Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV27094, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27094    Hearing Date: November 12, 2024    Dept: 52

Plaintiff Alma Magana’s Motion for Peace Officer Records

Plaintiff Alma Magana moves for an order requiring defendant City of Long Beach to disclose peace officer records pertaining to her and defendants Jason Lehman and Robert Titus.  Generally, peace officer personnel records are confidential and are not disclosed in any civil proceeding.  (Pen. Code, § 832.7.)  Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a)(5) defines “personnel records” to include “[c]omplaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties.”

Motions for discovery of these records must include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.”  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) 

The “ ‘good cause’ requirement has two components.  First, the movant must set forth ‘the materiality’ of the information sought ‘to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’  (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  The function of this requirement is to ‘exclude[ ] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.’  [Citation.]  If the movant shows that the request is ‘relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met.’ ”  (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 41.)  “Second, the ‘good cause’ requirement obliges the movant to articulate ‘a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ ”  (Id. at p. 42.)  A plaintiff’s “initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard.  …  Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.”  (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086 (Haggerty) internal quotes and alterations omitted.) 

Categories of Records

            Plaintiff requests nine categories of records.  She does not show good cause to disclose categories 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9.  Category 1 seeks writings “that consist of, mention, or reflect any disciplinary investigations or disciplinary actions taken against” Lehman “for the ten (10) year period preceding the incident of October 13, 2022.”  Category 3 seeks documents pertaining to investigations by supervisors “into any charges or complaints, or claims of conduct unbecoming, or other inappropriate action by Lehman, including the results and/or findings thereof, from October 2013 to the date of production.”  Category 6 requests all writings concerning Lehman’s and Titus’s job performance over the last 10 years.  Category 9 requests documents pertaining to any discipline against Lehman since October 1, 2019. 

Plaintiff does not show good cause to discover writings about all discipline, investigations, or performance evaluations of Lehman and Titus.  “The information sought must . . . be ‘requested with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that [the moving party] is engaging in a “fishing expedition.” ’ ”  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 85.)  These requests are overly broad as to the subject matter.  This is a sexual harassment and retaliation case.  The only investigations, discipline, or performance evaluations that would be material are those related to sexual harassment or retaliation.  Investigations, discipline, or job performance in general are immaterial.

            Plaintiff also does not show good cause for disclosing category No. 5, which seeks all writings regarding discipline against Lehman and Titus “in response to the incident on October 13, 2022.”  None of plaintiff’s papers, including her complaint, identify any “incident” on that date.  Counsel’s declaration refers to incidents on November 28, 2020, and September 11, 2021.  (Diggs Decl., ¶¶ 6-10.)  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the City terminated her on October 11, 2022.  (Comp., ¶¶ 35, 76, 89.)  Plaintiff does not show that records about the unidentified “incident on October 13, 2022” are material to her claims. 

            Plaintiff shows good cause for partial disclosure of category 2, which requests writings about “any personnel actions against Lehman, including complaints of… hostile work environment, harassment, discrimination, retaliation, or other related actions” since October 2013.  “[M]e-too evidence” of other discrimination or retaliation can be relevant to prove a defendant’s discriminatory intent.  (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114.)  Writings about other complaints against Lehman for conduct similar to plaintiff’s allegations are material. 

            Category 2, however, is overly broad as to time and subject.  Plaintiff alleges she complained about sexual harassment in 2020.  (Comp., ¶ 23.)  Information about events up to seven years earlier is too remote.  The court will limit these categories to writings regarding personnel actions or complaints against Lehman since January 1, 2018. 

Category 2 also requests writings about “misconduct” or “conduct unbecoming” in general.  Plaintiff does not show good cause to disclose those records for the same reasons discussed above with respect to categories 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9. 

Plaintiff shows good cause for partial disclosure of category 4, which seeks writings regarding all disciplinary investigations or actions taken against plaintiff “for the ten (10) year period preceding the incident of October 13, 2022.”  These documents are material to the City’s motive for terminating plaintiff.  But, like category 2, the request is overly broad as to time.  The court will limit disclosure to documents reflecting investigations or actions against plaintiff since January 1, 2018. 

Plaintiff shows good cause for disclosure of category 7, which seeks “All privileged records, writings, investigations, reprimands relating to Internal Affairs file nos., ADM2020-0037 and ADM2021-0048.”  In response to plaintiff’s requests for production about who made the decision to take an adverse employment action and who supervised plaintiff, the City agreed to produce “documents relating to IA Case Numbers ADM2020-0037 & ADM2021-0035.”  (Diggs Decl., Ex. A, RFP Nos. 2-3.)  Similarly, in response to plaintiff’s request for production of documents relating to investigation of plaintiff’s complaints, the City identified the responsive documents as including “IA File No. ADM2021-0048,” but stated it would only produce the file pursuant to a Pitchess motion.  (Diggs Decl., Ex. A, RFP Nos. 8-9.)  The City’s identification of these documents as responsive to those requests for production suffices to show the documents are material.

