Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV03484, Date: 2024-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV03484 Hearing Date: March 21, 2024 Dept: 52
Defendant TransUnion
Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’
Complaint
Defendant TransUnion Rental
Screening Solutions, Inc. (TransUnion) demurs to all three causes of action
alleged in the complaint by plaintiffs Tadeh Davtian, Lauren Gordon, and
Gabriella Mitry. (Several other
plaintiffs named in the caption were later dismissed.) TransUnion also moves to strike numerous
portions of the complaint.
Requests for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs
request judicial notice of two complaints in other actions. Though the documents are court records
subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code § 452(d), they are not relevant
or necessary to the court’s analysis.
(See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6; Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6.)
Both requests for
judicial notice are denied.
Demurrer
1. Violation of Investigative
Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA)
Plaintiffs
do not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action against TransUnion. The ICRAA (Civ. Code, § 1786, et seq.) imposes
separate obligations on two categories of potential defendants. First, as to an “investigative consumer
reporting agency” (Civ. Code, § 1786.2(d)), the law requires numerous things. (§§ 1786.10, 1786.11, 1786.12, 1786.18,
1786.20, 1786.22, 1786.24, 1786.26, 1786.28, 1786.29, 1786.30.) Second, the statute has other requirements
for “the person requesting the report” (§ 1786.12(e)), also referred to as “the
person seeking the investigative consumer report” (§ 1786.16(a)(2)), “[t]he
person procuring or causing the report to be made” (id., subds. (2)(A)
& (B)), or “the user of the investigative consumer report” (§ 1786.40(a)).
In
this case, the person requesting the report is defendant Equity Residential
Management, LLC, who sought reports “in connection with the hiring of a
dwelling unit.” (Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3).) TransUnion, meanwhile, is the “investigative
consumer reporting agency” that is “in the practice of collecting, assembling,
evaluating, compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating
information concerning consumers for the purposes of furnishing investigative
consumer reports to third parties.” (§
1786.2(d).)
The
complaint alleges only the first category of violations (Comp., ¶¶ 43-46),
which apply to the requestor, not the reporting agency. It alleges “Defendants failed to comply with”
provisions applicable to the “person requesting an ‘investigative consumer
report.’ ” (¶ 43.) It further alleges,
“Defendants did not provide a box to check, did not provide a consent form or
disclosure, did not provide copies of any of the numerous reports obtained
about the Plaintiffs, and did not supply the names or addresses of the
investigative consumer reporting agencies making the reports.” (Ibid.) The latter alleged violation means the
landlord, Equity Residential Management, LLC, did not supply the name of the
moving defendant, TransUnion. The
complaint does not allege any violation applicable to the investigative
consumer reporting agency itself.
Plaintiffs’
opposition argues TransUnion’s demurrer relies on “transcriptional
incongruencies” that could “be cured by amendment.” (Opp., p. 3.)
Plaintiffs further argue, “This minor wording issue can be simply
addressed with amendment.” (Ibid.) That these problems could be cured by
amendment is not a basis for overruling the demurrer. The potential for amendment is a reason to
sustain the demurrer with leave to amend.
2. Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiffs
do not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action against TransUnion. “[A] plaintiff alleging an invasion of
privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must
establish each of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2)
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by
defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40 (Hill).)
Plaintiffs
do not allege sufficient facts for the second element. They had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the circumstances because they consented to release their information. The complaint alleges, “Equity Residential
Management, LLC required Plaintiffs to complete an ‘Application’ and to consent
to a release of information” (¶ 23), and “Plaintiffs completed the required
‘Application’ that included a consent to release of information” (¶ 25).
Plaintiffs
also do not allege sufficient facts for the third element. “Actionable invasions of privacy must be
sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to
constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy
right. Thus, the extent and gravity of
the invasion is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged invasion
of privacy.” (Hill, supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 37.)
Any invasion of
privacy was not serious. Plaintiffs
allege only that defendants did not comply with certain requirements related to
informing plaintiffs of their rights when a landlord requests an investigative
report. “ICRAA states that ‘[a]n
investigative consumer reporting agency’ may provide an ‘investigative consumer
report’ to a person other than the subject of the report under limited
circumstances.” (Connor v. First
Student, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1032.)
