Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV01166, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01166    Hearing Date: April 2, 2025    Dept: 52

Plaintiff Eunice Ko’s Motion to Quash or Modify Employment Records Subpoena

Plaintiff Eunice Ko moves to quash or modify the subpoena defendants Lynx DX, Inc. and Jeremiah Johnson served on plaintiff’s subsequent employer, Guardant Health, Inc.  Upon a party’s motion, a court “may make an order quashing [a] subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.  In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

Defendants’ subpoena requests 14 categories of documents.  Plaintiff does not object to category No. 11, which seeks pay records.  Plaintiff contends the other requests violate her privacy rights.  “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 (Williams).)  If the objecting party shows all three elements, then the court must balance the need for disclosure against the right to privacy.  (Ibid.)  People generally have a right to privacy in their personnel files and other employment records.  (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530.) 

Plaintiff repeatedly argues defendants must show a “compelling need” for this discovery.  The California Supreme Court overruled that standard in 2017—including by expressly disapproving the chief case plaintiff relies on.  (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 556-558 & fn. 8 [disapproving, among other cases, Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839].) 

Plaintiff does not substantiate her objections to category Nos. 1-4 and 6.  These request: (1) “Application for employment, résumé, and interview notes”, (2) “communications … relating to the obtaining or holding of employment by Ko”, (3) “offers of employment or offers to hire”, (4) “documents … sent by Ko in response to offers of employment”, and (6) “documents that relate to the job titles, duties, and compensation earned for each position and/or role Ko applied for, and/or held.” 

In the circumstances of this lawsuit, plaintiff does not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in these records.  While bringing a lawsuit does not waive one’s privacy rights, it limits one’s expectation of privacy in matters relevant to the action.  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  In this action, plaintiff alleges not only employment claims against defendants, but also defamation based in part on the doctrine of compelled self-publication: “Plaintiff was under strong pressure to communicate Defendants’ statements to other persons outside Lynx, including prospective and future employers for which Plaintiff sought employment.  Plaintiff made the statements in response to inquiries of the circumstances relating to her termination, and Plaintiff’s prospects for employment with others were hindered, inhibited, or otherwise damaged.”  (Comp., ¶ 127.)  The process of plaintiff seeking other employment, including with Guardant Health, Inc., is directly relevant to this allegation.  These document requests properly seek discovery on that subject. 

Plaintiff also does not show a serious threatening intrusion as to category Nos. 1-4 and 6.  They include a limited range of documents that would not contain sensitive information.  Plaintiff makes no reasoned argument as to how, for example, disclosing her resume or information about the jobs she applied for constitutes a serious intrusion.

Plaintiff’s objections to category Nos. 1-4 and 6 are overruled.

Plaintiff substantiates her objections to category Nos. 5, 7-10, and 12-14.  No. 5 demands: “Recordings, in whatever form made whether written or oral, audio or video, of any communications with or RELATING TO KO during the hiring process and, at any time, during their employment RELATING TO KO obtaining or holding employment of any kind.”  (Italics added.)  No. 7 seeks documents about plaintiff’s job performance, including “performance reviews … warnings, [and] disciplinary notices.”  No. 8 asks for “discrimination, retaliation or harassment complaints by Ko.”  No. 9 asks for “documents … relating to investigations conducted that reference Ko.”  No. 10 asks for “[t]he complete contents of Ko’s personnel or employment file.”  No. 12 asks for documents on “the reasons for the separation or end of Ko’s employment.”  No. 13 asks for “all civil, administrative, and/or internal complaints relating to Ko.”  No. 14 asks for documents “relating to accommodations provided to or requested by Ko.”

Suing a prior employer for discrimination does not mitigate plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy in these broad categories of documents.  These are serious intrusions that go into the minutiae of her employment, including the potential to include embarrassing, confidential, or sensitive information.  Plaintiff’s defamation claims concern the process of her seeking another job.  What happened after she got that job, including her performance, complaints by or about her, and accommodations for disability, are not relevant to this action.  Defendants’ need for disclosure does not justify these invasions of plaintiff’s privacy.  Plaintiff’s efforts to mitigate her damages were at least partially successful.  Discovering every detail about plaintiff’s subsequent job is unnecessary.   

Plaintiff’s objections to category Nos. 5, 7-10, and 12-14 are sustained.

Sanctions

            The parties move for sanctions against one another.  Both sides were partially successful and acted with substantial justification.

Disposition

            Plaintiff Eunice Ko’s motion to quash or modify the subpoena to Guardant Health, Inc. is granted in part.  The court hereby quashes the subpoena only as to category Nos. 5, 7-10, and 12-14.