Finally, plaintiff shows good cause to disclose category 8.  This category seeks documents about discipline against plaintiff since October 1, 2020.  The documents are material to the City’s motive for terminating plaintiff.

The affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel adequately shows a reasonable belief that the City of Long Beach possesses records within these categories.

Limits to Disclosure

Defendants argue the court must disclose only the names and contact information of witnesses to the complaints or investigations.  In cases “where a criminal defendant seeks discovery of prior third party complaints to prove the arresting officer had a history of engaging in violent acts to support the criminal defendant’s excessive force/self-defense claims … courts have generally limited the criminal defendant to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the prior complainants/witnesses unless the defendant shows he or she has been unsuccessful in obtaining the relevant information.”  (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089-1090.) 

“The central rationale underlying the rule limiting discovery to witness identifying information is that the actual documents of third party complaint information often have minimal relevance and constitute a substantial invasion of officer privacy.”  (Haggerty, supra, at p. 1090.)  But “courts have generally recognized that the law enforcement records of the investigation at issue may be discoverable and have never imposed any special limitations on this disclosure if the requested discovery otherwise meets the statutory criteria.”  (Ibid.) 

Here, the actual documents concerning investigations or discipline are likely to be more than minimally relevant.  Plaintiff’s claims require her to prove the City subjected her to harassment or an adverse employment action because of her sex or protected activity.  For sexual harassment, the City may only be liable for harassment by a non-supervisor if it “kn[ew] or should have known of” the harassment “and fail[ed] to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)  Given that plaintiff must prove the City’s motive or knowledge, she needs to discover more than complainants’ or witnesses’ contact information.

Defendants also argue the court must not disclose any documents reflecting investigators’ conclusions or subjective impressions.  Documents “reflecting solely the investigating officer’s ‘conclusions,’ defined to mean the ‘thought processes of, and factual inferences and deductions drawn by, an officer investigating a complaint, concerning such matters as the credibility of witnesses or the significance, strength, or lack of evidence’ ” may be protected from disclosure.  (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.)  “The analysis of relevancy in the Pitchess context must be on a case-by-case basis, rather than on a one-size-fits-all approach.”  (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)  In Haggerty, the plaintiff sued for excessive force.  (Id. at p. 1082.)  The court held, “There is nothing contained in the officer’s subjective impressions of the facts found during the investigation that would be admissible at trial or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Ibid.) 

Here, plaintiff alleges retaliation and discrimination.  In an excessive force case, the Internal Affairs investigator’s conclusions (i.e., whether the investigator found the level of force excessive) are irrelevant.  That is a question for the jury.  Retaliation and discrimination, however, require proof of motive—which is subjective.  And as discussed above, plaintiff may be required to prove what the City knew about the purported harassment.  Evidence of the investigators’ subjective conclusions therefore may be relevant and admissible at trial.

In their opposition briefs, the City and Lehman also seek a protective order limiting disclosure under Evidence Code section 1045, subdivisions (d) and (e).  The court will issue such an order.             

Disposition

Plaintiff Alma Magana’s motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records is granted in part.

Defendant City of Long Beach is ordered to lodge with the court all documents in the following categories, no later than December 20, 2024:

(a) Documents reflecting, constituting or pertaining to any personnel actions against LEHMAN, related to hostile work environment, harassment, discrimination, or retaliation, from January 1, 2018, to the present.  Said documents to include complaints by or on behalf of Plaintiff and/or personnel complaints initiated by the City of Long Beach, or the Long Beach Police Department based upon complaints by Plaintiff for sexual harassment, discrimination, or retaliation.

(b) Any and all writings that consist of, mention, or reflect any disciplinary investigations or disciplinary action taken against Plaintiff Alma Magana since January 1, 2018, including but not limited to internal investigation reports from the District Attorney’s Office, reports from the Office of Independent Review, or other similar writings.

(c) All records, writings, investigations, reprimands relating to Internal Affairs file nos., ADM2020-0037 and ADM2021-0048; and

(d) Documents evidencing or pertaining to any discipline, or proposed discipline, including modifications thereto, reports, evidence, interviews, charges, Skelly letters, Letters of Transmittal, responses, oral writings, written warnings, reprimands, suspensions, and termination, imposed by the City of Long Beach and/or the Long Beach Police Department, and/or their agents or employees against PLAINTIFF from October 1, 2020, to the date of production.

            Defendant City of Long Beach is not required to disclose any documents that are inadmissible under Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (f)(2).

The court will hold an in camera hearing to review the records on January 7, 2024, at 10:00 a.m.  After reviewing the records, the court will order defendant City of Long Beach to produce appropriate records to plaintiff pursuant to a protective order under Evidence Code section 1045.