Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV01166, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV01166 Hearing Date: May 3, 2024 Dept: 52
Tentative
Ruling:
Defendants Lynx Dx, Inc. and
Jeremiah Johnson’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
Demurrer
Defendants Lynx Dx, Inc. (Lynx) and Jeremiah
Johnson demur to plaintiff Eunice Ko’s eighth cause of action for defamation. “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a
publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that
(e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ ” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th
683, 720.)
A. The Statements
Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the substance
of the defamatory statements. To allege
defamation, the complaint “must set forth ‘either the specific words or the
substance of’ the allegedly defamatory statements.” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 931, 948.) “As Witkin
distills the pleading rule, ‘It is sometimes said to be a requirement, and it
certainly is the common practice, to plead the exact words or the picture or
other defamatory matter. The chief
reason appears to be that the court must determine, as a question of law,
whether the defamatory matter is on its face or capable of the defamatory
meaning attributed to it by the innuendo.
Hence, the complaint should set the matter out verbatim, either in the
body or as an attached exhibit.’ ” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Lynx and
Johnson published statements “directly or by inference, that Plaintiff was
incompetent, unreliable, a poor performer, manipulated or falsified test
results.” (Comp., ¶ 124.) She alleges these statements are false. (Id., ¶¶ 123, 125.)
The allegedly false statement that plaintiff
“manipulated or falsified test results” is defamatory either on its face or based
on the context alleged in the complaint.
Plaintiff worked for Lynx, “a corporation that provides diagnostic
solutions for informed prostate cancer risk screening that can be implemented
in a clinical setting.” (Comp., ¶
3.) Lynx “planned to do” a “clinical
trial” of a test to detect prostate cancer.
(Id., ¶ 15.) When speaking
about an employee at a company that develops cancer screening tests, falsely
claiming she manipulated or falsified test results is clearly defamatory.
B.
Publication
Defendants
argue the complaint does not adequately identify the people to whom they
allegedly published the statements. Plaintiff
alleges she “is informed and believes that” defendants made the defamatory
statements “to others within Defendants’ organization, as well as attorneys,
consultants, contractors, vendors, prospective employers, and others outside
the business.” (Comp., ¶ 124.) Under the liberal standard of pleading, these
allegations suffice.
The California Supreme Court rejected an
argument like defendants’ in Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442. There, the complaint alleged defendants “made
the Slanderous Statement to members of the Beverly Hills community.” (Id. at p. 458.) The Court stated, “Defendants contend the
allegation of slander is fatally inexact as to time and place of utterance and
persons addressed. Yet the pleading does
seem certain enough in those respects. Less particularity is required when it appears
that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading
gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Ibid.)
As in Okun, the defendants who
allegedly made the defamatory statements necessarily have superior knowledge of
to whom they spoke. And plaintiff’s
description of the people to whom defendants published the statements is no
less specific than “members of the Beverly Hills community.”
Defendants cite Dible v. Haight Ashbury
Free Clinics, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 843, 853-54 (Dible) for
the proposition that “a plaintiff must specifically allege the defamatory
statement was published to a third party and identify the individual or entity
to whom the statement was made.” (Memo.,
p. 10.) Dible does not require
specifically identifying the individual or entity who heard the statement. There, the court reviewed an order granting
defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The
plaintiff alleged two categories of defamatory statements. The first was made to the Employment
Development Department, which the court held had no probability of prevailing because
of plaintiff’s “inability to establish that any damage occurred.” (Dible, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p.
853.) The second category of statements
was made directly to the plaintiff. (Ibid.) Plaintiff showed no probability of prevailing
as to those statements because (a) there was “no evidence of the presence of a
third person” and (b) the court rejected the “rule of compulsory
self-publication” because of “the lack of any republication.” (Id. at p. 854.)
The plaintiff in Dible thus did
specifically identify the people to whom the statements were made: the
Employment Development Department and plaintiff herself. Her defamation claim failed for other
reasons.
Plaintiff’s complaint also invokes the
doctrine of compelled self-publication.
(Comp., ¶ 127.) Defendants argue
plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to do so. Because plaintiff adequately alleges defendants
published the statements to third parties, the court need not and does not
reach this issue.
