Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV24758, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24758    Hearing Date: February 5, 2025    Dept: 52

Defendant Hammitt, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant Hammitt, Inc. moves for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff Rusty Rendon’s sole cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51.  Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for that cause of action.  Defendant relies on authority that the statute does not apply when neutral policies disparately impact members of a protected class.  (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854 [“A disparate impact analysis or test does not apply to Unruh Act claims”].)  Defendant is partially correct.

In Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 (Martinez), the court applied this rule to a complaint alleging defendant “violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by intentionally maintaining a retail website that was inaccessible to the visually impaired.”  (Id. at p. 1032.)  The court held, “[A] failure to address known discriminatory effects of a policy” is not “alone sufficient to establish intentional discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,” and plaintiff’s complaint therefore “could not have stated a cognizable Unruh Civil Rights Act claim on this basis.”  (Id. at p. 1038.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations are like those in Martinez—with one key difference discussed below.  The complaint alleges defendant’s website “is inaccessible to blind users.”  (Comp., ¶ 1.)  Plaintiff further alleges, “Defendant’s actions constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of a disability in violation of the Unruh Act because Defendant has constructed a Website that is inaccessible to Plaintiff, knowingly maintains the Website in this inaccessible form, and has failed to take adequate actions to correct these barriers even after being notified of the discrimination that such barriers cause.”  (¶ 21.)  Martinez bars this theory of intentional discrimination.

Plaintiff, however, alleges sufficient facts under an alternative legal theory for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer (Ibarra v. Chuy & Sons Labor, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 874, 881), which must dispose of an entire cause of action.  (Southern California Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London etc. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 140, 154; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)  The court must “examine the factual allegations of the complaint, ‘to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal theory.’ ”  (Adelman v. Associated Intern. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 359.) 

 The rule requiring intentional discrimination does not apply when a plaintiff alleges a violation of Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f), which incorporates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  “Unless an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is based on an ADA violation, the act requires a claimant to prove ‘ “intentional discrimination.” ’ ”  (Martinez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036, italics added; accord Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 665.) 

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the ADA: “Defendant is also violating the Unruh Act because the conduct alleged herein likewise constitutes a violation of various provisions of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.  Section 51(f) of the California Civil Code provides that a violation of the right of any individual under the ADA shall also constitute a violation of the Unruh Act.”  (Comp. ¶ 22.)  And unlike Martinez, plaintiff alleges defendant maintains “physical ‘brick and mortar’ locations” (¶ 1) and that he “attempted to access the Website in connection with [his] desire to access a brick and mortar location of Defendant” (¶ 5).    

Though plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for an intentional violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, he alleges sufficient facts for a violation of Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f).  Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings therefore would not dispose of any entire cause of action as required.  The court must deny the motion.

Disposition

Defendant Hammitt, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.