Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV34822, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV34822    Hearing Date: January 5, 2024    Dept: 52

Defendant Crescenta Valley Water District’s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint

Defendant Crescenta Valley Water District (Crescenta) demurs to all four causes of action alleged against it in the third amended complaint by plaintiff Perry Lazar, as an individual and as trustee of the Plone Trust.

First Three Causes of Action for Negligence

            Crescenta’s demurrer to the first three causes of action is moot.  Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed these causes of action before the deadline to oppose the demurrer.

Fourth Cause of Action for Trespass

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action against Crescenta.  Crescenta demurs on the basis that it owns or has an easement over the portion of the property where it allegedly trespassed.  “Trespass is an invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of land.”  (McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)  “Thus, in order to state a cause of action for trespass a plaintiff must allege an unauthorized and tangible entry on the land of another, which interfered with the plaintiff’s exclusive possessory rights.”  (Id. at p. 1174.)

The demurrer relies on a corporation grant deed from 1966 conveying interests in the subject property to Crescenta.  (3AC, Ex. 4.)  The deed shows the grantor conveyed two interests: “Parcel 1,” a “portion of lot 2, Tract 4121 in the County of Los Angeles” as described by metes and bounds, and “Parcel 2,” “[a]n easement for ingress and egress and pipelines and miscellaneous purposes oner a portion of said Lot 2, Tract 4121” as described by metes and bounds.  (Id., p. 2.)  Crescenta argues that, because it is exempt from taxation, the 1980 tax deed purporting to convey property including Crescenta’s parcel to plaintiff’s predecessor is void.  (See L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 950, 956.) 

Based on the pleadings, the court cannot rule as a matter of law that Crescenta owns the portion of the subject property described in the 1966 tax deed and that plaintiff has no exclusive possessory right to that property.  The parties are litigating that issue in a related action, Plone Trust v. Kalousd Pandazos, et al., case No. 21STCV19845.  Crescenta recently moved for summary judgment against plaintiff in that case for the same reasons it argues in this demurrer.      

Furthermore, even accepting that Crescenta owns a fee interest and easement in part of the subject property as described by the 1966 grant deed, the court must overrule the demurrer.  The third amended complaint must be “liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means … draw[ing] inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)   

            The third amended complaint alleges the following facts in support of its cause of action for trespass against Crescenta: “[T]here is no easement to the portion upon which Crescenta Valley Water District has built structures and roads exceeding any prior permission that may have arisen from a false belief in the existence of an easement.  …  Crescenta Valley Water District has built structures, excavated land, and prevented Lazar from the property and now claims ownership of said property.  Lazar has demanded that Crescenta Valley Water District remove all structures from Parcel 36 where Crescenta Valley Water District has no authority or right.  The maintenance of structures including a Water tank and portions of a road and extended pipes are a continuing trespass as well as the claims of ownership of Plaintiff’s land.”  (3AC, ¶ 58.)

When liberally construed, the third amended complaint’s allegations of trespass are not limited to the metes and bounds conveyed to Crescenta by the 1966 deed.  Plaintiff alleges Crescenta “built structures and roads exceeding any prior permission that may have arisen from a false belief in the existence of an easement” and built structures “where Crescenta Valley Water District has no authority or right.”  (3AC, ¶ 58.)  When making inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the court cannot conclude the third amended complaint only alleges Crescenta has entered onto the property granted to it via the 1966 deed. 

The court must also overrule the demurrer for another reason.  “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.”  (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38; accord Adelman v. Associated Intern. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 359 [courts “examine the factual allegations of the complaint, ‘to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal theory’ ”].)   

Assuming Crescenta has the property rights conveyed to it by the 1966 deed, plaintiff alleges a cause of action against Crescenta arising from allegations other than maintaining structures on the property.  “[M]any activities will give rise to liability both as trespass and a nuisance, if they result in the violation of a person’s right of exclusive possession of land, and also constitute an unreasonable and substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.”  (Rancho Viejo LLC v. Tres Amigos Viejos LLC (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 550, 561.)  A property owner can be liable for causing a landslide or other harm to neighboring property.  (See Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 351 [potential liability for “landowner’s conduct in using or altering the property in a manner which affects the discharge of surface waters onto adjacent property”]; Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 276 [landslide]; see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 940 [“A public entity ‘takes or damages’ private property when it causes physical damage to that property without physically invading it”].) 

Crescenta’s demurrer does not address the following allegation in plaintiff’s third amended complaint: “The actions of Crescenta Valley Water District is a substantial factor in causing damage and harm by preventing Lazar from the use enjoyment and resale of the property, continued deterioration of the raw land including excavation and landslide.”  (3AC, ¶ 58.)  This allegation suffices to constitute a cause of action against Crescenta for damaging plaintiff’s property outside the bounds of Crescenta’s rights pursuant to the 1966 grant deed.

Disposition   

Defendant Crescenta Valley Water District’s demurrer is overruled.  Defendant Crescenta Valley Water District shall answer plaintiff’s third amended complaint within 15 days.