Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV11710, Date: 2025-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11710    Hearing Date: February 6, 2025    Dept: 52

Order to Show Cause Re: Entry of Default Judgment

Plaintiff Yan Asturias brings an action against defendants Lin Yang aka Anthony Yudong Wang and Kundi Li.  The clerk entered Li’s default on August 12, 2024, and entered Yang’s default on November 25, 2024. 

California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(h) provides, “When a default is entered, the party who requested the entry of default must obtain a default judgment against the defaulting party within 45 days after the default was entered, unless the court has granted an extension of time.  The court may issue an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed if that party fails to obtain entry of judgment against a defaulting party or to request an extension of time to apply for a default judgment within that time.”

            More than 45 days have passed since defaults were entered.  Plaintiff has not requested default judgment or an extension of time to do so.  The court will therefore set an order to show cause re: why plaintiff should not pay $100 in sanctions under rule 3.110(h).

Quiet Title Claims

            Plaintiff’s complaint includes two causes of action for quiet title.  The complaint is defective as to these causes of action.  “Under the ‘well pleaded’ complaint rule, it is error to enter a default judgment on a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against the defaulting defendant.”  (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 539.)    

            In an action for quiet title, the complaint must allege “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination … is sought and the basis of the title.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (b).)  “If plaintiff owns the property in fee, a general allegation of ownership of the described property is sufficient.”  (Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 292.)  But if the plaintiff asserts less than full ownership, the complaint must be more specific.  Plaintiff’s “title must be stated with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see that the plaintiff has such a right.”  (Peck v. Martinez (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 855, 856.)  The plaintiff “must show the nature of his right or title against which defendant asserts an adverse claim” and “cannot simply allege” he or she “has ‘an estate in, interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon’ the property.”  (Ibid.)  Defendants are “entitled to” notice of whether plaintiff “claim[s] ownership of, or a lien upon, or an encumbrance upon the property in question.”  (Ibid.)

The 13th cause of action seeks quiet title of real property at 1600 Sunset Plaza Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90069.  The 14th cause of action seeks quiet title of real property at 1646 Woods Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90069.  The complaint alleges, “[P]er the agreements made by and between Plaintiff and Defendants, Plaintiff has an equitable right of ownership to” each property “for the financial investment Plaintiff put into the purchase or improvement of the real property.”  (¶¶ 159, 163.)  It further alleges, “Plaintiff is entitled to quiet title of” each property “in favor of granting Plaintiff an apportionment of legal and equitable title in the” property.  (¶¶ 160, 164.)  The complaint’s prayer for relief on these causes of action seeks “a determination by the Court as to the ownership interest of Plaintiff and Defendants in the subject properties.”  (Comp., p. 30.)  The complaint does not allege plaintiff fully owns either property.  It only alleges she has an unspecified partial interest in each property. 

Moreover, a complaint seeking quiet title must allege “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (d).)  Plaintiff’s complaint does not do so.

Based on plaintiff’s complaint, the court cannot enter judgment for plaintiff on her 13th or 14th causes of action for quiet title. 

Plaintiff also cannot recover both the full amount of damages she seeks and a judgment quieting title to either property.  “ ‘Where a person has two concurrent remedies to obtain relief on the same state of facts, and these remedies are inconsistent, he must choose or elect between them.’ ”  (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1218.)  “ ‘ “[A]n election of remedies is the choice by a plaintiff to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same fact” such that the plaintiff must choose “between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to or a repudiation of the other.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  A plaintiff may not recover two remedies that each fully compensate for the same injury.  (Speirs v. BlueFire Ethanol Fuels, Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 969, 989-990.)    

The basis she alleges for her title to the property is that she lent $3.2 million to defendants (Comp., ¶¶ 49, 59), who used the money toward purchasing or renovating the properties (¶¶ 60-61).  Plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeks to recover the $3.2 million, plus interest (Comp., pp. 28-29), and to quiet title to a portion of each property.  That would be a double recovery.          

Disposition

The court hereby continues the order to show cause re: entry of default judgment to March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.  Plaintiff shall file a complete default judgment application including all documents listed in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a), no later than March 12, 2025.

The court hereby sets an order to show cause re: why plaintiff should not pay $100 in sanctions under rule 3.110(h) for March 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.