Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV02144, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02144    Hearing Date: May 19, 2025    Dept: 52

Plaintiff John A.R. Doe’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production

Special Interrogatories

Plaintiff John A.R. Doe moves to compel defendant Los Angeles Unified School District to provide further responses to special interrogatories Nos. 1-3, 15-17, and 19-87.  A party propounding interrogatories may move to compel further responses when an answer “is evasive or incomplete,” “[a]n exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate,” or “[a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

Defendant gave evasive and incomplete answers to interrogatories.  Special interrogatory No. 1, for example, asked defendant to “IDENTIFY all employees that worked on the campus of Thomas Starr King Middle School, as part of administration during the 2022/2023 school year.”  Defendant answered with various objections, followed by the substantive response: “Plaintiff’s Counselors/Teachers/Nurses during the requested time period included Jacqueline Chacon, Aniko Alexovics, Patty DeLeon, Sharon Rodriguez, Yvette Rugamas, Ceclia Brill, Linda Armstrong, Sarah Cerritos, Saxon Griffin, Deysi Meza, Maria Rodriguez, Ana Hernandez, Paula Kurilich, David Robles.”  The question asks about all employees as “part of administration.”  It is not limited to counselors, teachers, or nurses who interacted directly with plaintiff. 

Defendant argues this interrogatory improperly seeks the identities of employees like janitors and groundskeepers.  The question asks about those who were “part of administration.”  The reasonable interpretation of that phrase does not include janitors or groundskeepers, but does include principals, vice principals, and other administrators, regardless of whether they directly interacted with plaintiff.

Defendant also made meritless objections in response to these interrogatories.  Generally, after the requesting party moves to compel further responses, the responding party bears the burden of justifying its objections.  (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)  Defendant does not substantiate its objections.  The interrogatories are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  Defendant made numerous objections that the interrogatories are vague and ambiguous because they use terms like “utilize” and “reprimanded.”  The questions and terms used are plain enough to permit an answer.  Defendant objected that some interrogatories “assume[] facts” or “lack[] foundation.”  Those objections do not apply to written discovery requests.  (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 421.)

Defendant further objected to interrogatories asking it to state facts supporting each affirmative defense.  Defendant does not substantiate its objections based on attorney-client privilege and work product.  The interrogatories ask for the supporting facts, not communications between client and attorney or any attorney work product.  Defendant also argues these interrogatories are premature.  Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220, subdivision (b) provides, “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.”  Defendant chose to assert 44 affirmative defenses.  Plaintiff may ask defendant to state the facts supporting those defenses.  If defendant knows no facts supporting a defense, it must state that.

Defendant’s objections to special interrogatories Nos. 1-3, 15-17, and 19-87 are overruled.

Requests for Production

            Plaintiff moves to compel defendant to provide further responses to requests for production Nos. 1-99.  A party demanding documents may move to compel further responses to requests for production if “[a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete,” “[a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive,” or “[a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) 

Defendant responded to several requests with incomplete statements of compliance.  A statement of compliance must state that “all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)  The response must include that precise language because it states under oath not only that the responding party will produce specified documents, but also that the responding party is not withholding any responsive documents. 

Request for production No. 1, for example, demanded, “The ACADEMIC FILE of Plaintiff John A.R. Doe.”  Defendant responded, “Plaintiff’s MiSiS and Welligent Files will be produced.  See Bates numbers 0001-0841.  Plaintiff’s Social Adjustment Report will also be produced.  See Bates nos. 2462-2471.”  That is not a complete statement of compliance.  Defendant agreed only to produce some documents.  To the extent defendant withheld any documents within this category, it failed to object and identify the documents withheld as required.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240.)  Plaintiff is entitled to a complete statement of compliance. 

Defendant also made meritless objections.  Primarily, it objected based on laws protecting education records and privacy.  Those statutes permit disclosure of student records upon judicial order.  (Ed. Code, § 49076, subd. (a) [“A school district shall not permit access to pupil records to a person without written parental consent or under judicial order”]; 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) [exception when “such information is furnished in compliance with judicial order”].)  Defendant’s objections were thus proper when made but do not justify withholding documents if the court compels production.  (See Smith v. Brown University (D.R.I. 2023) 695 F.Supp.3d 246, 250.)

Defendant does not substantiate its privacy objections.  “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)  If the objecting party shows all three elements, then the court must balance the need for disclosure against the right to privacy.  (Ibid.)  The court must also consider “the availability of alternatives and protective measures.”  (Id. at p. 556.)

Defendant establishes the first element.  As to documents limited to the student “Alexander” who allegedly attacked plaintiff (Comp., ¶ 19), a student accused of physically assaulting a fellow student does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his disciplinary records.  Other students, however, do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the requested records.  The intrusion may be serious at least as to some of the responsive documents. 

The court finds plaintiff’s need for disclosure outweighs the privacy rights involved.  The invasion of privacy can be greatly mitigated by redacting information that personally identifies other students.  A protective order limiting use of the information disclosed would also mitigate privacy concerns. 

Defendant’s objections to requests for production Nos. 1-99 are overruled.

Disposition

Plaintiff John A.R. Doe’s motion to compel defendant Los Angeles Unified School District to serve further responses to special interrogatories is granted.  Defendant is ordered to serve further verified responses without objections to plaintiff’s special interrogatories Nos. 1-3, 15-17, and 19-87 within 30 days.

Plaintiff John A.R. Doe’s motion to compel defendant Los Angeles Unified School District to serve further responses to requests for production is granted.  Defendant is ordered to serve further verified responses without objections to plaintiff’s requests for production Nos. 1-99 within 30 days.  Defendant shall produce all responsive documents concurrently with its verified written responses.