Judge Armen Tamzarian, Case Number: 23STCV20222, Date: 2025-01-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV20222, Date: 2025-01-27 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23STCV20222 Hearing Date: January 27, 2025 Dept: 52

Plaintiff People of the State of California’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Plaintiff the People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, moves for summary adjudication of its first cause of action for ejectment against defendants Araceli Martinez, David Anthony Parada, and Daniel Samuel-David Solorio.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff makes seven objections to evidence submitted by Martinez. Objection Nos. 1-3 and 5 are sustained. Objection Nos. 4, 6, and 7 are overruled.

Legal Standard for Summary Adjudication

A plaintiff moving for summary adjudication must prove each element of each cause of action; once the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a triable issue of at least one material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

Ejectment

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of its first cause of action for ejectment. “The essential elements of an ejectment action are (1) the plaintiff’s valid interest in the property and (2) the defendant’s wrongful possession and withholding thereof.” (2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 842, 866; accord Baugh v. Consumers Associates, Limited (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 672, 675 [“the essential elements of a cause of action in ejectment” are “ownership disclosing a right to possession, the defendant’s possession and a withholding thereof from the plaintiff”].)

I. Defendant David Anthony Parada

Assuming plaintiff met its initial burden on summary adjudication against Parada, the record shows triable issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication. Defendant Araceli Martinez presents evidence that Parada is not wrongfully possessing or withholding the property because Parada does not possess the property at all. In her declaration, Martinez states, “My son, David Anthony Parada, has never lived with me at the property and was not with me when I first moved in, nor has he lived there at any point since.” (Martinez Decl., ¶ 5.) The record thus demonstrates a triable issue on whether Parada wrongfully possesses or is withholding the property.

II. Defendant Daniel Samuel-David Solorio

In this motion, plaintiff purports to move for summary adjudication of its ejectment claim as against all three named defendants, including Daniel Samuel-David Solorio, a minor. Plaintiff never filed proof of service of summons on Solorio. He never appeared in the action. The court therefore never acquired personal jurisdiction over him and cannot grant summary adjudication against him.

III. Defendant Araceli Martinez

Plaintiff is entitled to summary adjudication of its claim for ejection against Martinez. She concedes that plaintiff owns legal title to the property, that she entered the property without authorization, and that she remains in possession and is withholding the property from plaintiff. She opposes this motion on two grounds.

A. “Seized of the Property”

Martinez argues plaintiff has not met the element that it was “seized of the property within 5 years” of her entrance onto it. That is not an element of ejectment. Martinez relies on two sources of authority.

First, Martinez relies on Nichols v. Wolf (1915) 27 Cal.App. 1, 3 (Nichols). Her opposition cites this portion of the opinion: “It is not found that the property, while in the possession of plaintiff, was protected by a substantial inclosure, nor that it was usually cultivated or improved, nor that the plaintiff, while so occupying, has paid all the taxes which have been levied and assessed upon the land. The payment of some of those taxes would not alone meet the requirement. The court further neglected to find that the plaintiff was in possession of the property at the time of entry by the defendants. [¶] These findings are not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was seised or possessed of the strip of land in question at the time of entry by the defendants.” (Ibid.) The opposition omits the prior two sentences which establish the court was referring to the elements of adverse possession, which plaintiff relied on: “It nowhere appears in the record that the adverse possession was under claim of title or that it was founded upon a written instrument. Even assuming that the adverse possession so found was under a claim of title, the facts as found do not meet the requirements of section 325, Code of Civil Procedure, by which the finding must be tested.” (Ibid.)

The Nichols plaintiff’s ejectment action failed not because she did not possess the property, but because she did not have title to it. Here, plaintiff does not rely on adverse possession. It is undisputed that plaintiff has legal title to the property. Nichols thus is distinguishable from the present case.

Second, Martinez relies on portions of California Jurisprudence misstating the law on ejectment. (28 Cal. Jur. 3d, §§ 2, 8, 11, 12.) The treatise relies almost exclusively on ancient cases about the 1855 Van Ness Ordinance—an ordinance under which the City and County of San Francisco ceded title to certain land “to the parties in the actual possession thereof.” (Townsend v. Greeley (1866) 72 U.S. 326, 327; see Spotts v. Hanley (1890) 85 Cal. 155, 166 [“possessio pedis” (actual possession) “is necessary to confer title under the Van Ness ordinance”].) The treatise also cites Hart v. Cox (1915) 171 Cal. 364, 367, which better explains the rule: “Where neither claimant relies upon a paper title, prior actual possession is sufficient to support an action in ejectment.” Plaintiff relies on undisputed paper title. Actual possession is not required for ejectment.

B. Tenancy by Consent

Martinez also opposes this motion on the basis that, though she entered unlawfully, she became a tenant by plaintiff’s consent. “A tenancy may be created without a formal agreement, by consent and acceptance of rent.” (Getz v. City of West Hollywood (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 625, 629.) “Such conduct can create a landlord-tenant relationship despite the absence of a lease.” (Ibid.) In the cases on this subject, the tenant paid rent, which the landlord physically received and accepted. (Id. at p. 628 [“Appellant accepted Makram’s checks”]; Parkmerced Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 490, 494 [referring to “Parkmerced’s repeated acceptance of Abenheim’s checks over a long period of time”]; Lummer v. Unruh (1914) 25 Cal.App. 97, 102 [the party in possession entered without permission but paid “a yearly crop rental”].)

Rather than paying money, Martinez contends she paid rent by improving the property. “Rent may not necessarily be a single specific dollar amount. It consists even of services.” (640 Octavia, LLC v. Pieper (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1195.) Martinez presents evidence she performed or paid for maintenance at the property. (Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 10-13.) But she presents no evidence plaintiff accepted that purported rent. Generally, consent or acceptance requires communication of (1) the offer to the offeree and (2) acceptance to the offeror. (Hofer v. Young (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 52, 56; Russell v. Union Oil Co. (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 110, 114.)

Nothing in the record shows plaintiff accepted Martinez’s purported rent. The record does not show plaintiff knew Martinez sought to pay rent by maintaining the property. Nor does it show plaintiff communicated any form of acceptance to Martinez. To the contrary, Martinez testifies that plaintiff’s first communication with her was giving her notice to vacate. She states, “I am informed and believed that Cal Trans knew of my presence at the property since I moved in, but I never received any communications from anyone at Cal Trans for the first 3 & ½ years I lived in the property, which led me to believe they were ok with me living there in exchange for my services repairing, maintaining, and protecting the property.” (Martinez Decl., ¶ 14.) “Since I have lived in the property, Caltrans has never contacted me once until I received a 5-day notice to vacate on or around August 8, 2023.” (¶ 15.)

Martinez also does not explain how a property owner could refuse to accept a trespasser’s improvements or maintenance of the property—except by taking legal action to eject her. That is what plaintiff has done.

The undisputed material facts show plaintiff owns the property and Martinez wrongfully possesses and withholds it. Plaintiff is entitled to summary adjudication of its cause of action for ejectment against Martinez.

Disposition

Plaintiff the People of the State of California’s motion for summary adjudication of its first cause of action for ejectment against defendants David Anthony Parada and Daniel Samuel-David Solorio is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of its first cause of action for ejectment against defendant Araceli Martinez is granted.