Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV13254, Date: 2023-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13254    Hearing Date: October 23, 2023    Dept: 52

Defendants Slipknot, LLC, Slipknot, Inc., Knot Productions, LLC, Corey Taylor, and Michael Shawn Crahan’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

Demurrer

Defendants Slipknot, LLC, Slipknot, Inc., Knot Productions, LLC, Corey Taylor, and Michael Shawn Crahan demur to all six causes of action alleged by plaintiff Steamroller, LLC in its first amended complaint (FAC). 

Summary of Allegations

            Plaintiff Steamroller, LLC is the successor in interest of the late Joey Jordison.  (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 4.)  “Joey Jordison was the original drummer and co-founder of the famous heavy metal band Slipknot.”  (¶ 18.)  Defendants Taylor and Crahan are members of Slipknot.  (¶ 19.)  The other defendants are business entities related to the band.  (¶¶ 8-10, 19, 19 [sic; the FAC has two sets of ¶¶ 19-21].)  “Jordison traveled the world performing hundreds, if not thousands, of shows for Slipknot over the course of three decades.  Jordison played innumerable drum sets and wore countless outfits and masks at his shows, all of which contributed to Jordison’s iconic image adored by fans across the globe.”  (¶ 3.) 

            In 2013, Taylor and Crahan kicked Jordison out of the band.  (FAC, ¶ 2.)  In 2015, the parties “entered into a Release Agreement to buyout Jordison’s interest in the Slipknot Partnership.”  (¶ 19.2, Ex. B.)  Defendants agreed to “return to Jordison ‘any property, including musical gear or equipment, belonging to’ Jordison, ‘that is now in the possession of’ Defendants.”  (¶ 19.2.)  The first amended complaint alleges, “Exhibit D to the Release Agreement is a non-exclusive list of items belonging to Jordison in Defendants’ possession.  The list is preceded by the following introductory language: ‘To the extent within the exclusive possession or control of the Slipknot Partnership and to the extent exclusively owned by Joey, the Slipknot Partnership shall release the following items to Joey . . . .’  What follows are two broad categories, ‘GEAR’ and ‘WARDROBE,’ brief descriptions of the respective category, and non-exclusive lists of items within each category.”  (Ibid.)

            Jordison died in July 2021.  (FAC, ¶ 22.)  Plaintiff alleges defendants “have continued to profit off Jordison’s death and his grieving fanbase to this day, by displaying Jordison’s belongings at a traveling Slipknot museum called Knotfest.  The museum has made numerous tour stops over the course of several years and Defendants have profited handsomely from Jordison’s fans’ willingness to pay admission fees to view Jordison’s iconic belongings in person.”  (¶ 24.)

            Plaintiff’s first amended complaint asserts six causes of action arising from defendants’ alleged breach of the release agreement, failure to return Jordison’s belongings, and use of those belongings for profit.

Statute of Limitations

            Defendants argue all causes of action are untimely.  A demurrer should be sustained where “the complaint shows on its face that the statute [of limitations] bars the action.”  (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)  “[T]he defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.”  (Id. at p. 1316.) 

            All six causes of action are timely due to the rule of delayed discovery.  To rely on the discovery rule, the plaintiff “must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.”  (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808 (Fox).)  “When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a cause of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if [the record] can support only one reasonable conclusion.”  (Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 193.)

Plaintiff alleges specific facts showing how and when it discovered the alleged injury.  The first amended complaint alleges, “In October 2022, a fan of Jordison sent a direct message to Jordison’s Instagram account, including a photograph of the fan posing with certain of Jordison’s items at Knotfest Finland 2022.  This was the first time that Plaintiff, the successor-in-interest to Jordison’s estate, learned that Defendants remained in possession of any of Jordison’s belongings and that Defendants were displaying these items for a profit at Knotfest.”  (FAC, ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff also alleges facts showing it was unable to discover defendants’ alleged wrongdoing earlier.  The first amended complaint alleges defendants “misrepresented what items belonging to Jordison were in their possession.  After execution of the Release Agreement, Defendants proceeded to return some of Jordison’s belongings in an effort to conceal the fact that they were withholding numerous other items belonging to Jordison and required to be returned under the Release Agreement.  Because the categories listed in Exhibit D to the Agreement were broad and non-exclusive, when Defendants returned some of Jordison’s belongings, Defendants intentionally deceived Jordison into believing that Defendants had returned all of Jordison’s belongings in their possession in compliance with the Release Agreement.”  (FAC, ¶ 20.2.)  These allegations suffice on demurrer.    

