Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV01738, Date: 2024-10-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01738    Hearing Date: October 22, 2024    Dept: 52

Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina’s 4 Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses

(1) Interrogatories to LACCD

            Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina moves to compel further responses by defendant Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) to form interrogatories – employment, No. 217.1, and special interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, and 22.  A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories when an answer “is evasive or incomplete” (CCP § 2030.300(a)(1)) or an objection “is without merit or too general” (id., subd. (a)(3)).

A. Official Information Privilege

            LACCD made meritless objections to special interrogatories Nos. 15 and 16.  No. 15 asks LACCD to identify “each person who provided any information which was considered in reaching the decision to place PLAINTIFF on leave.”  No. 16 asks LACCD to identify all documents “considered in making the decision to place PLAINTIFF on leave.”  LACCD responded: “Other than as stated in the letter attached as Exhibit ‘A,’ the facts supporting the reasons for placing Plaintiff on leave, and the sources thereof, are the subject of an ongoing investigation, and are subject to the official information privilege set forth at Evidence Code Section 1040.  …  Subject to and without waiving these objections, and given the confidential and/or privileged nature of the information at issue and its potential misuse, Responding Party may provide the requested information subject to an appropriate protective order.”

            LACCD does not meet its burden of showing the information plaintiff seeks is protected by the official information privilege.  Generally, after the requesting party moves to compel further responses, the responding party bears the burden of justifying its objections.  (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417, 441.) 

            The official information privilege protects “information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege is made.”  (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (a).)  It provides an absolute privilege when “[d]isclosure is forbidden by” statute (id., subd. (b)(1)) and a conditional privilege when “there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice” (id., subd. (b)(2)).

LACCD does not show that answering these interrogatories would violate the absolute privilege.  It argues, “As reflected in the Notice of Discontinuation of Services (Johnson Decl., Ex. A; Diaz Decl., Ex. K), some of the information at issue is from closed sessions of the LACCD Board of Trustees, which is protected by the absolute privilege of Section 1040.”  (Opp., p. 9.)  Aside from this sentence, LACCD gives no explanation of how any part of the answers to these interrogatories would require disclosing information for which a statute prohibits disclosure.  The notice of discontinuation of services is exhibit 2 to the declaration of Maria G. Diaz.  It is 12 pages long.  The document only mentions closed sessions twice: first, it asserts plaintiff failed to give appropriate advice “regarding the disclosure of closed session information to inappropriate parties” when someone complained about a Trustee leaking information to the press (Diaz Decl., Ex. 2, p. 6); and second, it asserts plaintiff “put an action before the Board of Trustees pursuing the termination of Howard Irvin in a closed session vote” (id., p. 9).  Nothing in the record indicates that answering special interrogatories Nos. 15 and 16 would require disclosing information that is absolutely privileged under Evidence Code section 1040(b)(1). 

LACCD also does not meet its burden of showing the conditional privilege applies.  For this privilege, the public entity bears “the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence.”  (Marylander v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126.)  If so, the court must then “weigh the interests and … sustain the privilege only if ‘ “there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 

LACCD asserts, “[T]he information confidential reports of unprofessional conduct and abusive behavior by LACCD employees, attorney-client privileged communications between Plaintiff and LACCD administrators and staff,” among other things.  (Opp., p. 9.)  But LACCD again only generally cites the entire 12-page Notice of Discontinuation of Services.  A trial court has “ha[s] no obligation to undertake its own search of the record ‘backwards and forwards to try to figure out how the law applies to the facts’ of the case.”  (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934.)  The record does not establish the information LACCD seeks to protect was acquired in confidence or that the need to preserve confidentiality outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interests of justice.

LACCD’s objections to special interrogatories Nos. 15 and 16 are overruled.

B. Contact Information

            LACCD gave incomplete responses and made meritless objections to the other disputed interrogatories, which ask LACCD to give the names, addresses, and phone numbers of various witnesses.  Several of LACCD’s answers include lists of multiple names followed by the statement that those people’s “contact information is 770 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90017-3896; 213-891-2000.”  Giving the address and the phone number for the entire agency, rather than for the individuals identified, is evasive. 

            LACCD’s privacy objection is not valid.  “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)  If the objecting party shows all three elements, then the court must balance the need for disclosure against the right to privacy.  (Ibid.)  The court must also consider “the availability of alternatives and protective measures.”  (Id. at p. 556.)

