Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV23071, Date: 2023-11-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23071    Hearing Date: November 28, 2023    Dept: 52

Plaintiff The People of the State of California’s Demurrer to Defendants’ Answers

Plaintiff The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, demur to the answers by nine defendants: (1) Felix Hernandez Rubio; (2) Oswaldo Pena Diaz; (3) Juan Rosas; (4) Alfredo Barillas; (5) Reyes Ipinaardon; (6) Santiago Tacain Ordodez; (7) Alberto Gomez; (8) Guadalupe Pineda; and (9) Marvin Virgil.  Their answers are identical. 

Plaintiff demurs to four purported affirmative defenses alleged in each answer.  Rather than denying the plaintiff’s allegations, affirmative defenses assert new allegations that would defeat the plaintiff’s claims.  (CCP § 431.30(b); FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 383-385.)  Affirmative defenses must not be pled as “terse legal conclusions,” but “rather … as facts averred as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and are alleged in the complaint.”  (In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 812-13, internal quotes and citations omitted.)

Uncertainty

            Plaintiff demurs to paragraphs 3(c), 3(d), 4(b), and 4(c) of defendants’ answers as uncertain.  “Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that [the opposing party] cannot reasonably respond.”  (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695, internal quotes and alterations omitted.)  These portions of defendants’ answers are not so incomprehensible that plaintiff cannot understand them.    

Affirmative Defense 3(c)

            Defendants do not allege sufficient facts for this affirmative defense.  This paragraph alleges, “(Nonpayment of rent only) On (date): 09/01/2023 before the notice to pay or quit expired, defendant offered the rent due but plaintiff would not accept it.”  (Form UD-105, ¶ 3.c.)  The form answer states, “For each box checked, you must state brief facts to support it in item 3w.”  (UD-105, ¶ 3.)  In paragraph 3.w, defendants allege, “Defendant[] does not owe the amount stated on the 3-Day Notice to pay rent or quit, Defendant [has] been paying the rent since he move[d] in up to 8/30/2023 to Metro Investment Group Inc.”

            That does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.  A landlord may evict a tenant who “continues in possession, in person or by subtenant … after default in the payment of rent.”  (CCP § 1161, subd. 2.)  The landlord must serve the three-day notice to quit “upon the tenant and if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon the subtenant.”  (Ibid.)  If the tenant defaulted in paying rent to the plaintiff/landlord, that constitutes a basis for evicting the subtenants, too.

The complaint alleges plaintiff leased the property to defendants Metro Investment Group Inc. and Anthony Nowaid.  (¶ 1, Ex. 1.)  It alleges these nine individual defendants, among others, are “unauthorized subtenants currently in possession of portions of the Premises.”  (¶ 7.)  The complaint further alleges Metro Investment Group and Nowaid owe $222,852 in unpaid rent.  (¶ 16.)  The 3-day notice to pay rent or quit demanded the named defendants to pay that amount.  (¶ 16, Ex. 3.)  Affirmative defense 3(c) alleges these subtenant defendants paid their rent to the master tenant, Metro Investment Group—not to plaintiff.  That does not constitute a defense.  It is irrelevant if these defendants paid the sublessor.  The basis for this unlawful detainer action is that plaintiff, the property owner, was not paid.

Affirmative Defense 3(d)

            Defendants do not allege sufficient facts for this defense.  They checked box 3.c. of form UD-105, which provides, “Plaintiff, waived, changed, or canceled the notice to quit.”  That is a mere legal conclusion.  The facts alleged in paragraph 3.w in support of defendants’ affirmative defenses allege only that defendants do not owe the money because they paid Metro Investment Group and that “Defendant has been suffering harassment and abuse from Metro Investment Group Inc.”  Those factual allegations are not related to whether plaintiff waived, changed, or canceled the notice.

Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c)

            Plaintiff also demurs to purported affirmative defenses 4(b) and 4(c) of the answers.  These are not affirmative defenses.  They instead constitute denials of the allegations of the complaint.  (CCP § 431.30(b)(1).)  Paragraph 4 of the answer on form UD-105 labels the subparagraphs, “Other Statements.”  (UD-105, p. 4, ¶ 4.)  These “other statements” do not attempt to “state facts sufficient to constitute a defense” (CCP § 430.20) and are not subject to demurrer on that basis. 

Alleging the fair rental value of the premises is excessive (UD-105, ¶ 4(b)) constitutes denying the allegation that “the reasonable rental value of the Premises is Six-hundred Nineteen Dollars and Three Cents ($619.03) per day.”  (Comp., ¶ 25.)  The other allegations regarding the notice to quit (UD-105, ¶ 4(c)) seek to controvert an element of plaintiff’s cause of action, service of a proper notice to pay or quit, rather than alleging “new matter constituting a defense.”  (CCP § 431.30(b)(2).)

Disposition

            Plaintiff The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation’s demurrers to paragraphs 3(c) and 3(d) of the answers by defendants: (1) Felix Hernandez Rubio; (2) Oswaldo Pena Diaz; (3) Juan Rosas; (4) Alfredo Barillas; (5) Reyes Ipinaardon; (6) Santiago Tacain Ordodez; (7) Alberto Gomez; (8) Guadalupe Pineda; and (9) Marvin Virgil, are sustained with 5 days’ leave to amend.  Plaintiff’s demurrers to paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of these defendants’ answers are overruled.