Defendants argue Jordison was on inquiry notice years before bringing this action.  None of defendants’ arguments on this subject defeat plaintiff’s allegations of delayed discovery.  The court cannot rule that, as a matter of law, the only reasonable conclusion is that plaintiff could have discovered the relevant facts earlier if he had been diligent.  That defendants returned some of Jordison’s belongings (FAC, ¶ 2) does not mean, as a matter of law, Jordison was obligated to inquire whether defendants retained any of his belongings.  As plaintiff alleges, his “belongings were shipped from tour stop to tour stop” over a period of decades “and the sheer number of items made it impossible to keep a comprehensive inventory on hand.”  (¶ 3.)  One could reasonably find that Jordison had no way of knowing that, of the myriad articles of clothing he wore while performing in the band, Slipknot held on to, for example, some jackets and pairs of shoes he wore over 10 years earlier. 

Defendants also argue Jordison was on inquiry notice because, as a partner in the Slipknot Partnership, he had imputed knowledge of everything defendants knew.  But he had no reason to “suspect[] that an injury ha[d] been wrongfully caused” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808) until after he left the partnership pursuant to the 2015 release agreement.  Before that, defendants were not obligated to return any property to Jordison and therefore could not have injured him by failing to do so.

1. Breach of Contract

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for breach of contract.  Defendants argue plaintiff did not allege they failed to return any property “exclusively owned” by Jordison and “within the exclusive possession or control of the Slipknot partnership.”  (Demurrer, p. 12.)  The release agreement provides, “To the extent within the exclusive possession or control of the Slipknot Partnership and to the extent exclusively owned by Joey, the Slipknot Partnership shall release the following items to Joey” including “[a]ll drum kits, drum hardware, drum accessories and drum cases,” “[a]ll wardrobe made for and/or given to Joey Jordison for the purpose of Joey wearing at any time for” purposes related to the band, and “[a]ll promotional items made for and/or given to” Jordison.  (FAC, Ex. B.)

Plaintiff alleges defendants failed to return property that was both “exclusively owned” by Jordison and was in defendants’ “exclusive possession.”  First, plaintiff alleges defendants remained in possession of “numerous other items belonging to Jordison” (FAC, ¶ 2), possessed “his belongings” (¶ 3), “Jordison’s belongings” (ibid.), and “Jordison’s items” (¶ 5).  These allegations suffice to constitute property that Jordison exclusively owned. 

Second, plaintiff alleges the Slipknot partnership had exclusive possession or control of these items.  The first amended complaint alleges, “The [release] agreement contained a nonexclusive list of broad categories of items that Defendants represented were in their possession.”  (FAC, ¶ 2.)  It further alleges, “[A]fter Defendants fired Jordison in 2013, Defendants held both exclusive possession and exclusive knowledge of the inventory of Jordison’s belongings in their possession.”  (¶ 3.)

Plaintiff also specifically alleges various items defendants failed to return.  The first amended complaint alleges, “Photos and videos posted on the internet clearly show Jordison’s masks, jackets, Adidas sneakers, and drums displayed at Knotfest Japan in April 2023.”  (FAC, ¶ 5.)  It further alleges, “Defendants are in possession of at least 22 items belonging to Jordison that are captured in photos and videos at recent Knotfests, as well as potentially other items, that are currently unknown to Plaintiff.”  (¶ 6.)

2. Fraud and Deceit

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  The first amended complaint asserts a claim for promissory fraud.  “ ‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit.  A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar).)  The misrepresentation plaintiff alleges was that defendants claimed they “would return to Jordison all of Jordison’s belongings that were in Defendants’ possession.”  (FAC, ¶ 40.)  Plaintiff further alleges defendants “falsely promis[ed] to return Jordison’s belongings to him.”  (Ibid.)   

Plaintiff does not specifically allege facts showing he suffered any damages due to his reliance on defendants’ alleged false promise.  “The fraud plaintiff must … allege his damages were caused by the actions he took in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations.”  (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1064.)  “If the defrauded plaintiff would have suffered the alleged damage even in the absence of the fraudulent inducement, causation cannot be alleged and a fraud cause of action cannot be sustained.”  (Ibid.)  When damages result solely from defendant’s failure to perform its contractual obligations, those constitute “breach of contract damages, not reliance damages” and therefore do not satisfy the element of damages for fraud.  (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1819; accord Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1240 [“ ‘a defrauded party is ordinarily limited to recovering his “out-of-pocket” loss’ ” rather than “benefit of the bargain” damages].)

