Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV11038, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV11038    Hearing Date: January 28, 2025    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant County of Los Angeles moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiff Otto Perdomo’s first, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action.

1st Cause of Action: Age Discrimination

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Defendant argues otherwise only on the basis that plaintiff did not allege an adverse employment action.   An adverse employment action must “materially affect the terms and conditions of employment.”  (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1036.)  “[I]n determining whether an employee has been subjected to treatment that materially affects the terms and conditions of employment, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the circumstances and to apply the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine.”  (Ibid.)  This test “looks to ‘the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her career,’ and the test ‘must be interpreted liberally ... with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the workplace... .’ ”  (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1389, overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703.) 

            Defendant argues plaintiff only alleges he was forced on a paid leave of absence.  The complaint alleges plaintiff was told that defendant “could no longer accommodate his work restrictions and he was forced to give up his job and be placed on a one (1) year leave of absence and told termination would ensue after the one-year period of time.”  (¶ 21.)  Plaintiff does not allege the leave of absence was paid.  He instead alleges defendant effectively terminated him such that he “has lost wages” (¶ 25) and suffered “loss of past and future earnings” (¶ 30). 

            Even if plaintiff’s leave of absence were fully paid, that would not mean it did not constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law.  Even without a pay cut or other concrete harm, relieving an employee of “prestigious” duties may constitute an adverse employment action.  (Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1279 [demotion from columnist to reporter].)  Here, plaintiff alleges defendant completely prohibited him from working.  A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that prohibiting plaintiff from working limits his opportunity for advancement in his career.   

            Defendant’s reliance on Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 735 is misplaced.  There, the court reasoned, “On appeal, Doe argues the fact he twice took medical leave when he didn’t receive his requested accommodations constitutes an adverse employment action.  This argument fails for the simple reason that the leave was Doe’s action, not CDCR’s.  Doe requested and obtained permission to take two medical leaves.  Nothing in the record suggests CDCR forced him to do so… .”  (Ibid.) 

Here, that is exactly what plaintiff alleges.  “Plaintiff Perdomo was told that Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES could no longer accommodate his work restrictions and he was forced to give up his job and be placed on a one (1) year leave of absence and told termination would ensue after the one-year period of time.”  (¶ 21.)  He does not allege he requested the leave of absence.

7th, 8th, and 9th Causes of Action

            Defendant’s motion is moot as to these causes of action.  On December 2, 2024, at 10:36 a.m., plaintiff requested dismissal of the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action without prejudice.  Defendant filed this motion later that day at 4:42 p.m.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.