallery “if she could have ADT home security installed at her home at Defendant’s expense.  Pelletier cited to Curtis’ ability to easily search her home address and ability to follow her home from the workplace, raising her concerns for her safety outside of the workplace that were caused by Defendants’ failure to properly handle the situation in the workplace.”  (¶ 16.a.) 

On September 7, 2022, Gallery told plaintiff “she could work from home temporarily but would need to come back to work on September 26, 2022.”  (Comp., ¶ 16.e.)  On October 7, 2022, Gallery “contacted Pelletier and requested she return to the office on October 10, 2022.”  (¶ 16.f.)  Pelletier refused.  (Ibid.)  On October 11, Gallery “told Pelletier that she needed to return to the office, in-person, the following day.”  (¶ 16.g.)  Again, she refused and “requested information regarding the increased security that she was promised upon her return to work.”  (Ibid.)  On October 19, Gallery made a final request for plaintiff “to return in person to the office.”  (¶ 16.h.)  On October 24, Gallery fired her.  (¶ 17.)

1.         First Cause of Action for Sex Discrimination

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  She must allege: (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) “some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.”  (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

Plaintiff alleges no facts for the final element.  Plaintiff alleges why Gallery terminated her, and those facts do not permit an inference that her sex or gender “was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.”  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 375.)  Gallery fired Curtis in mid-July 2022.  (Comp., ¶ 14.c.) 

Plaintiff attempts to connect (1) her fear of a coworker based on his comments that were, at most, somewhat related to sex or gender, to (2) her demands that defendant provide increased security—at the office and her home—to (3) her refusal to return to the office because defendant would not meet those demands.  Defendant terminated her because she refused to come to the office.  (Comp., ¶¶ 16-17.)  This reason is so far removed from plaintiff’s sex or gender that one cannot reasonably infer any discriminatory intent.  (See Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107 (Brown) [upholding judgment after trial court sustained demurrer because the complaint “alleged no facts from which discriminatory intent be inferred”].)

Plaintiff’s opposition argues Gallery “continued to dismiss her complaints and disregard her safety due to the sexual harassment” and therefore that suggests a discriminatory motive.  (Opp., pp. 3-4.)  To the contrary, the complaint’s factual allegations show Gallery took her complaints seriously and fired Curtis, at least partially due to her complaints.  The only complaints Gallery dismissed were those about security over a month after Curtis was fired.  FEHA does not prohibit discriminating against someone for demanding extra security at home.

2.         Second Cause of Action for Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “[T]o establish liability in a FEHA hostile work environment sexual harassment case, a plaintiff employee must show she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive work environment.”  (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283.)  “[A]n employee generally cannot recover for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather, the employee must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature.”  (Ibid.)  “[W]hen the harassing conduct is not severe in the extreme, more than a few isolated incidents must have occurred to prove a claim based on working conditions.”  (Id. at p. 284.)

Plaintiff alleges Curtis—who was not a supervisor—sexually harassed her.  “The employer is liable for harassment by a nonsupervisory employee only if the employer (a) knew or should have known of the harassing conduct and (b) failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.  [Citation.]  This is a negligence standard.”  (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1041.)  “If an employee other than an agent or supervisor commits the harassment, and the employer takes immediate and appropriate corrective action when it becomes or reasonably should become aware of the conduct—for example, when the victim or someone else informs the employer—there simply is no ‘unlawful employment practice’ that the FEHA governs.”  (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1136, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 470–471.)

Even assuming plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment, she does not allege facts showing Gallery knew or should have known of the harassing conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.  She alleges she complained to her superiors around September 2021 that Curtis’s conduct made her uncomfortable.  (Comp., ¶¶ 11.a-b.)  But at that point, she alleges Curtis made only two comments that made her uncomfortable: a comment about her boyfriend’s appearance in September 2021 (¶ 10.b.) and a comment about Curtis’s sexual history, that he “was kicked out of the marines for consensual relationships” and “used to be a big dog and cheated a lot” (¶ 10.c.).  These minor and sporadic comments were barely related to sex and did not rise to the level of severity or pervasiveness necessary for a hostile work environment.  Her superiors were not required to take any corrective action regarding that conduct. 