Those circumstances include when the person requesting the report “[i]ntends
to use the information in connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit.” (Civ. Code, § 1786.12(d)(4).) That is what plaintiffs allege happened. They “applied for housing” (¶ 21), and the
landlord “requested and obtained investigative consumer reports about the
Plaintiff during the processing of the Plaintiffs’ applications for an
apartment” (¶ 22).
Assuming
plaintiffs corrected the “transcriptional incongruencies” in their complaint,
the substance of the allegations is not that TransUnion disclosed private
information to anyone other than Equity Residential, who had a valid purpose to
request it. The alleged violations are
that, though the private information was disclosed to the correct person, that
person did not: “provide a means by which the Plaintiffs could indicate that he
or she wished to receive a copy of any report prepared in connection with the
application,” “provide a consent form or disclosure with a box to check” (¶
31), “agree to provide a copy of any of the reports prepared about the Plaintiffs”
(¶ 32), “notify the Plaintiffs in writing that an investigative consumer report
would be made” (¶ 33), “notify Plaintiffs of the name or address of the
investigative consumer reporting agency that would prepare the reports” (¶ 34),
“provide a summary of the provisions of” ICRAA (¶ 35), or “provide copies of
any reports to the Plaintiffs.” (¶ 36.)
None of these
alleged violations concern plaintiffs’ privacy rights. They concern the process of a request for
information and plaintiffs’ right to know what information about them was being
transmitted—not to limit the information transmitted. These allegations do not constitute an
egregious breach of social norms. At
most, they constitute a breach of certain statutory requirements.
Plaintiffs’ opposition argues, “[S]tatutes may
form the basis for recognizing a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
such as the ICRAA with in rentals.”
(Opp., p. 4.) Plaintiffs then
quote Civil Code section 1786.52, which provides, “Nothing in this chapter
shall in any way affect the right of any consumer to maintain an action against
an investigative consumer reporting agency, a user of an investigative consumer
report, or an informant for invasion of privacy or defamation.” The ICRAA does not “in any affect”
plaintiffs’ tort claims for invasion of privacy, meaning the tort should be
analyzed independent of the statute.
Moreover, though
plaintiffs allege they consented to release this information about them, ICRAA
does not require their consent. Civil
Code section 1786.12(f) provides, “An investigative consumer reporting agency
shall not furnish an investigative consumer report to a person described in
subdivision (d) if that report contains medical information about a consumer,
unless the consumer consents to the furnishing of the report.” Thus, no consent is required unless the
report contains medical information. Plaintiffs
do not allege that. They allege the
information in the reports concerned “each of the Plaintiffs’ character,
reputation, or mode of living.” (Comp.,
¶ 24.) The statute does not even require
plaintiffs’ consent and therefore does not form a basis for a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this information.
3. Declaratory Relief
Plaintiffs
do not allege sufficient facts for declaratory relief for the same reasons as
the first cause of action. “[T]he
essence of an action for declaratory relief is an allegation showing that
either an actual (present), or probable future, controversy exists relating to
the legal rights and duties of the parties, coupled with a request that those
rights and duties be adjudged by the court.”
(Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of Social Services (1985) 173
Cal.App.3d 52, 58.)
Plaintiffs
allege “continued violations of the ICRAA” with respect to “the legality and
effect of the Defendants’ Application” for housing. (Comp., ¶ 55.) They further allege, “Plaintiffs demand that
an injunction follow the title to the land so that any future owners, managers
or other persons in authority are aware of the judgment in this case and are
bound by it.” (¶ 56.) They further seek “to prevent the Defendants’
continued violations of the ICRAA during the re-certification of Plaintiffs’
tenancy.” (¶ 58.) As with the first cause of action for
violation of ICRAA, these allegations all concern the landlord’s violations of
statutory requirements imposed on the person requesting an investigative
report. Not on the agency conducting or
supplying the investigative report.
Plaintiffs therefore do not allege an actual controversy with
TransUnion.
Motion to Strike
The court will sustain the demurrer to all causes of
action against TransUnion. TransUnion’s
motion to strike portions of the complaint is therefore moot.
Disposition
Defendant TransUnion Rental
Screening Solutions, Inc.’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint is sustained
with 30 days’ leave to amend.
Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the complaint is moot.