C. Common
Interest Privilege
Defendants contend the common interest
privilege precludes plaintiff’s claim for defamation. “Civil Code section 47 provides in pertinent
part that a publication or broadcast is privileged if made: ‘(c) In a
communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who
is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the
communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested
to give the information.’ ” (McGrory
v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538.) This privilege “has been determined to apply
to statements by management and coworkers to other coworkers explaining why an
employer disciplined an employee.” (Ibid.) It also applies when “a former employer…
respond[s] to an inquiry from a potential employer concerning an individual’s
fitness for employment” and acts without malice. (Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d
871, 877.)
Any defect in the complaint based on this
privilege is not clear from the face of the pleading. Plaintiff alleges defendants made the
defamatory statements “to others within Defendants’ organization, as well as
attorneys, consultants, contractors, vendors, prospective employers, and others
outside the business.” (Comp., ¶
124.) Those “within Defendants’
organization” and “prospective employers” may fall within the common interest
privilege, but the court cannot reach that conclusion as to “attorneys,
consultants, contractors, vendors, … and others outside the business.” The complaint does not allege facts
suggesting all those people shared a common interest with defendants or
requested the information from defendants.
Moreover, plaintiff alleges defendants made
the statements maliciously. The
privilege only applies to “a communication, without malice.” (Civ. Code, § 47(c).) The complaint alleges defendants knew the
statements “to be false” or made them “with reckless disregard for their
probable falsity.” (Comp., ¶ 125.) On demurrer, the court must accept that
factual allegation as true. Defendants
rely on cases decided based on evidence.
(McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc., supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at p. 1540 [no “triable issue of malice” on summary judgment]; King
v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 442 [summary
judgment proper because plaintiff “has not unveiled the quantum of evidence
necessary to create a triable issue” on “malice”]; Deaile v. General
Telephone Co. of California (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 848 [appeal after
jury trial].)
D. Opinion or Fact
Finally, defendants argue plaintiff only alleges statements
of opinion, not fact. “A statement of
opinion ‘cannot be false and is outside the meaning of’ ” defamation. (Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 958, 970.) Plaintiff
alleges defendants falsely told others she “manipulated or falsified test results.”
(Comp., ¶ 124.) Assuming the
truth of the complaint’s allegations, that statement is “a provably
false assertion of fact” because it “either happened or it did not.” (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 728.)
The other defamatory statements that “Plaintiff was
incompetent, unreliable, [and] a poor performer” (Comp., ¶ 124) may not be
actionable. But “[a] demurrer must
dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Fremont
Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Because plaintiff alleges at least one
defamatory statement of fact, the court must overrule the demurrer.
Motion to Strike
Defendants
Lynx and Johnson move to strike numerous portions of the complaint regarding punitive
damages. Courts may strike allegations
related to punitive damages where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level
of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil
Code section 3294. (Turman v. Turning
Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.) Conclusory allegations are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) The complaint
must make “factual assertions supporting a conclusion [defendants] acted with
oppression, fraud or malice.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to recover
punitive damages. “[W]illfully and
consciously retaliat[ing] against” employees for exercising their rights can
constitute malicious or oppressive conduct sufficient for punitive
damages. (Colucci v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 455.)
That an employer “intentionally discriminated against” an employee can
suffice for malice. (Cloud v. Casey
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 911.)
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges defendants terminated
her “based on her gender/sex, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints about
discrimination and harassment, and for protesting against what she perceived as
a hostile work environment.” (¶
38.) It further alleges defendants
terminated her because she “raised concerns over illegal activity or practices
pertaining to solicitation of business and sales in the healthcare area” and
“was terminated for her efforts to follow” laws “pertaining to kickbacks and
inducement of healthcare professionals.”
(¶ 39.) At this stage, these
allegations suffice for punitive damages.
Whether the alleged conduct rises to the level of malice, oppression, or
fraud is a question of fact.
Disposition
Defendants Lynx Dx, Inc. and Jeremiah
Johnson’s demurrer to plaintiff Eunice Ko’s eighth cause of action is overruled.
Defendants’ motion to strike portions of the
complaint is denied.
Defendants Lynx Dx, Inc. and Jeremiah Johnson
shall answer within 20 days.