Plaintiff then alleges further incidents where Curtis made her uncomfortable between December 2021 and July 7, 2022.  First, he sent her a text message about praying for her to recover and return to work, though she was not sick.  (Comp., ¶ 12.a.)  In January 2022, Curtis told her he knew how to break a fever by “strip[ping] the person down naked and put[ting] ice packs in their armpits, thighs, stomach, and all the crevices.”  (¶ 12.b.)  Plaintiff further alleges that in June 2022, “Curtis tried to get Pelletier’s attention at every opportunity he could” and “[t]hroughout the workday, Curtis would inappropriately stare at Pelletier.”  (¶ 12.c.)  On July 1, Curtis sent her a text “checking in on her because she was not her ‘happy go lucky self.’ ”  (¶ 12.d.)  Finally, on July 7, Curtis told plaintiff he spent time in prison and that his father sexually abused him when he was a child.  (¶ 12.e.)  The court cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, this conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. 

Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts showing that Gallery knew or should have known about this conduct between December 2021 and July 2022.  She alleges she next reported her concerns about Curtis to her superiors on July 9.  (Comp., ¶¶ 13.a-d.)  Two days later, Sylvia Lewis contacted plaintiff to discuss her concerns about Curtis.  (¶ 13.e.)  By July 15, Gallery hired a third-party consultant to investigate plaintiff’s concerns (¶ 13.f) then fired Curtis (¶ 14.c).  This constitutes immediate and appropriate corrective action.  Gallery took the ultimate corrective action—firing the accused harasser—and did so within a week of learning about the alleged harassment.

Plaintiff’s allegations that Gallery did not provide sufficient security measures after firing Curtis do not support this cause of action.  Gallery fired him.  These complaints were not about workplace harassment such that Gallery had a duty to take immediate and appropriate corrective action under FEHA.

With respect to defendants Josue Thomas and Sylvia Lewis, this cause of action fails for an independent reason.  As opposed to the employer, an individual employee of the employer is only “personally liable for any harassment… that is perpetrated by the employee.”  (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(3).)  Plaintiff does not allege Thomas or Lewis perpetrated any harassment.  She instead merely alleges Thomas and Lewis did not adequately respond to her complaints about harassment by Curtis.

3.         Third Cause of Action for Retaliation in violation of FEHA

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “The elements of a cause of action for retaliation in violation of section 12940, subdivision (h) are: ‘(1) the employee’s engagement in a protected activity ...; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer; (4) a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damages; and (6) causation.’ ”  (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)

Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing any causal link between a protected activity and her termination.  “The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.”  (Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal. (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69, internal quotes omitted.)  

Neither plaintiff’s complaint nor opposition identify her purported protected activity.  Protected activity means “oppos[ing] any practices forbidden under” FEHA.  (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).)  Plaintiff made various complaints, but the only ones that could ostensibly constitute opposing practices forbidden under FEHA are her complaints about Curtis in September 2021 (Comp., ¶ 11) and July 2022 (¶¶ 13-14). 

Plaintiff’s other complaints were not related to FEHA.  On August 18, 2022, she complained that she felt unsafe because Curtis sent her a text message.  (Comp., ¶ 15.)  But defendant had already fired him.  Complaining that a fired former coworker sent a purportedly threatening text message is not opposing a practice forbidden under FEHA.  Plaintiff’s remaining complaints from August through October 2022 were that she felt unsafe, both when working at the office or from her home, and she wanted Gallery to provide extra security measures.  (Comp., ¶ 16.)  Providing insufficient security measures does not violate FEHA.  Complaining about that is not opposing a practice forbidden under FEHA. 

Thus, plaintiff’s only potential protected activity under FEHA were her complaints about Curtis in September 2021 and July 2022.  Defendant terminated plaintiff in October 2022.  And as discussed above, plaintiff alleges a good and legitimate reason why defendant terminated her: she refused to return to the office.  Considering the totality of plaintiff’s factual allegations in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff does not allege facts showing a causal link between any protected activity and plaintiff’s termination months later.  (See Chen v. County of Orange (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 926, 931 [Generally “mere sequence is not enough” to show a causal link]; Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105 [upholding judgment after trial court sustained demurrer on the ground complaint alleged no facts that “implicate retaliation”].) 

