Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV20977, Date: 2025-02-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV20977 Hearing Date: February 21, 2025 Dept: 52
Defendant Sweet Orange66, LLC’s Demurrer
Defendant Sweet Orange66,
LLC demurs to the entire complaint by plaintiff Mia Camillah.
Timeliness
Defendant’s demurrer is untimely. Plaintiff’s proof of service shows personal
service of the summons and complaint on September 11, 2024. Defendant was required to demur within 30
days (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a)), on October 11. Without a court order, the parties could
stipulate to no more than “one 15-day extension.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(d).) Defendant did not submit a declaration as
required for an “automatic 30-day extension” under Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Defendant
filed this demurrer on December 18, long after its deadline.
In its discretion, the court will also overrule this
demurrer on the merits.
Summary of Allegations
The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant
committed housing discrimination based on plaintiff’s source of income: public
assistance through the federal Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Plaintiff alleges that in June 2024, she
responded to advertisement for rental housing at defendant’s property. (¶ 26.)
After some initial correspondence via text message, plaintiff asked, “
‘[D]o you accept section 8 at this property.’ ”
(¶ 27.) Defendant’s
representative replied, “ ‘We do not.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings causes of
action for: (1) violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, (2) violation
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (3) negligence, (4) violation of Los Angeles
Municipal Code, Chapter IV, Article 5.6.1, and (5) unfair business practices.
Section 8
Defendant demurs first on the basis that plaintiff has
not alleged she has a Section 8 voucher.
The complaint does allege that: “At all times relevant herein Plaintiff
has been … a recipient of Section 8” (¶ 8); “Plaintiff is a participant
in the Section 8 program through” the Housing Authority of the City of Los
Angeles (¶ 21); “Without the benefit of Section 8, Plaintiff is unable to
afford safe and decent housing” (¶ 22); “Plaintiff is, and at all times
relevant herein was, a recipient of Section 8” (¶ 37).
Defendant also contends the
complaint is insufficient because it does not allege defendant is an eligible
landlord under Section 8. For example,
defendant argues the subject unit might cost too much to qualify for Section
8. Defendant asserts, “[P]laintiff
alleges no analysis of the Fair Market Rent limits established by HUD, or
whether the rent charged is California State Law.” (Demurrer, p. 6.) Defendant cites no authority for the
proposition that the complaint must affirmatively allege the unit would be
eligible for a Section 8 voucher.
The purpose of
amending the definition of “source of income” under FEHA to include Section 8
vouchers was to require landlords to consider tenants who use Section 8
vouchers. (Stats. 2019, Ch. 600, § 1 [“It
is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to provide a participant
in a housing voucher program an opportunity to receive a thorough and fair
vetting when they seek housing”]; see Southern California Housing Rights
Center, Inc. v. TPG (Metropolitan), LLC (C.D. Cal., July 8, 2021, No.
CV203056JAKPLAX) 2021 WL 2883179, at *9 [as of 2020, “California landlords were
required to accept Section 8 or housing vouchers as an income source from
applicants”].)
Moreover, the
regulations implementing the Fair Employment and Housing Act provide that landlords
may not “refus[e] to negotiate in good faith with the provider of any public
assistance, rental assistance, or housing subsidy program.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 12141(a)(1).) In other words, landlords cannot initially refuse
to rent to someone because they receive Section 8 vouchers. When a tenant with a Section 8 voucher applies
to rent a unit, the landlord must consider the applicant equally with others.
Defendant’s demurrer
also relies in part on Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.1. (Demurrer, p. 5.) That section is part of Chapter IV, Article
14.6, which temporarily limited residential evictions during the pandemic. It is irrelevant. Assuming defendant cited the correct section,
plaintiff does allege defendant refused to rent to her solely because of income
from housing vouchers. Defendant
expressly told her they “do not” accept Section 8 vouchers. A reasonable person in plaintiff’s shoes could
conclude that meant any further effort was futile.
Standing
Defendant contends plaintiff lacks standing because she
suffered no injury in fact. Standing
under FEHA is broad. Even “testers” who
have no intent to rent housing can have standing to sue. (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1426.)
Plaintiff alleges defendant denied her the opportunity to rent housing
because of her source of income. Refusing
to rent a unit is the prototypical way to injure someone via housing
discrimination. (See Department of
Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896,
902 [prima facie case requires showing plaintiff “was denied a housing
accommodation”]; Gov. Code, §§ 12927, subd. (c)(1) [“ ‘Discrimination’ includes
refusal to sell, rent, or lease housing accommodations”], 12955, subd. (k)
[landlords may not “make unavailable or deny a dwelling based on discrimination
because of … source of income”].)
Plaintiff has standing for these claims.
Disposition
Defendant Sweet Orange66, LLC’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant is ordered to answer the
complaint within 15 days.