Lazar explains the nature of damages for promissory fraud.  There, the plaintiff alleged he “relied on” defendant’s false promises “in leaving secure New York employment, severing his connections with the New York employment market, uprooting his family, purchasing a California home and moving here.”  (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 639.)  The California Supreme Court held, “[A]s to his fraud claim Lazar may properly seek damages for the costs of uprooting his family, expenses incurred in relocation, and the loss of security and income associated with his former employment.”  (Id. at pp. 648-649.)  But he “must rely on his contract claim for recovery of any loss of income allegedly caused by” defendant’s failure to pay the plaintiff as promised.  (Id. at p. 649.)  In other words, proper damages for promissory fraud are those suffered due to plaintiff’s own actions in reliance on the promise. 

Plaintiff alleges that, in reliance on defendants’ false promise, he entered the release agreement.  (FAC, ¶ 43.)  Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.”  (¶ 45.)  The only factual allegations of damages are the same as those for his breach of contract claim: that defendants did not return Jordison’s property.  These damages are equivalent to the income the plaintiff lost in Lazar because defendant broke his promise, not damages caused by what the plaintiff did in reliance on the promise.     

In the opposition, plaintiff argues, “Had Defendants merely breached the Agreement and not acted to actively conceal their breach from Jordison, Jordison would have been able to recover his belongings much earlier in time, and would have been able to profit from their display.”  (Opp., p. 17.)  Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not allege that.  Even if it had, that still would not be damages caused by Jordison’s reliance on the allegedly false promise.  Had defendants fulfilled their promise to promptly return Jordison’s belongings, he would have recovered his things and been able to profit from displaying them.  Those damages would be caused by the breach, not plaintiff’s reliance on the promise.    

3. Negligent Misrepresentation

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action for two reasons.  First, for the same reasons discussed with respect to fraud, plaintiff does not allege facts showing it suffered any damages as a result of acts taken in reliance on the purported misrepresentation. 

Second, unlike intentional promissory fraud, there is no cause of action for a “negligent false promise.”  (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.)  “To be actionable, a negligent misrepresentation must ordinarily be as to past or existing material facts.  ‘[P]redictions as to future events, or statements as to future action by some third party, are deemed opinions, and not actionable fraud.’ ”  (Id. at p. 158.)  The alleged negligent misrepresentation was a false promise to return Jordison’s belongings.  (FAC, ¶¶ 48-49, 51-52.)  That is not a misrepresentation of past or existing material fact as required for negligent misrepresentation.

4. Conversion

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for conversion.  Defendants argue plaintiff failed to “give notice of the ‘specific property’ at issue.”  (Demurrer, p. 14.)  Assuming doing so is required, the first amended complaint alleges conversion of numerous specific items: “Jordison’s drums, sticks, masks, clothing (including his signature Adidas tennis shoes)” including “ ‘the shoes Joey wore while recording the band’s second album.’ ” (FAC, ¶ 26.)  Plaintiff further alleges it “sent Defendants a detailed list of 26 items belonging to Jordison that Plaintiff was able to identify in photographs and videos of Knotfest on the internet.”  (¶ 28.) 

            Defendants further argue plaintiff cannot bring this cause of action because it “ ‘belongs in the realm of contract law.’ ”  (Demurrer, p. 15.)  With additional context, the authority defendants quote provides, “A distinction is drawn between commercial transactions involving the sale of goods protected by contract law and actions involving injury resulting from a defective product generally remedied by tort law.  [Citation.]  If the claim asserts loss of the benefit of the bargain, the claim ‘belongs in the realm of contract law which deals with “the vindication of economic expectations”.’ ”  (Lum v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S. Holdings Inc. (S.D. Cal., Mar. 20, 2023, No. 20CV01049 JAH-MSB) 2023 WL 2583307, at *12, quoting Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Monsanto Co. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 502, 529-530.) 

            Plaintiff does not allege defendants simply breached a contract to transfer possession of goods in an economic exchange.  It alleges defendants failed to return property that Jordison owned before contract—not property that he purchased from defendants pursuant to the contract.  Plaintiff’s tort claim for conversion thus arises from defendants’ alleged misconduct independent of defendants’ contractual obligations.  Moreover, the agreement to return belongings was not a typical “commercial transaction.”  Plaintiff alleges conversion of articles of clothing Jordison wore and of the drum sets he played.  The first amended complaint alleges, “No amount of money could possibly compensate Jordison’s family for the sentimental value of these items.”  (FAC, ¶ 27.) 

