Judge Armen Tamzarian, Case Number: 23STCV31263, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 23STCV31263, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31263 Hearing Date: April 30, 2025 Dept: 52

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Claims Against Los Angeles Southwest College and the Board of Trustees

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to defendant Los Angeles Southwest College on the basis that it is not a distinct legal entity under the Education Code. They cite no authority except “Education Code sections 70900, et seq.” They do not identify or address the relevant test to determine whether a division of a public agency is a distinct legal entity. (See Vann v. City and County of San Francisco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1024.)

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to defendant the Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College District on the basis that plaintiff does not allege any unique conduct by the Board itself other than ratifying others’ conduct. (Memo, pp. 7-8.) The complaint, however, alleges, “The Board of Trustees … also governs and controls Los Angeles Southwest College on a local level, and Plaintiff and others attempted to work through the Board of Trustees, but they turned a blind eye and refused to even acknowledge the teachers’ complaints against Awan and Irvin. They ratified and condoned and assisted in covering up the age, racial and gender discrimination and hostile work environment and retaliation and allowed Awan and Irvin to do whatever they wanted without any accountability.” (¶ 8.) Plaintiff thus alleges more than just ratification.

1st Cause of Action: Education Code §§ 44112 and 44113

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action. Defendants argue these sections of the Education Code apply only to elementary and secondary education. Education Code sections 44112 and 44113 are part of title 2, named “Elementary and Secondary Education.” Defendants are part of the community college system, which is postsecondary education, governed by title 3 of the Education Code. Plaintiff’s opposition requests leave to amend “to correct the citation to Education Code [sections] 87161 and … 87162.” (Opp., p. 9.) The court will grant the motion as to this cause of action and give plaintiff leave to amend the complaint as requested.

2nd Cause of Action: Gender Discrimination

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s purported second cause of action for “gender discrimination based on association.” (Memo, p. 8.) This part of defendants’ motion would not dispose of any entire cause of action as required. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are equivalent to demurrers (Ibarra v. Chuy & Sons Labor, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 874, 881), which must dispose of an entire cause of action (Southern California Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London etc. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 140, 154). Plaintiff’s second cause of action includes some allegations regarding associational discrimination. For example, it alleges, “PLAINTIFF was subjected to discrimination based on her association with a member of the protected class (gender) from 2017 to 2023.” (¶ 121.) But it also alleges plaintiff is a woman and “was subjected to discrimination based on her gender from 2017 to 2022.” (¶ 98.)

Assuming plaintiff asserted a distinct cause of action for gender discrimination based on association, defendants do not show the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts for that claim. They argue, “Outside of” disability discrimination, “claims of associational discrimination are not codified or discussed in caselaw.” (Memo, p. 8.) Associational discrimination, however, is codified for most protected classes: “ ‘Race, religious creed, … sex,’ ” etc. “includes any of the following: [¶¶] (3) A perception that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics or any combination of those characteristics.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (o), italics added; see also id., subd. (r)(2) [defining “sex” to include “gender”].)

7th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action against any defendant. Its elements are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) “An essential element of such a claim is a pleading of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency. [Citations.] Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for discrimination.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.)

Plaintiff’s allegations in support of this cause of action do not constitute outrageous conduct beyond human decency. She alleges only various forms of personnel management or trivialities like using profanity at meetings or making insensitive comments.

This cause of action also arises from alleged conduct not directed at the plaintiff. “ ‘The law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.’ [Citation.] The only exception to this rule is that recognized when the defendant is aware of, but acts with reckless disregard of the plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff.’ ” (Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 102.) For example, plaintiff alleges Awan “allowed sexually implicit video footage to be posted on the LASC website, which is accessed by high school students whose high schools reside on the LASC campus.” (Comp., ¶ 35.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that conduct had any relation to or impact on her.

8th Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action. “[A]ll government tort liability must be based on statute.” (County of San Bernardino v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1107.) “ ‘[S]overeign immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 1108.)

Plaintiff’s opposition relies on Government Code section 815.2, which makes public entities vicariously “liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Id., subd. (a).) The public entity employer can only be liable if its employees breached a common law duty of care to the plaintiff. (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 933.)

Plaintiff relies on authority holding that school districts can be liable for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision under Government Code section 815.2. That rule, however, has only been applied to public school districts’ negligent hiring of employees who injure students. It arises from schools’ special duties to protect students. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-870 (C.A.)) In C.A., the California Supreme Court explained: “The scope and effect of our holding on individual liability is limited by requirements of causation and duty, elements of liability that must be established in every tort action.” (Id. at p. 876.) For duty, “the potential legal responsibility of District administrators and supervisors for negligently hiring or retaining” an employee who allegedly sexually abused a student “arises from the special relationship they had with plaintiff, a student under their supervision, which relationship entailed the duty to take reasonable measures to protect plaintiff from injuries at the hands of others in the school environment. Absent such a special relationship, there can be no individual liability to third parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow employee, and hence no vicarious liability under section 815.2… .” (Id. at p. 877.) Plaintiff identifies no such duty in this case.

Disposition

Defendants Los Angeles Community College District; Los Angeles Southwest College; the Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College District; Dr. Seher Awan; Dr. Howard Irvin; and Dr. Francisco Rodriguez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in part with leave to amend as to plaintiff Dr. Sandra Lee’s seventh and eighth causes of action. Plaintiff shall file any first amended complaint within 20 days.

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