Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 24STCV24625, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24625    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: 52

Plaintiff Terrence Martin’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission and Form Interrogatories

Plaintiff Terrence Martin moves to compel defendant California Commerce Club, Inc. to serve further responses to form interrogatories and requests for admission. 

Timeliness

Defendant contends plaintiff’s motion is untimely.  The Civil Discovery Act provides that the requesting party “waives any right to compel a further response” to discovery “[u]nless notice of [a] motion is given within 45 days of” the verified response or by “any specific later date to which the” parties “have agreed in writing.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c) [interrogatories], 2033.290, subd. (c) [requests for admission].) 

The parties agreed in writing that plaintiff could file this motion no later than March 10, 2025.  (Ryan Decl., Ex. 1.)  Plaintiff initially served and filed this motion on March 10, giving notice that it would be heard on April 6, 2025.  (Mar. 10 motion, p. 1.)  But plaintiff had reserved the hearing for the wrong year: April 6, 2026.  (Mar. 10 motion, p. 272.)  Plaintiff then served and filed the motion again on March 12, giving notice that it would be heard on April 11, 2025.  Assuming adequate “notice of this motion [was] given” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2033.290, subd. (c)) on the agreed date of March 10, the court denies the motion on other grounds.

Defective Separate Statement

The motion is procedurally defective as to all but one request for admission.  “Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement.  The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: (1) To compel further responses to requests for admission; (2) To compel further responses to interrogatories.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) 

The memorandum in support of this motion argues defendant made meritless objections to requests for admission Nos. 4-8, 10, 11, and 13 and form interrogatories – general Nos. 12.2, 12.3, and 17.1.  (Memo, pp. 11-12.)  Plaintiff’s separate statement, however, includes only request for admission No. 4 and numerous requests for production, which are not addressed in the moving papers.  The separate statement includes no interrogatories.  The court will therefore only consider the motion as to request for admission No. 4.

Request for Admission No. 4

A party may “request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.010.)  The requesting party “may move for a further response to a request for admission when “[a]n answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete” or “[a]n objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).) 

Plaintiff’s request for admission No. 4 asks: “Admit YOU owed a duty to use reasonable care to keep the INCIDENT SCENE in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”  Defendant responded, “Objection.  Vague and ambiguous in the use of the terms ‘reasonable care’ and ‘reasonably safe condition.’  Objection.  This is not a request for admission of fact or application of law to fact, but rather asks responding party to admit what the law is.  This is not a correct statement of law, which will be governed at trial by CACI instructions.” 

This request is not vague or ambiguous.  It concerns the application of law to fact because it refers to three things specific to this case: “YOU”, the “INCIDENT SCENE,” and the “SUBJECT INCIDENT.”  But the only potential dispute of application of law to fact turns on whether defendant owned and controlled the premises at the time of the incident.  Defendant admitted it “owned”, “maintained”, and “controlled the incident scene at the time of the subject incident.”  (Shemtoub Decl., Ex. B, p. 2 [responses to RFA Nos. 1-3].) 

As to the standard of “reasonable care” and “reasonably safe condition,” request No. 4 does ask defendant only to admit the law.  The request therefore serves no real purpose.  As defendant’s response states, in this personal injury case based on premises liability, the California Judicial Council has provided jury instructions.  (CACI Nos. 1000-1012.) 

Plaintiff’s separate statement asserts, “ ‘It is now well established that California law requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.’  Ann M. v.Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674.  CACI instructions use the same Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center citation.  Defendant is clearly attempting to evade responding to interrogatories by employing baseless objections that have no merit.”  (Separate Statement, p. 40.)  Defendant’s response acknowledged that CACI instructions apply, which demonstrates why moving to compel a further response to this request was pointless. 

Defendant does bear some responsibility for this meaningless dispute over request for admission No. 4.  As stated above, the request asks, “Admit YOU owed a duty to use reasonable care to keep the INCIDENT SCENE in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”  Defendant objected that “[t]his is not a correct statement of law, which will be governed at trial by CACI instructions.”  It is a correct statement of the law.  It matches the CACI instruction verbatim: “A person who [owns/leases/occupies/controls] property is negligent if that person fails to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition.”  (CACI No. 1001.)  Nevertheless, there is no reason to compel defendant to provide a further response to request for admission No. 4.  Defendant admitted the pertinent facts in response to request Nos. 1-3.  The standard of care necessarily follows from those facts.

Sanctions      

Defendant moves for $3,135 in sanctions against plaintiff and his counsel, Michael Shemtoub.  The Civil Discovery Act provides, “The court shall impose a monetary sanction …  against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel” further discovery responses “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d) [interrogatories], 2033.290, subd. (d) [requests for admission].) 

Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to compel further discovery responses.  He did not act with substantial justification.  As defendant’s opposition argues, the motion has many errors and procedural defects.  Plaintiff also sought an excessive amount of monetary sanctions, including attorney fees for “3 hours reviewing Defendant’s responses and document production [and] 2 hours reviewing Plaintiff’s discovery request.”  (Shemtoub Decl., ¶ 8.)  Sanctions against plaintiff and his counsel are appropriate.  Defendant reasonably incurred $3,135 in expenses opposing this motion.  (Ryan Decl., ¶ 13.) 

Disposition

            Plaintiff Terrence Martin’s motion to compel further responses to requests for admission and form interrogatories is denied.  Plaintiff Terrence Martin and his counsel of record, Michael Shemtoub, are ordered to pay defendant California Commerce Club, Inc. $3,135 in sanctions within 30 days.  Plaintiff and his counsel are jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.