4.         Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent FEHA Violations

This cause of action fails because it cannot stand on its own without the underlying claims for FEHA violations.  (Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1309.)

5.         Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code § 232.5

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Labor Code section 232.5, subdivision (c) provides that an employer may not “[d]ischarge, formally discipline, or otherwise discriminate against an employee who discloses information about the employer’s working conditions.”  (Lab. Code, § 232.5, italics added.) 

“ ‘Working conditions are those conditions determined by the employer as a condition of employment.’ ”  (United States ex rel. Lupo v. Quality Assurance Services, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2017) 242 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1031.)

Plaintiff does not allege she disclosed information about the employer’s working conditions.  In her opposition, she argues, “The standard for what is considered a ‘working condition’ is intentionally broad and requiring Pelletier to come to an office is clearly a working condition as set and admitted by her employer, exemplified by their pressure to force her back to work.”  (Opp., p. 7.)  But she did not “disclose” that she was required to come to the office.  Her employer told her that.  If there was any disclosure of working conditions, it was by the employer to plaintiff, not the other way around. 

Furthermore, assuming plaintiff “disclose[d] information about the employer’s working conditions,” plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing Gallery discharged her for that reason.  For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff alleges no facts permitting an inference of a discriminatory or retaliatory motive for terminating her.

6.         Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for reporting information that “the employee has reasonable cause to believe … discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.”  Like FEHA retaliation, this cause of action for whistleblower retaliation requires alleging a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Assuming plaintiff engaged in any protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5, she does not allege any causal link between it and her termination for the same reasons discussed above.

7.         Seventh Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  She does not meet the basic elements of negligence.  “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff’s injury.”  (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)  The only injury plaintiff alleges is the same as for her other causes of action.  She alleges Gallery breached its duty to “appoint, hire, retain, and supervise persons who would not engage in retaliatory, harassing, or discriminatory conduct” (Comp., ¶ 67) and its duty “to ensure that” Gallery’s employees “would refrain from harassing and retaliating against plaintiff.”  (Ibid.)  As discussed above, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing that she suffered any such injury. 

Moreover, plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts that would impose a duty on Gallery to protect her from Curtis harassing her.  “[L]iability for negligence can be imposed only when the employer knows, or should know, that the employee, because of past behavior or other factors, is unfit for the specific tasks to be performed.”  (Federico v. Superior Court (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1215.)  “An employer is not charged with guaranteeing the safety of anyone his employee might incidentally meet while on the job against injuries inflicted independent of the performance of work-related functions.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff alleges Gallery knew Curtis “had a criminal record” (Comp., ¶ 14.a) and was “convicted for sex crimes with underage girls” (¶ 13.b).  Gallery employed Curtis as a “warehouse assistant.”  (¶ 10.a.)  Knowing of Curtis’s past crimes would not give Gallery any reason to know that he was unfit to be a warehouse assistant.

Plaintiff also does not allege that the particular risk Gallery knew or should have known of materialized.  “Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’ ”  (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.)  Any particular risk or hazard Gallery knew of was a risk of Curtis committing sex crimes of some kind with underage girls.  Plaintiff does not allege that risk materialized.  She instead alleges Curtis made comments that created a hostile work environment.   

8.         Eighth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Its elements are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) 

Plaintiff alleges no extreme or outrageous conduct by defendants.  “An essential element of such a claim is a pleading of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.  [Citations.]  Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.  A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.  If personnel management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for discrimination.”  (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.)

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that her coworker Curtis did various things to make her uncomfortable.  Even assuming Curtis’ conduct could be sufficiently egregious for this cause of action, that was his conduct—not defendants’.  Plaintiff alleges no basis under which defendants would be vicariously liable for Curtis’ actions.  The factual allegations show nothing more than that plaintiff believed defendants’ personnel management decisions were erroneous.

9.         Ninth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public                     Policy

As with the other causes of action alleging Gallery had a discriminatory or retaliatory motive for firing her, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for causation.

Disposition

Defendants Gallery Department LLC, Josue Thomas, and Sylvia Lewis’s demurrer is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Date:   March 21, 2023

_______________________________________

Armen Tamzarian

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT