Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV22893, Date: 2024-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22893    Hearing Date: January 23, 2024    Dept: 52

Defendant Dawn Suskin’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

            Defendant Dawn Suskin moves to strike 15 portions of plaintiff FirstService Residential California, LLC’s first amended complaint.

Injunctive Relief

            Suskin moves to strike several portions of the first amended complaint regarding injunctive relief.  Courts may strike a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b)(3).)  “[T]o obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages.”  (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.)  Courts may enjoin disclosure of confidential information.  (See, e.g., Angelica Textile Services, Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 495, 505-507; Courtesy Temporary Service, Inc. v. Camacho (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1289-1291.)

            The first amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to obtain injunctive relief.  It alleges, “Suskin is sharing FirstService’s proprietary documentation, which is now being used against FirstService’s interests and with the intent to harm FirstService.”  (¶ 38.)  It further alleges, “While still employed with FirstService, Suskin obtained confidential information regarding FirstService’s business plans and models, and FirstService is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Suskin is sharing such information with the intent to harm FirstService by drawing other employees away from FirstService to join Seabreeze.”  (¶ 40.)  Plaintiff thus alleges Suskin continues to use its confidential information to aid its competitor and harm plaintiff.  On demurrer, these allegations constitute irreparable injuries that support injunctive relief.

            Suskin contends plaintiff relies on improper allegations based on information and belief.  “A ‘ “[p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true” ’ [citation], and thus a pleading made on information and belief is insufficient if it ‘merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such information that “lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.” ’ ”   (Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158–1159.) 

            Plaintiff adequately alleges the information that leads it to believe its allegations are true.  It alleges Suskin emailed plaintiff’s former employees about transitioning plaintiff’s former staff and its former client, Playa Vista, to a competing business.  (FAC, ¶¶ 30-31.)  These allegations suffice on demurrer.

Punitive Damages

Suskin moves to strike several portions of the complaint regarding punitive damages.  Courts may strike such allegations where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.) 

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to constitute malice.  “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) 

The first amended complaint alleges facts, which the court must accept as true, showing defendant intended to cause injury to plaintiff.  It alleges, “Suskin deliberately and covertly (without coordination with FirstService or its Human Resources Department) orchestrated a series of meetings between Seabreeze management and the on-site associates of FirstService during regular working hours, which FirstService was paying for.  During these clandestine meetings, Suskin not only facilitated the introduction of Seabreeze management to FirstService employees but also went as far as to convey an implicit endorsement of the idea of transitioning to Seabreeze.”  (FAC, ¶ 31.)  It further alleges Suskin’s conduct was “aimed at actively soliciting and enticing FirstService associates away from their current employment, thereby causing harm to FirstService’s business interests.”  (Ibid.)  The first amended complaint also alleges, “Suskin solicited FirstService’s client and disparaged FirstService for the benefit of herself and/or the benefit of others.”  (¶ 35.) 

These factual allegations constitute malicious conduct intended to cause injury to the plaintiff.

Disposition

Defendant Dawn Suskin’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied.  Defendant is ordered to answer the first amended complaint within 20 days.