Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV10944, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10944    Hearing Date: September 8, 2023    Dept: 52

Defendant Light of Foci, Inc.’s Defendants’ Motions: (1) To Set Aside and Vacate Judgment, and (2) For New Trial

Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment

            Defendant Light of Foci, Inc. moves to vacate the judgment in favor of plaintiff Kong Chow Benevolent Association of Southern California, Inc.  A party may move to vacate a judgment and enter a new judgment because of an “[i]ncorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts.”  (CCP § 663, subd. 1.)  “In ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot ‘ “in any way change any finding of fact.” ’ ”  (Glen Hill Farm, LLC v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.) 

            Defendant contends the judgment relies on an incorrect or erroneous legal basis because the court did not properly apply the lease and its addendum’s terms defining “delivery” of the premises.  (Lease, ¶¶ 2.2, 3.3; Addendum, ¶ 53.)  Defendant further argues, “[T]he Premises was not equipped with ‘building systems in good working order and condition prior to the Commencement Date.’ ”  (Motion, p. 8.)  Any error in the judgment does not result from an “erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts.”  (CCP § 663, subd. 1.)  In substance, defendant challenges a finding of fact.  Based on the evidence at trial, the court made the factual finding that the premises were in adequate “good working order and condition” such that plaintiff had delivered the premises and defendant was obligated to pay rent.  Those factual findings are consistent with the judgment against defendant.    

            Defendant Light of Foci, Inc.’s motion to set aside and vacate judgment is denied.

Motion for New Trial

            Defendant Light of Foci, Inc. moves for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657.  Defendant contends the court should grant a new trial on six grounds.

First, defendant argues there was an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings … or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.” (CCP § 657, subd. 1) because witness Lydia Lam, defendant’s former CFO, gave false testimony at trial.  (Motion, pp. 9-10.)  Assuming that could constitute an irregularity in the proceedings, defendant does not show Lam’s testimony was false. 

Defendant’s sole admissible evidence on this subject is the declaration of its CEO, Wengying Leng.  Leng states Lam gave “false testimony that the Temple was actually open during April and June of 2023.”  (Leng Decl., ¶ 18.)  “The Temple was not operating during those months.”  (Leng Decl., ¶ 19.)  This dispute amounts to a pure credibility contest between Lam and Leng.  At trial, the court found Lam’s testimony on this subject more credible than Leng’s testimony. 

Defendant also submits “text communications Defendant sent to the followers of the Temple indicating that [the] Temple will be closed in June, and that updates will be provided.”  (Liu Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. A.)  These messages are not admissible.  Defendant did not properly authenticate them.  Defendant’s counsel, Long Z. Liu, does not establish he has personal knowledge about these text messages.  The messages are also hearsay because they are out of court statements offered for the truth of the matters asserted: that the temple was closed in June 2023.  Even if these messages were admissible, they concern only June 2023, not April or May.  Finally, defendant offers no explanation for why it could not have presented this evidence at trial.  If someone sent these messages on behalf of defendant from May 31 to July 4, defendant could have presented them at the trial.  Defendant’s lack of diligence is not an irregularity in the proceedings. 

In addition to the evidence discussed above, defendant now speculates that Lam was colluding with plaintiff.  Defendant does not present evidence showing that is more likely than not. 

Second, defendant argues for a new trial based on “[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”  (CCP § 657, subd. 3.)  The purported surprise is that Lydia Lam lied about the Temple being open.  The court therefore rejects this argument for the same reasons discussed with respect to irregularity in the proceedings.

Third, defendant argues for “newly discovered evidence” under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision 4 because Lam gave misleading or false testimony.  Again, the court rejects this argument because defendant has not shown Lam’s testimony was false.

Fourth, defendant argues the damages were excessive (CCP § 657, subd. 5) because plaintiff never delivered the premises or otherwise did not perform conditions precedent to defendant’s obligation to pay rent.  “A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground … of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.”  (CCP § 657.)  After weighing all the evidence, the court is not convinced it clearly should have reached a different judgment.  The evidence supports the court’s finding that the premises in adequate working condition to constitute “delivery” and require defendant to pay rent. 

Fifth, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment.  (CCP § 657, subd. 6.)  This basis for a motion for new trial is subject to the same standard as excessive damages.  (CCP § 657.)  For the same reasons as above, the court again finds there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant breached its obligation to pay rent.

Finally, defendant argues the court committed an “[e]rror in law” (CCP § 657, subd. 7) because it “granted a small percentage discount on the damages awarded” (Motion, p. 17) based on paragraph 9.6(a) of the lease.  Defendant contends the court should have reached a different result because (for the same reasons discussed above) plaintiff never “delivered” the premises.  The court properly applied the lease’s terms.  Its decision relied on its factual findings of the condition of the premises.  The court concluded those conditions did not constitute failure to “deliver” the premises, but instead warranted only a discount in damages.

Defendant Light of Foci, Inc.’s motion for new trial is denied.