Defendants also argue the 2015 release agreement bars this cause of action.  (Demurrer, p. 15.)  The release, however, provides, “Except for the parties’ obligations hereunder, each party …. forever releases and discharges the other … from all rights, claims” or other liabilities.  (FAC, Ex. B, § III.2.)  Returning Jordison’s property was not just a general tort obligation, it was also an obligation under the release agreement itself.  The parties’ agreement therefore did not release this cause of action for conversion.  

5. Unjust Enrichment

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Defendants rely on the rule that “a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where … express binding agreements exist and define the parties’ rights.”  (California Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172.)  Plaintiff alleges defendants were unjustly enriched by “profits from display” of Jordison’s property.  (FAC, ¶ 64.)  The release agreement required defendants to return Jordison’s property but did not define the parties’ rights with respect to using property Slipknot did not return, with the potential exception of masks.  (FAC, Ex. B, § II.3.)  In contrast, the contract defined Slipknots’ rights to use Jordison’s “name, image, voice, performance, [and] likeness” without any further compensation.  (Ibid.) 

            Defendants’ reliance on Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342 is misplaced.  There, the plaintiffs sued Chevron for allegedly “selling non-temperature-adjusted motor fuel” (Id. at p. 1389.)  Plaintiffs alleged that because of “Chevron’s failure to compensate for temperature increases,” its “consumers receive[d] less motor fuel” than they paid for.  (Id. at p. 1348.)  The money Chevron received that purportedly caused unjust enrichment was the very money consumers paid under “the consumer sales agreement.”  (Id. at p. 1389.)  Here, plaintiff does not allege unjust enrichment arising from defendants accepting the benefits of the contract without performing their obligations.  Plaintiff instead alleges defendants used Jordison’s property for their own profit without consent.  Such unjust enrichment would exist independent of the contract. 

            Defendants also argue plaintiff released this claim.  The release, however, does not indicate the parties intended to release future claims.  The agreement provides the parties released all claims “of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever, occurred, done, omitted or suffered to be done prior to the date hereof.”  (FAC, Ex. B, § III.2.)  This cause of action for unjust enrichment arises from events after the parties entered the release agreement.  Plaintiff alleges defendants “profited from charging fans a ‘VIP’ rate in order to access the display of Jordison’s belongings.”  (FAC, ¶ 26.)  Plaintiff further alleges defendants displayed Jordison’s property for profit at “Knotfest” “over the course of several years” after Jordison’s death (¶ 24), including specifically at “Knotfest Finland 2022” (¶ 4) and “Knotfest Japan in April 2023” (¶ 5).

6. Accounting

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for accounting.  “An action for an accounting has two elements: (1) ‘that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting’ and (2) ‘that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.’ ”  (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 869 (Sass).) 

            An action for accounting is not limited to money.  “The right to an accounting can arise from the possession by the defendant of money or property which, because of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, the defendant is obliged to surrender.”  (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179–180.) 

Nor does accounting require a fiduciary relationship.  “An action for an accounting may be brought to compel the defendant to account to the plaintiff for money or property (1) where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, or (2) where, even though no fiduciary relationship exists, the accounts are so complicated that an ordinary legal action demanding a fixed sum is impracticable.”  (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 910.)

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for an accounting “of all property of Plaintiff in Defendants’ possession that has not yet been returned to Plaintiff.”  (FAC, ¶ 68.)  Plaintiff alleges that over “hundreds, if not thousands, of shows for Slipknot over the course of three decades,” “Jordison played innumerable drum sets and wore countless outfits and masks at his shows.”  (¶ 3.)  Plaintiff further alleges, “[T]he sheer number of items made it impossible to keep a comprehensive inventory on hand.”  (Ibid.)  These allegations constitute the tangible property equivalent of complicated accounts of money. 

Defendants argue accounting is a remedy, not a cause of action.  It is a hybrid of both.  As the California Supreme Court has recognized, “An action for an accounting has been characterized as ‘a means of discovery.’ ”  (Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 869.)  “The plaintiff’s lack of knowledge drives the need for discovery; and the fact that the gap can be filled via discovery implies the information is within the control of the defendant.  In other words, the defendant in an accounting action possesses information unknown to the plaintiff that is relevant for the computation of money owed.”  (Ibid.)            

Motion to Strike

            Defendants Slipknot, LLC, Slipknot, Inc., Knot Productions, LLC, Corey Taylor, and Michael Shawn Crahan move to strike several portions of plaintiff Steamroller, LLC’s first amended complaint. 

