Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 22STCV41006, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV41006    Hearing Date: May 1, 2025    Dept: 52

Order to Show Cause Re: Entry of Judgment

            Plaintiffs Thee Aguila Inc. and Rocio Rosales request court judgment by default against defendant Jessica Robin Barsotti.  The request is defective for four reasons.

            First, plaintiffs do not present sufficient evidence of their damages.  “Even when the allegations of a complaint do support the judgment a plaintiff seeks, he is not automatically entitled to entry of that judgment by the court, simply because the defendant defaulted.  Instead, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove up his damages, with actual evidence.”  (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 272 (Kim).)  Plaintiffs provide evidence supporting $5,100,000 in damages on the basis that Barsotti’s conduct caused them to lose cases where they could have recovered that amount for the diminution of property value.  (Aguila Decl., ¶¶ 12-15.)  Plaintiffs do not present sufficient evidence of the remaining $4,900,000 in damages they seek.  Plaintiffs seek damages for emotional distress.  Their evidence does not justify the amount they seek. 

Plaintiffs also have a more serious problem regarding emotional distress damages.  “A default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded in the complaint is void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction.”  (Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018.)  The complaint prays for $58,500 in damages for Rocio Rosales.  (FAC, p. 15.)  To the extent plaintiffs seek millions in emotional distress damages, the court only has jurisdiction to award such damages to Thee Aguila Inc., which prayed for $10,000,000 in damages.  (Ibid.)  Thee Aguila Inc. is a corporation.  Corporations have no emotions and cannot recover damages for emotional distress.  (Dynamic Image Technologies, Inc. v. U.S. (1st Cir. 2000) 221 F.3d 34, 37, fn. 2; F.D.I.C. v. Hulsey (10th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 1472, 1489.)   

Second, plaintiffs do not justify the $10,000,000 in punitive damages they seek.  “[T]he defendant’s failure to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the matters well pleaded in the complaint.”  (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 281, internal quotes omitted.)  “The well-pleaded allegations of a complaint refer to all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”  (Ibid., internal quotes omitted.) 

Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to recover punitive damages.  A plaintiff cannot do so when the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)  Simply using the word “malice” (FAC, ¶¶ 52, 63, 75, 84) does not suffice.  The gravamen of the first amended complaint is that Barsotti committed legal malpractice by performing poor work and abandoning her client and that Barsotti refused to return plaintiffs’ retainer fee.  These facts do not constitute malice, oppression, or fraud under Civil Code section 3294(c).

Assuming plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to recover punitive damages, plaintiffs do not present sufficient evidence of Barsotti’s financial condition.  “[E]vidence of the defendant’s financial condition is a prerequisite to a punitive damages award.”  (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 119.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of introducing such evidence.  (Ibid.)  The plaintiff must show “ ‘evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.’ ”  (Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453.)  The amount of punitive damages should not be so great as to risk “ ‘crippling or destroying the defendant.’ ”  (Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 915.)  Plaintiffs present no evidence of Barsotti’s financial condition.

Third, plaintiffs’ request for court judgment (form CIV-100) and proposed judgment (form JUD-100) do not match.  The CIV-100 requests a judgment of $10,001,124, but the JUD-100 states a total of $25,576,624.  The latter amount also exceeds the demand of the complaint and would be void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

Fourth, the proposed judgment is only for plaintiff Thee Aguila, Inc.  It would not resolve the matter as to plaintiff Rocio Rosales.  The court again notes that the first amended complaint specifically prays for $58,500 in damages for Rosales.  (FAC, p. 15.)  Rosales therefore cannot recover a judgment for damages exceeding that amount.

Disposition

Plaintiffs’ request for default judgment is denied without prejudice.