Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV07062, Date: 2024-05-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV07062 Hearing Date: May 16, 2024 Dept: 52
Defendants Ford Motor Company and
South Bay Ford Inc.’s Demurrer to Complaint
Defendants Ford Motor Company and South
Bay Ford Inc. demur to the fifth and sixth causes of action alleged in the
complaint by plaintiffs Cristian A. Barahona and Ashly M. Palomares.
5th
Cause of Action: Negligent Repair
Defendant South Bay Ford Inc. argues
the economic loss rule bars this cause of action. The economic loss rule does not apply because
plaintiff does not allege purely economic loss.
“ ‘[E]conomic loss’ is pecuniary damage not arising from injury to the
plaintiff’s person or from physical harm to the plaintiff’s property.” (Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Economic Harm,
§ 2.) Federal courts
have specifically found a tort duty when repairing vehicles: “ ‘One who
undertakes repairs has a duty arising in tort to do them without negligence.’
” (Sabicer v. Ford Motor Company
(C.D. Cal. 2019) 362 F.Supp.3d 837, 840–841; accord McKeown v. Ford Motor
Company (C.D. Cal., Mar. 13, 2019, No. CV1900281CJCPLAX) 2019 WL 1199468,
at *3.)
For this cause of action, the complaint
alleges only: “Plaintiffs delivered the Subject Vehicle
to Defendant SOUTH BAY for substantial repair on at least one occasion. Defendant SOUTH BAY owed a duty to Plaintiffs
to use ordinary care and skill in storage, preparation and repair of the
Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. Defendant SOUTH BAY breached its duty to
Plaintiffs to use ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare
and repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. Defendant SOUTH BAY’s negligent breach of its
duties owed to Plaintiffs was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ damages.” (¶¶ 69-72.)
From the face of the complaint, it is not
clear plaintiffs seek pecuniary damage subject to the economic loss rule. When liberally construed, these allegations state
not only that South Bay did not adequately repair the vehicle, but also that
South Bay caused physical property damage to the vehicle. In other words, South Bay’s repair efforts
left the vehicle in worse condition than before the repairs. In particular, the allegation of “failing to
properly store” the vehicle supports that conclusion. Improperly storing a vehicle generally leads
to harm separate from failing to repair the vehicle.
Assuming plaintiffs seek recovery of some
purely economic losses in addition to compensation for physical harm to
property, the court cannot sustain the demurrer on that basis. On
demurrer, courts “examine the factual allegations of the complaint, ‘to
determine whether they state a cause of action on any available
legal theory.’ ” (Adelman v.
Associated Intern. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 359.) The complaint states a cause of action via
the theory of physical harm to property.
6th Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement -
Concealment
Plaintiffs
allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.
A. Economic Loss Rule
Defendants
again argue the economic loss rule applies.
That doctrine does not apply to claims for fraudulent inducement of
contract. “Several courts
have found that fraudulent inducement is an exception to the economic loss
rule.” (Lewis v. Ford Motor Company
(E.D. Cal. 2023) 655 F.Supp.3d 996, 1002.)
“[F]raudulent inducement claims fall within an exception to the economic
loss rule recognized by our Supreme Court.”
(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828,
843, review granted Feb. 1, 2023, No. S277568
[permitting citation as persuasive authority].)
B. Sufficient Allegations
Defendants argue plaintiff does not
allege sufficient facts for the elements of this cause of action. Fraud by concealment requires: (1) defendant
omitted, concealed, or suppressed a material fact; (2) defendant had a duty to
disclose the fact to plaintiff; (3) defendant intentionally omitted or
concealed the fact with intent to defraud plaintiff; (4) plaintiff must have
been unaware of the fact and would have acted otherwise if he had known of the
concealed fact; and (5) the omission caused damages. (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc.
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.)
Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts
for each element. First, they allege
Ford Motor Company failed to “disclos[e] that the Subject Vehicle and its
transmission was defective and susceptible to sudden and premature failure.” (Comp., ¶ 75.) They allege Ford “knew that the transmission
installed in the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact.” (¶ 76.)
“Specifically, Defendant FMC knew that vehicles equipped with the same
10-speed transmission as the Vehicle suffered from one or more defects that can
cause the vehicles and their 10-speed transmissions to experience hesitation
and/or delayed acceleration; harsh and/or hard shifting; jerking, shuddering,
and/or juddering. (¶ 77.) These allegations adequately specify what
fact Ford was required to disclose.
Second, plaintiffs allege Ford owed
a duty to disclose based on its exclusive knowledge of material facts. A defendant can be liable for fraud by
omission “when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known to the plaintiff.” (Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181
Cal.App.3d 646, 651; accord LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
326, 336.) Plaintiffs allege Ford “acquired
its knowledge of the Transmission Defect prior to Plaintiffs acquiring the
Subject Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiffs,
including but not limited to pre-production and post-production testing data,
early consumer complaints about the transmission defect made directly to FMC
and its network of dealers, aggregate warranty data compiled from FMC’s network
of dealers, testing conducted by FMC in response to these complaints, as well
warranty repair and part replacements data received by FMC from FMC’s network
of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information.” (Comp., ¶ 78.) This allegation suffices to constitute exclusive
knowledge of the defect.
Defendants argue duty to disclose
requires a direct transaction. It does
not. A defendant has a duty to disclose
when it “possesses or exerts control over material facts not readily available
to the plaintiff.” (Jones v.
ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199; accord OCM
Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 835, 859 [“a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only
to the immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchaser when the
vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold”]; Barnhouse v.
City of Pinole (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 171, 192 [developer of residential
property who did not disclose material facts to original purchaser was liable
for fraud to subsequent purchaser because it was “foreseeable” that the
nondisclosure would be “passed on”].)
Plaintiff alleges the defect was material
because it poses safety risks. (Comp.,
¶¶ 77, 83.) Facts regarding unreasonable
safety risks are material. (See Daugherty
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835-836;
Falk v. General Motors Corp. (N.D.
Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1096.)
Third,
plaintiffs allege defendant intentionally concealed the defect with the intent
to defraud. “[T]he only intent by a
defendant necessary to prove a case of fraud is the intent to induce
reliance. Moreover, liability is affixed not only where the
plaintiff's reliance is intended by the defendant but also
where it is reasonably expected to occur.” (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93.) “It may be
inferred that [defendant] concealed [a material fact] with fraudulent intent,
for the purpose of making a profit; it may also be inferred that plaintiff, who
was unaware of the [fact], would have acted differently had he known of the
suppressed fact.” (Id. at p. 96.) Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to permit
the inference that Ford should have reasonably expected plaintiffs to rely on
Ford’s failure to disclose the alleged defect.
Fourth,
plaintiffs allege they were unaware of the defect and would have acted
differently if they knew about it. They
allege, “Had Plaintiffs known that the Subject Vehicle suffered from the Transmission
Defect, they would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle.” (Comp., ¶ 79.)
Fifth,
plaintiffs allege they suffered damages as a result of their reliance on Ford’s
omission. “Plaintiffs were harmed by
purchasing a vehicle that Plaintiffs would not have leased and/or purchased had
Plaintiffs known the true facts about the Transmission Defect.” (Comp., ¶ 87.)
Disposition
Defendants Ford Motor Company and
South Bay Ford Inc.’s demurrer is overruled.
Defendants shall answer plaintiffs’ complaint within 20 days.