Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV03718, Date: 2024-09-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV03718 Hearing Date: September 5, 2024 Dept: 52
Defendants’
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
Defendants Dolores Rosslyn Owner, LLC,
Avaloninv LP, Jonathan Cookler Company Inc., Weston Cookler, and Jonathan
Cookler move to strike 16 portions of the first amended complaint (FAC) by
plaintiffs Janek Boniecki, Ruth Ammon, and Bauer Pottery of Los Angeles, Inc.
Defendants move to
strike 16 portions of the first amended complaint on the basis that plaintiffs
do not allege sufficient facts to support punitive damages. Courts may strike a “demand for judgment
requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (CCP § 431.10(b)(3).) Many of the 16 portions of the FAC this
motion targets, however, are not demands for relief. Several have nothing to do with punitive
damages. For example, portion No. 1 in
the notice of motion is: “Bauer Pottery was founded in Paducah, Kentucky in
1885, then moved to Los Angeles in 1910 and operated in this city until it
closed down in 1962. Original pieces of Bauer Pottery in pristine condition
trade at high prices today.” (FAC, ¶
2.) Those allegations may be irrelevant
or immaterial for other reasons, but not for any reason defendants argue in
their motion or memorandum of points and authorities.
Plaintiffs allege
sufficient facts to support a demand for punitive damages. Courts may strike allegations related to
punitive damages where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice,
oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code
section 3294. (Turman v. Turning
Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)
Plaintiffs allege
defendants “broke in, locked the tenants [i.e., plaintiffs] out, and knocked
down the walls of the premises … while the tenants were in lawful possession of
the premises.” (FAC, ¶ 1.) More specifically, they allege defendants issued
“an invalid Notice to Quit demanding that the Plaintiffs vacate … followed by a
steady stream of harassing phone calls and emails”, “removal of the door and
exterior wall of the building housing the Bauer showroom”, “digging deep
trenches and piling high, wide piles of dirt in front of the door to the
Premises”, and “cutting a large opening in the wall through which the
Defendants’ employees and agents intruded into Plaintiffs’ showroom.” (¶ 35.)
Plaintiffs further
allege defendants broke “into the Plaintiffs’ showroom and” stole or destroyed
“thousands of dollars’ worth worth of finished pottery, display shelves,
tables, equipment, packaging materials, advertising and marketing materials,
supplies and other items.” (FAC, ¶
35.h.) Plaintiffs also allege each
defendant “secretly and unlawfully caused a hole to be cut in the wall of the
Premises which they and their agents used to enter Janek and Ruth’s showroom
when neither tenant was present and without the tenants’ knowledge or consent.” (¶ 91.)
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude these acts rise to the level
of malice, oppression, or fraud required for punitive damages.
Defendants contend
these allegations are insufficient because they do not adequately identify
which defendant did what. Though
plaintiffs do not separately identify who performed each act, plaintiffs allege
all defendants acted together in a joint venture (FAC, ¶¶ 17-25) to
“intentionally and systemically interfere[] with and disturb[] Plaintiffs’
possession of the Premises” (¶ 79) and all “caused a hole to be cut in the wall
of the Premises” (¶ 91). The first
amended complaint thus alleges an adequate basis for holding each defendant
liable for punitive damages.
Defendants also
argue plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to recover punitive damages against
the three entity defendants. Civil Code
section 3294, subdivision (b) provides that for a corporate employer to be
liable for punitive damages, “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard [of
an employee’s unfitness], authorization, ratification or act of oppression,
fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent
of the corporation.”
The FAC alleges Weston
Cookler and Jonathan Cookler are managers, equity owners, officers, directors, or
general partners of the three entity defendants. (¶¶ 14-15.)
For example, plaintiffs allege Weston Cookler is “the Chief Executive
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and a Director (together
with Jonathan Cookler) of Defendant Jonathan Cookler Company Inc.” (¶ 14.)
Plaintiffs allege “Weston Cookler, acting for Dolores Rosslyn Owner, LLC
and Avaloninv LP, falsely offered to provide space in another nearby building,
while simultaneously embarking on an escalating campaign of harassment,
threats, intimidation, repeated inspections of the Premises, the creation of
physical obstacles, breaking and entering, trespassing, theft, and the
destruction of Janek and Ruth’s personal property.” (¶ 34.)
The FAC thus alleges Weston Cookler is an officer, director, or managing
agent of the entities and directed or authorized the numerous events alleged in
paragraph 35.
Regarding Jonathan
Cookler Company Inc., plaintiffs allege it is “a general partner of Defendant
Avaloninv LP.” (FAC, ¶ 13.) That suffices as a basis to hold Jonathan
Cookler Company Inc. liable for punitive damages awarded against Avaloninv
LP. (Corp. Code, §§ 15904.04(a),
15904.05(a); Evans v. Galardi (1976) 16 Cal.3d
300, 305-306.) Moreover, plaintiffs
allege facts supporting the legal conclusions that Jonathan Cookler Company
Inc. is a joint venture or alter ego of the other defendants, which would make
it vicariously liable for punitive damages against other defendants. (FAC, ¶¶ 17-24.)
Disposition
Defendants’ motion to strike portions of the
first amended complaint is denied. Defendants are ordered to answer within 20
days.