A. Royalties

Defendants move to strike the portion of the prayer for relief seeking “royalties owed to Plaintiff.”  (FAC, prayer, ¶ 3.)  Plaintiff does not allege facts showing a basis for recovering “royalties.”  “Royalties,” particularly in the music business, is a term of art.  The release agreement expressly refers to “Record Royalties.”  (FAC, Ex. B, § I.2.)  Plaintiff does not allege defendants owe any record royalties.

Plaintiff’s opposition argues, “A ‘royalty’ is simply a fee paid to a property owner for use of the property.  See Royalty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Royalty, Merriam-Webster.com (2023) (‘a share of the product or profit reserved by the grantor . . .’).”  (Opp., p. 3.)  The definition plaintiff cites from Black’s Law Dictionary begins “1. Intellectual property.  A payment — in addition to or in place of an up-front payment — made to an author or inventor for each copy of a work or article sold under a copyright or patent.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).)  The definition from Merriam-Webster similarly does not apply because plaintiff does not allege he reserved a share of profits nor that he granted the property to defendants. 

Plaintiff further argues the demand for “royalties” is “effectively synonymous with both Plaintiff’s prayers for money damages and restitution.”  (Opp., p. 3.)  Courts may strike “superfluous” allegations.  (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.)  Using the term “royalties” this way is superfluous. 

B. Punitive Damages

Defendants move to strike portions of the first amended complaint related to punitive damages.  Courts may strike such allegations where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)  Conclusory allegations do not suffice.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to constitute malice with respect to its cause of action for conversion.  “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) 

The first amended complaint alleges defendants “intentionally and substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s rights by refusing to turnover Jordison’s property, including but not limited to musical gear, equipment, and wardrobe, in Defendant’s possession.”  (FAC, ¶ 57.)  It further alleges defendants “converted Jordison’s musical instruments, gear, and wardrobe, so that they can include these items in a travelling Slipknot museum called Knotfest and line their pockets with profit off of Jordison’s devoted fanbase.”  (¶ 1.)  The first amended complaint thus alleges defendants intended to harm plaintiff.  The court cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, these allegations do not constitute malice. 

C. Irrelevant Allegations

Defendants move to strike three portions of the first amended complaint as irrelevant.  A party may move to strike portions of pleadings that are “irrelevant, false, or improper matter.”  (CCP § 436(a.)  Irrelevant matter includes allegations “not essential to the statement of a claim or defense” (CCP § 431.10(b)(1) and those “neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense” (id., subd. (b)(2)).  Courts also have “inherent authority to strike scandalous and abusive statements in pleadings.”  (Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1070.)

First, defendants move to strike paragraphs 20-21 (page 5, line 27 to page 6, line 7), which detail Joey Jordison’s medical condition and purported “callousness” and “mistreatment” by his bandmates.  Second, defendants move to strike paragraph 23, which alleges, among other things, that Taylor and Crahan did not “express[] condolences to Jordison’s family after his passing” and “used Jordison’s death as marketing for their new album.”  Third, defendants move to strike the text “off Jordison’s death and his grieving fanbase to this day” in paragraph 24. 

These three portions of the first amended complaint are irrelevant.  This action is about whether defendants failed to give Jordison’s property back to him.  The circumstances surrounding Jordison’s illness and death and whether defendants were “callous” to him are not pertinent to any cause of action.  These allegations are inflammatory and scandalous.  They serve no legitimate purpose in the first amended complaint.

Disposition

            Defendants Slipknot, LLC, Slipknot, Inc., Knot Productions, LLC, Corey Taylor, and Michael Shawn Crahan’s demurrers to plaintiff Steamroller, LLC’s second and third causes of action are sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.  Defendants’ demurrers to plaintiff’s first, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action are overruled.

Defendants Slipknot, LLC, Slipknot, Inc., Knot Productions, LLC, Corey Taylor, and Michael Shawn Crahan’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff Steamroller, LLC’s first amended complaint is denied as to allegations about punitive damages.  Defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to the prayer for “royalties” and the irrelevant allegations, with 20 days’ leave to amend.

The court hereby strikes the following portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint with 20 days’ leave to amend: (1) paragraphs 20 and 21 (page 5, line 27 to page 6, line 7); (2) paragraph 23 (page 7, line 19 to page 8, line 5); (3) the language “off Jordison’s death and his grieving fanbase to this day,” at page eight, lines 6 to 7; and (4) the language “royalties owed to plaintiff” in prayer, paragraph 3 at page 18, line 10.