Assuming LACCD establishes all three elements, plaintiff’s need for disclosure outweighs the witnesses’ privacy rights.  Generally, “[t]he disclosure of the names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 543-544, internal quotes omitted.)  Plaintiff should not have to rely on LACCD’s claim that it will make all witnesses—particularly those whom it acknowledges are no longer employees—available to her.  Moreover, a protective order will adequately mitigate the intrusion.

LACCD’s objections to form interrogatory – employment No. 217.1 and special interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, and 22 are overruled.  The court will require LACCD to provide further responses subject to a protective order.

Although LACCD must provide plaintiff with the contact information of certain current LACCD employees who are witnesses, plaintiff’s counsel is not relieved of their obligation to deal with these witnesses with courtesy and civility.  (Guidelines of Civility in Litigation, Local Rules, Appendix 3A, Rule 3A(l).)  For example, plaintiff’s counsel should first attempt to schedule depositions of these witnesses through LACCD’s counsel before directly contacting the witnesses. 

(2-4) Requests for Production to LACCD, Rodriguez, and Veres

            Plaintiff moves to compel further responses by defendants LACCD, Francisco C. Rodriguez, and Steven F. Veres to numerous requests for production.  A party propounding requests for production may move to compel further responses if “[a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete,” “[a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive,” or “[a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.”  (CCP § 2031.310(a).)

A. The Responses

            Defendants gave inadequate statements of compliance.  To the disputed requests, defendants responded, “Responding Party will produce responsive, non-privileged documents that are in [its/his] possession, custody, or control.”  A statement of compliance must state that “all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”  (CCP § 2031.220.)  Defendants’ responses omit the crucial word “all.”  A statement of compliance must include that because it states under oath not only that the responding party will produce response documents, but also that the responding party is not withholding any responsive documents. 

Furthermore, responding that defendants “will produce responsive, non-privileged documents” improperly seeks to give themselves license to withhold documents without making a specific objection or identifying the documents withheld.  When the responding party withholds responsive documents based on an objection, it must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.”  (CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).)  If they object based on privilege or attorney work product, the response must also “provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of” these objections, “including, if necessary, a privilege log.”  (CCP § 2031.240(c)(1).)  If defendants withhold documents they claim are privileged, they must identify those documents, specify the basis for the privilege, and provide enough information to permit plaintiff to evaluate the claims of privilege. 

B. Delay in Production

Plaintiff also argues defendants improperly refused to produce documents by the date specified in the demand and instead unilaterally insisted on a “rolling production” with no deadline.  Producing all documents on the date specified may be impractical, but plaintiff correctly notes the Civil Discovery Act expressly doing so.  (CCP § 2031.280(b).)         

Sanctions

            In each motion, plaintiff moves for monetary sanctions against defendants.  The court must impose monetary sanctions against a party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further discovery responses “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (CCP §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.310(h).)  Defendants unsuccessfully opposed these motions, but they acted with substantial justification.  They made reasonable arguments in support of their position and, before plaintiff filed this motion, attempted to negotiate a protective order.  No sanctions are appropriate.           

Disposition

            The parties are ordered to meet and confer by telephone, videoconference, or in person within seven days regarding a stipulated protective order based on this court’s model protective order.  All further responses ordered below shall be subject to a protective order.

Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina’s motion to compel further responses from defendant Los Angeles Community College District to interrogatories is granted.  Defendant Los Angeles Community College District is ordered to serve further verified responses without objections to form interrogatory – employment No. 217.1 and special interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, and 22 within 30 days.

Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina’s motion to compel further responses from defendant Los Angeles Community College District to requests for production is granted.  Defendant Los Angeles Community College District is ordered to serve a privilege log and further verified responses to requests for production Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6-14, 21-27, 30-34, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50-55, 57-80, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, and 93 within 30 days.  Defendant shall produce any additional responsive documents concurrently with its written responses.

Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina’s motion to compel further responses from defendant Francisco C. Rodriguez to requests for production is granted.  Defendant Francisco C. Rodriguez is ordered to serve a privilege log and further verified responses to requests for production Nos. 1, 2, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 62, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, and 98 within 30 days.  Defendant shall produce any additional responsive documents concurrently with his written responses.

Plaintiff Maribel S. Medina’s motion to compel further responses from defendant Steven F. Veres to requests for production is granted.  Defendant Steven F. Veres is ordered to serve a privilege log and further verified responses to requests for production Nos. 1, 2, 42, and 47 within 30 days.  Defendant shall produce any additional responsive documents concurrently with his written responses.