Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV05874, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV05874 Hearing Date: August 18, 2023 Dept: 52
Defendants
Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike
Demurrer
Defendants Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC demur
to both causes of action alleged by plaintiffs Antonio Vincenzo Silletti,
Maziyar Hassanpour, and Steven James Emery Gonzalez.
Employer/Employee Relationship
Plaintiffs
allege two causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public
policy, and (2) wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section
1102.5. Both require that defendants
employed plaintiffs. (Miklosy v.
Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 901 [a “cause of
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy lies only against
an employer”]; Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12
Cal.5th 703, 709 [“section 1102.5 prohibits an employer from retaliating
against an employee”].)
Defendants argue plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient
facts to show they were defendants’ employees.
On demurrer, courts liberally construe the complaint and draw “inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the
defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire
Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) Courts also “give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation by reading it as a whole.”
(Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d
120, 125.) When doing so, the complaint
alleges sufficient facts to show defendants Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC employed
each plaintiff.
The complaint
alleges Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC each “do[] business as Audi Valencia.” (¶¶ 4, 5.)
It further alleges, “Plaintiff and the aggrieved employees worked as
sales capacities [sic] for Defendants.”
(¶ 9.) The complaint alleges
plaintiff Silletti “was terminated” for pretextual reasons. (¶ 28.)
It also alleges plaintiff Hassanpour was “the general manager” (¶ 29)
and “was terminated under the false pretext that he was dishonest” (¶ 31). Finally, it alleges plaintiff Gonzalez “was
constructively terminated” and that various circumstances made it so that “he
could not do his job properly.” (¶ 32.)
Though the
complaint has minor inconsistencies, its gravamen is clear: all three plaintiffs
worked for all defendants (Akdok, Inc., Akdok, LLC, and Does 1-100) at an auto
dealer, Audi Valencia.
2nd Cause of Action for Whistleblower
Retaliation
Each
plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action. Labor Code section
1102.5, subdivision (b) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee for reporting information that “the employee has reasonable cause to
believe … discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of
or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.”
Defendants correctly note that, in
the factual allegations specific to each plaintiff, the complaint only alleges Silletti
complained that defendants did something illegal. The complaint alleges, “Silletti complained
to Defendants about illegally running credit since Defendants did not obtain
permission to do so, and about the payment packing.” (¶ 28.)
As for Hassanpour, the complaint alleges, “Hassanpour complained about
the dealership’s advertising budget and methods” (¶ 29) and questioned
defendants about “why El Famosisimo,” who does marketing on social media, “was
paid around $100,000 per month” (¶ 30).
And for Gonzalez, the complaint alleges he “was constructively
terminated because with all the consumers coming to the dealership and getting
taken advantage of as described above, as a result of El Famosisimo’s
advertising . . . the regular Audi customers felt uncomfortable, and he could
not do his job properly.” (¶ 32.)
The complaint, however, also makes allegations
common to all plaintiffs. It alleges,
“Civil Code section 1632 . . . provides that when a contract is negotiated in a
language other than English, the consumer must be given a copy of the contract
that the language was negotiated in.” (¶
36.) “[T]he consumers who came to
Defendants as a result of El Famosisimo’s advertising were Spanish speakers,
but Defendants did not provide documents in Spanish.” (¶ 37.)
“When Plaintiffs complained about Defendants’ violations of the above public
policies,” including violation of Civil Code section 1632, “they were
wrongfully terminated.” (¶ 41.) The complaint further alleges, “Plaintiffs
complained about the above statutory violations, which included Civil Code
1632,” among others, “and as a result they were wrongfully terminated.” (¶ 47.)
Despite the dearth of specific
factual allegations about each plaintiff’s complaints in paragraphs 28 to 33,
the complaint’s other allegations in paragraphs 36 to 47 cure any defect. When liberally construed and read as a whole,
the complaint alleges each of the three plaintiffs complained to defendants
about each of the violations of law discussed in the complaint, and defendants
terminated them in retaliation for those complaints.
Motion to Strike
Defendants
Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC move to strike the complaint’s allegations related
to punitive damages. Courts may strike such allegations where the
facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud
necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central
California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.) Conclusory allegations are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) The
complaint must make “factual assertions supporting a conclusion [defendants]
acted with oppression, fraud or malice.”
(Ibid.)
Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts
for malice or oppression. “[W]illfully
and consciously retaliat[ing] against” employees for exercising their rights
can constitute malicious or oppressive conduct sufficient for punitive
damages. (Colucci v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 455.)
The complaint alleges defendants willfully retaliated against plaintiffs
for exercising their rights to report violations of law. (¶¶ 36-41.)
Defendants argue
the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to make business entities liable
for punitive damages. Civil Code section
3294, subdivision (b) provides that for a corporate employer to be liable for
punitive damages, “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard [of an employee’s
unfitness], authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice
must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.” The complaint alleges “the
employee who wrongfully terminated Plaintiffs . . . was Shariq Khan (an officer
of Defendants as the acting vice president).”
(¶ 44.) Plaintiffs thus allege
the oppressive or malicious conduct was personally done by an officer of Akdok,
Inc. and Akdok, LLC.
Disposition
Defendants Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC’s
demurrer to the complaint by plaintiffs Antonio Vincenzo Silletti, Maziyar
Hassanpour, and Steven James Emery Gonzalez is overruled.
Defendants’ motion to strike portions of the
complaint is denied.
Defendants Akdok, Inc. and Akdok, LLC are ordered
to answer within 20 days.