Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV22536, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV22536 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 Dept: 52
Cross-Defendant
Peter Alexan Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Cross-defendant
Peter Alexan Enterprises, Inc., doing business as RA Consulting (RA), moves for
judgment on the pleadings on the cross-complaint by Jara Blash.
PAGA
RA
contends Blash did not adequately exhaust her administrative remedies for her
claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Before
filing a PAGA action, the plaintiff “must provide notice to the employer and the
responsible state agency ‘of the specific provisions of [the Labor Code]
alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the
alleged violation.’ ” (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545.)
“[T]he ‘facts and theories’ provided in support of ‘alleged’ violations”
are not required to “satisfy a particular threshold of weightiness, beyond the
requirements of nonfrivolousness generally applicable to any civil filing.” (Ibid.)
The notice
requirement distinguishes “between the alleged violation (i.e., ‘the
allegations an aggrieved employee is making’) and the facts and theories to
support the alleged violation (i.e., ‘any basis for those allegations’).” (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 824, 836 (Brown).)
“[A] string of legal conclusions that parrot[s] the allegedly violated
Labor Code provisions” is insufficient because it does “not state facts and
theories supporting the alleged violations.”
(Id. at p. 837.) But “few ‘facts
and theories’ are needed to satisfy PAGA’s notice requirement.” (Rojas-Cifuentes v. Superior Court of San
Joaquin County (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057.)
Blash’s pre-filing
notice (Cross-Comp., Ex. A) includes sufficient facts and theories. The notice states, “The plaintiff worked for
Defendant and was misclassified as a salaried exempt employee. Plaintiff alleges that she and other workers,
including purported ‘event managers’ who were working as supposed independent
contractors, were misclassified and should have been classified as employees.” (Id., p. 1.) The notice provides further allegations of
the facts and theories underlying each category of violation. (Id., pp. 1-4.)
Two Court of Appeal
decisions are instructive. Brown
held a PAGA notice was adequate as to failure to provide complete wage
statements where the notice alleged the employer failed “ ‘to include the name
and address of the legal entity that is the employer.’ ” (Brown, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p.
838.) Uribe v. Crown Building
Maintenance Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986 (Uribe) held a notice alleging
defendant failed to reimburse employee expenses “ ‘for purchasing slip
resistant shoes and maintaining [plaintiff’s] uniform” was inadequate as to
claims for reimbursement for use of personal cell phones. (Id. at p. 1005.)
An employer can
violate the law on wage statements in numerous ways, such as by omitting any of
the nine items specified in Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), or by
simply not providing wage statements at all.
Blash’s notice letter adequately specified the wage statements were not
“accurate”, did not “include[] the total hours worked,” did not “show the start
and end date for each pay period,” among other specified violations. (Cross-Comp., Ex. A, pp. 3-4.) As in Brown, these allegations
suffice.
Similarly, employees
can incur a broad variety of expenses subject to reimbursement. Blash’s notice letter adequately specified the
aggrieved employees’ expenses: “the cost of using their personal cell phones
for business related purposes.”
(Cross-Comp., Ex. A, p. 3.) The
letter further stated, “Defendant required that Plaintiff be available by cell
phone and answer/use their cell phones while working and this was necessary to
perform their job duties.” (Ibid.) Under Uribe, these allegations suffice
as to failure to reimburse the cost of using personal cell phones.
Blash’s other
claims are largely self-explanatory and can generally be violated in only one
way. For example, for meal periods, the
notice letter alleged, “Defendant failed to apprise Plaintiff and the Aggrieved
Employees of their rights associated with meal periods and failed to provide
timely meal periods. Defendant has had a
consistent policy of: (1) requiring Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees to
work during meal breaks that occurred after the first five hours of each shift;
(2) required Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees to work shifts over ten (10)
hours without providing a second meal period of thirty minutes in length
altogether; and (3) failed to pay such employees one (1) hour of pay at the
employees regular rate of compensation for each workday that the first meal
period was not provided within the first (5) hours of the shift or that a
second meal period was not provided.”
(Cross-Comp., Ex. A, p. 2.) Hours
worked are hours worked. Not providing
breaks or paying the penalty is an ultimate fact.
As for claims based
on minimum wage or overtime, the only necessary allegations are facts showing
RA underpaid Blash. The notice letter
alleged, “These statutes require an employer to compensate its employees at the
minimum wage rate for all hours worked and at a rate of no less than one and
one-half times the regular rate of pay for any work in excess of eight hours in
one workday, double time for any hours beyond 12 hours per day, and any work in
excess of 40 hours in any one workweek. Plaintiff
and other aggrieved employees were not paid at the proper corresponding rate
for all overtime hours worked, including overtime as a result of Defendant’s
failure to pay overtime at the legal rates.”
(Cross-Comp., Ex. A, p. 2.) The facts
and theories underlying this claim, therefore, are that Blash and other
aggrieved employees sometimes worked more than 8 hours or 12 hours in a day or
more than 40 hours in a week, but RA did not pay increased overtime rates. Moreover, the notice letter alleges Blash
“was misclassified as a salaried exempt employee.” (Id., p. 1.) In other words, she was paid a regular salary
not calculated based on the number of hours she worked, which necessarily means
she did not get increased overtime pay.
Similarly, Labor
Code section 203 imposes penalties on employers who willfully fail to pay wages
of an employee after separation of employment.
Blash’s notice letter states she “was not paid all wages due upon [her]
separation from Defendant’s employ.”
(Cross-Comp., Ex. A, p. 4.) That
constitutes the necessary ultimate fact.
Nothing else is required.
Unfair Competition
As to Blash’s cause
of action for unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), RA argues the
violations “are based on the legally defective PAGA Notice.” (Memo, p. 10.) For the reasons discussed above, the PAGA
notice is not legally defective. Blash
thus alleges sufficient facts for her unfair competition claim.
Disposition
Cross-defendant
Peter Alexan Enterprises, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.