Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV24362, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24362    Hearing Date: February 13, 2025    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:

            Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Demurrer

            Defendants 5632 Lexington Ave, LLC, Above All Property Management, LLC, and Margarita Benecia demur to plaintiff Luis Oregon Hernandez’s fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and 10th causes of action. 

4th Cause of Action: Civil Code § 1942.4

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Civil Code section 1942.4(a) provides that a landlord may not demand or collect rent if: (1) the dwelling is substandard or not habitable; (2) a public employee inspected the premises and notified the landlord of his “obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions”; (3) the conditions continued for 35 days after that notice; and (4) the tenant did not cause the conditions.

            Plaintiff alleges facts establishing each element.  He alleges he “file[d] a formal complaint with the Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD) in May 2022.”  (Comp., ¶ 25.)  “Upon inspection, LAHD documented numerous health and safety code violations, including, but not limited to, vermin infestation, peeling paint, unsafe walkways, improper plumbing/heating installations, and missing carbon monoxide detectors.  …  LAHD mandated remediation by September 27, 2022.”  (¶ 26.)  “Despite LAHD’s citation and the clear mandate to remedy the hazardous conditions, Defendants willfully ignored the directive, failing to make any meaningful repairs or improvements to the property.”  (¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff alleges he filed “another complaint with the LAHD” in July 2023.  (¶ 29.)  “In response …, LAHD again cited Defendants for the ongoing health violations and ordered immediate remediation.  Despite this renewed order, Defendants, once more, willfully refused to take any action to fix the serious issues plaguing the property.”  (¶ 30.)  “By August 2023, LAHD issued a Notice of Failure to Comply,” which defendants “disregarded.”  (¶ 31.)  “In March 2024, LAHD once again inspected the property and issued further citations for the continuing infestation and deterioration.”  (¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff later alleges defendants did not correct conditions cited by LAHD on “May 09, 2022; September 27, 2022, August 07, 2023, March 19, 2024, April 29, 2024, and July 16, 2024.”  (¶ 122.)  Plaintiff alleges he has continued to the rent during his entire tenancy (¶¶ 85, 123-125, 153) and defendants “demanded” rent “during the period of October 2021 to the present” (¶ 70).  Finally, plaintiff alleges he “did not cause, create or contribute to the existence of the defective conditions.”  (¶ 102.)

6th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  The claim’s elements are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) 

            Defendants argue plaintiff has not alleged sufficiently outrageous conduct or sufficiently extreme distress.  “Whether the defendant’s conduct was outrageous and whether the plaintiff’s emotional distress was severe are generally questions of fact, and where, as here, the conduct complained of is continuing in nature encompassing a period of several years and the emotional distress alleged is also of a continuing nature, the point at which the defendant’s conduct has become sufficiently outrageous and the plaintiff’s emotional distress sufficiently severe for the plaintiff to state a cause of action will be questions of fact.”  (Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 51.)

            Plaintiff alleges that since 2021, his residence “has been plagued by an unabated and severe infestation of rodents, vermin, and other pests.”  (¶ 21.)  He alleges, “Defendants were fully aware of these conditions but took no substantive steps to address or alleviate the problem.”  (¶ 22.)  Plaintiff alleges these conditions continued after “LAHD mandated remediation.”  (¶ 26.)  For the severity of his distress, plaintiff alleges he “suffered and/or continue[s] to suffer … emotional harm, anguish, depression, fearfulness, anxiety, nightmares, [and] difficulty sleeping.”  (¶ 134.) The court cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, defendants’ conduct was not outrageous enough or plaintiff’s emotional distress was not severe enough to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

7th Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “Negligent infliction of emotional distress does not exist as an independent tort.  [Citation.]  The tort is simply negligence.”  (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1044–1045.)  A cause of action is subject to demurrer when “it merely duplicates” other causes of action.  (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24; accord Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.)  This cause of action merely duplicates plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for negligence. 

8th Cause of Action: Unfair Competition Law

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  The unfair competition law “ ‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.”  (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.¿(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143.)  Plaintiff alleges defendants violated other laws in conducting their residential rental business.  Defendants acknowledge that this cause of action “is dependent upon a finding that his remaining causes of action are viable.”  (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 770, quoted at Opp., p. 13.)  As discussed elsewhere in this order, plaintiff alleges several other viable causes of action.  Moreover, defendants did not even demur to most of plaintiff’s causes of action.

10th Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  Defendants argue only that, because plaintiff has not vacated the premises, he cannot bring this cause of action.  Defendants misinterpret authority concerning the remedy for the breach of the covenant—not whether the tenant can bring the cause of action.  “[W]hen the landlord has breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, but the tenant remains in possession of the premises, the tenant’s remedy is to ‘sue for breach of contract damages.’ ”  (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 902.)  That does not mean the tenant cannot sue for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, which “is a contract claim.”  (Id. at p. 896 [heading]; see also Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 230, 250 [“courts have allowed tort damages for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment only where there has been a wrongful eviction”].)

Motion to Strike

            Defendants move to strike 11 portions of the complaint regarding punitive damages.  Courts may strike allegations regarding punitive damages where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)  “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).)  “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) 

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for malice or oppression.  A trier of fact could conclude that knowing of severe rodent and pest infestations for years, but never correcting it, constituted despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of plaintiff’s rights or safety. 

Plaintiff does not, however, allege sufficient facts to recover punitive damages from the corporate defendants.  For an entity to be liable for punitive damages, “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard [of an employee’s unfitness], authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)  “[M]anaging agents are employees who ‘exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.’ ”  (Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 464.)  Plaintiff does not allege any officer, director, or managing agent of the companies committed, authorized, or ratified the malicious or oppressive acts.

The opposition argues, “Plaintiff alleges a systemic pattern of intentional neglect by corporate decision-makers, rather than isolated misconduct by low-level employees.”  (Opp., p. 8.)  It further contends, “Plaintiff has identified specific individuals with direct decisionmaking authority who ratified and perpetuated the substandard conditions.”  (Id., p. 9.)  The complaint alleges a pattern of neglect at 5632 Lexington Avenue in Los Angeles, but it alleges nothing about corporate decisionmakers.  It identifies only two individuals: defendant John Soluk, “the previous owner” (¶ 14) who is not involved with the two corporate defendants, and Margarita Benecia, “Defendants’ building manager” (¶ 33).  Plaintiff alleges no conduct by anyone other than Benecia.  He alleges no facts showing she has substantial independent authority such that her decisions determine corporate policy.  The complaint makes no allegations permitting one to conclude a “building manager” is an officer, director, or managing agent of either company.

Disposition

            Defendants 5632 Lexington Ave, LLC, Above All Property Management, LLC, and Margarita Benecia’s demurrer to plaintiff Luis Oregon Hernandez’s seventh cause of action is sustained with 15 days’ leave to amend.  Defendants’ demurrers to the fourth, sixth, eighth, and 10th causes of action are overruled.

            Defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint is granted in part, with leave to amend, only as to the prayer for punitive damages against defendants 5632 Lexington Ave, LLC, Above All Property Management, LLC.  The court hereby strikes the following portion of plaintiff’s complaint, only as against defendants 5632 Lexington Ave, LLC, Above All Property Management, LLC: “For exemplary and punitive damages to be determined at trial.”  (Prayer, ¶ 4.)