Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV12839, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12839    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: 52

Defendant “The Ronald Marshall Trust Cheron Turner Robinson” ’s Demurrer to Complaint

Defendant “The Ronald Marshall Trust Cheron Turner Robinson” demurs to plaintiff Bruce Talbot’s entire complaint. 

1st Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “To prove breach of contract, plaintiff must show that the parties had, and defendants breached, an enforceable agreement.”  (Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1037.)

            Plaintiff does not allege the threshold element for breach of contract: a valid contract with defendant.  An enforceable contract requires “sufficient cause or consideration.”  (Civ. Code, § 1550, subd. 4.)  Consideration means “a bargained-for exchange.”  (Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1248.)  Courts do not “enforce gratuitous promises, even if reduced to writing in the form of an agreement.”  (Id. at p. 1249.)

            The complaint alleges, “On or about September 16, 2013, Plaintiff and Ronald Marshall, now deceased and represented by the Ronald Marshall Trust, entered into a written agreement.”  (Comp., ¶ 5.)  “Under the Agreement, Plaintiff and Ronald Marshall agreed, if the” subject real property “were to be sold, one third of the proceeds would go to the Plaintiff.”  (Ibid.)  It further alleges, “The Agreement constitutes a binding contract between Plaintiff and Ronald Marshall, and by extension, The Ronald Marshall Trust.  Plaintiff has performed all conditions, covenants and promises required on his part in accordance with the Agreement.”  (Id., ¶¶ 9-10.)

            Attached as exhibit 1 to the complaint is a letter dated September 16, 2013.  (Comp., Ex. 1.)  It is addressed to “Bruce Talbert [sic]” and Cheron Robinson and signed by Ronald Marshall.  (Ibid.)  It identifies the subject real property and provides, “This property is part of my living trust.  If I should die, my daughter Cheron Robinson is the beneficiary of my living trust.  If she decides to sell the property, give Bruce Talbert one third (1/3) of any remaining equity.”  (Ibid.)

            This purported agreement is not a contract because it does not obligate plaintiff to do anything.  It is a gratuitous promise to pay plaintiff in the future.  There is no consideration by plaintiff.  Plaintiff therefore does not allege sufficient facts for breach of contract.       

2nd Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Fraudulent inducement of a contract requires: (1) the defendant “misrepresented or concealed a material fact . . . , (2) knowledge of the falsity of the fact or lack of reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, (3) an intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance by the [plaintiff], and (5) resulting damages.”  (Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 452, 470.) 

            Plaintiff does not allege fraudulent inducement of contract with the specificity required.  “[F]raud must be pled specifically.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  “ ‘This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ ”  (Ibid.)

Plaintiff does not allege facts showing the defendant, “The Ronald Marshall Trust Cheron Robinson,” misrepresented any material fact.  The complaint alleges, “Defendant knowing made false representations to induce Plaintiff into the Agreement, specifically the promise to pay Plaintiff one-third of the net proceeds from the sale of the Property.”  (¶ 14.)  But the complaint’s specific factual allegations assert that Ronald Marshall, not the defendant, made the agreement that “if the [subject property] were to be sold, one third of the proceeds would go to the Plaintiff.”  (¶ 5.)  The complaint does not specifically allege the named defendant to this action made a misrepresentation.

Plaintiff also does not specifically allege justifiable reliance and resulting damages.  “The fraud plaintiff must … allege his damages were caused by the actions he took in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations.”  (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1064.)  When damages result solely from defendant’s failure to perform contractual obligations, those constitute “breach of contract damages, not reliance damages” and therefore do not satisfy the element of damages for fraud.  (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1819; accord Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1240.) 

 Plaintiff makes only the conclusory allegation that he “reasonably relied on these representations to his detriment.”  (Comp., ¶ 15.)  He does not specifically allege any actions he took in reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.  Nor does he allege how any such actions caused harm other than him not receiving what he was promised. 

3rd Cause of Action: Unjust Enrichment

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this purported cause of action.  “California does not recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment.”  (Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 323, 336.)  “Unjust enrichment is ‘ “a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies,” ’ rather than a remedy itself.”  (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.)  “It is synonymous with restitution.”  (Ibid.)  “Ordinarily, restitution is required only if ‘ “the benefits were conferred by mistake, fraud, coercion or request.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)

            Assuming unjust enrichment were an independent cause of action, plaintiff does not allege any basis for restitution from defendant.  The complaint does not allege facts showing defendant received any benefit from plaintiff or that any such benefit was conferred by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.

4th Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for declaratory relief.  When a court sustains a demurrer to other causes of action, “a demurrer is also properly sustained as to a claim for declaratory relief which is ‘wholly derivative’ of” the other causes of action.  (Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794, 800.)  Declaratory relief is also “unnecessary and superfluous” when the issues involved are already “fully engaged by other causes of action.”  (Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324.) 

            The complaint alleges, “An actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant as to their respective rights and obligations under the Agreement.  Plaintiff seeks a declaration [of] the rights and obligations of the parties under the Agreement.”  (¶¶ 21-22.)  These allegations do not support a claim for declaratory relief because, as discussed above, the agreement is not an enforceable contract.  If it were enforceable, this cause of action would be superfluous.  Declaratory relief is not available because any controversy over the agreement has already “ ‘crystallized into a cause of action for past wrongs’ ” and “a money judgment will fully resolve the dispute.”  (Cardellini v. Casey (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 396.)

Disposition  

Defendant “The Ronald Marshall Trust Cheron Turner Robinson” ’s demurrer to plaintiff Bruce Talbot’s entire complaint is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.