Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: 25STCV01457, Date: 2025-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01457    Hearing Date: May 7, 2025    Dept: 52

Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Demurrer

            Defendant M.G.G.S. Properties demurs to all five causes of action alleged by plaintiff Ye Won Park.

Summary of Allegations

Defendant owns and operates an apartment complex at 4119 Los Feliz Blvd. in Los Angeles.  (Comp., ¶ 2.)  Plaintiff was a tenant there.  (¶ 9.)  In June 2023, she was in a common area of the property (ibid.) when a fellow tenant “threw a ball for an unleashed dog to fetch” (¶ 10).  “The ball flew near Plaintiff’s head, and the dog ran toward her at high speed, colliding with her left knee.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff further alleges that before her injury, defendant “was aware of other complaints from tenants about unruly or unleashed dogs, including reports of outside dogs being brought onto the premises.  Despite this knowledge, Defendant failed to take adequate measures to address these safety concerns.”  (¶ 13.)

Plaintiff also alleges defendant “failed to repair Plaintiff’s heater for months following” her injury.  (¶ 15.)

1st Cause of Action: Negligence & 2nd Cause of Action: Premises Liability

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for these causes of action.  “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.”  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)           

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to show defendant owed a duty to protect her from the harm she suffered.  Several cases have held that a landlord does not owe a duty to protect others from a “tenant’s dog unless the landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm.”  (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369 (Chee), citing numerous cases.)  Plaintiff alleges defendant “was aware of other complaints from tenants about unruly or unleashed dogs, including reports of outside dogs being brought onto the premises.”  (Comp., ¶ 13.)  She does not allege defendant actually knew the dog that caused her injury was dangerous.  She relies on the theory that allowing dogs off leash is generally dangerous.  That theory is inconsistent with the principle stated in Chee.

Plaintiff cites general principles of property owners’ duties to tenants.  Assuming the rule stated in Chee does not apply, plaintiff still does not allege sufficient facts to establish duty.  “California law requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.”  (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674, disapproved on other grounds by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 522.)  “In the case of a landlord, this general duty of maintenance, which is owed to tenants and patrons, has been held to include the duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable … acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.”  (Ibid. [applying principle to criminal acts].) 

“If the court concludes the injury was not foreseeable, there was no duty.”  (Sturgeon v. Curnutt (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 301, 306.)  “Foreseeability supports a duty only to the extent the foreseeability is reasonable.”  (Ibid.)  “The reasonableness standard is a test which determines if, in the opinion of a court, the degree of foreseeability is high enough to charge the defendant with the duty to act on it.  If injury to another ‘is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.’ ”  (Id. at p. 307.)

The degree of foreseeability of plaintiff’s injury was not high enough to charge defendant with a duty to act on it.  Plaintiff alleges an unusual injury: a fellow tenant “threw a ball for an unleashed dog to fetch,” “[t]he ball flew near Plaintiff’s head, and the dog ran toward her at high speed, colliding with her left knee.”  (Comp., ¶ 10.)  Knowing about the presence of “unruly or unleashed dogs” (id., ¶ 13) did not make this unusual injury foreseeable. 

3rd Cause of Action: Breach of Warranty of Habitability

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability ‘are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.’ ”  (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.)

Plaintiff alleges defendant “neglected its duty to maintain habitable conditions by failing to repair Plaintiff’s heater for several months, leaving her without adequate heating… .”  (Comp., ¶ 34.)  Defendant argues this allegation is insufficient because heating is not important in Los Angeles.  “Whether a particular defect or violation of a housing code constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability depends on the severity and duration of the defect or violation.”  (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298, fn. 9 (Erlach).)  The court cannot rule, as a matter of law, that months of inadequate heating is not a substantial defect.  Plaintiff does not, however, allege she gave defendant any notice that her heater did not work or that she gave defendant a reasonable time to correct the heater.  Plaintiff therefore does not allege facts establishing all elements of this cause of action.

Plaintiff contends permitting unleashed dogs was also a material defective condition of property.  That is a matter of controlling people’s behavior on the property, not a condition of the premises.  Plaintiff provides no authority indicating the warranty of habitability requires landlords to control their tenants (and their animals) to prevent injuries.

4th Cause of Action: Constructive Eviction

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  “Any interference by the landlord that deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises or renders the premises unfit for the purposes for which they are let amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and vacates within a reasonable time.”  (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1299–1300.)   Unlike breach of the warranty of habitability, this cause of action does not require giving the landlord notice and an opportunity to correct the interference. 

Plaintiff alleges defendant breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment in several ways, including that it “failed to perform basic maintenance on the property, including repairing Plaintiff’s heater.  This left Plaintiff without proper heating for several months … .”  (Comp., ¶ 41.)  She further alleges she vacated the premises in January 2024.  (¶ 43.)  These allegations suffice to show interference that deprived plaintiff of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises.  “[T]he landlord’s failure to fulfill an obligation to repair or to replace an essential structure or to provide a necessary service can result in a breach of the covenant if the failure substantially affects the tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of the premises.”  (Petroleum Collections Inc. v. Swords (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 841, 846.)  The court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that failing to repair plaintiff’s heater did not substantially affect her enjoyment of the premises. 

5th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.  The claim’s elements are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (Hughes).) 

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts for the first element.  This element requires “a pleading of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.”  (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.)  “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” ’ ”  (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) 

Plaintiff alleges defendant “shar[ed] Plaintiff’s private phone number with other tenants … with reckless disregard of the probability that this act would subject Plaintiff to harassment, hostility, and emotional distress.”  (¶ 48.)  Plaintiff alleges that as a result, she “began receiving harassing text messages from neighbors who had obtained her contact information from the property management.  These messages were hostile and disparaging, accusing Plaintiff of being responsible for the policy change and creating tension among the residents.”  (¶ 15.)  Sharing a tenant’s phone number with her neighbors is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.  That doing so might foreseeably have exposed her to hostile text messages from her neighbors is no more than an insult, indignity, annoyance, petty oppression, or other triviality. 

Motion to Strike

            Defendant moves to strike portions of the complaint regarding punitive damages.  Courts may strike allegations regarding punitive damages where the facts alleged “do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary” to recover punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64.)  “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).)  “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).)  Plaintiff alleges nothing that could be characterized as malice, oppression, or fraud.

Disposition

            Defendant M.G.G.S. Properties’ demurrer to plaintiff Ye Won Park’s first, second, third, and fifth causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.  Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled.

            Defendant’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint is granted with leave to amend.  The court hereby strikes the following portions of plaintiff’s complaint: (1) paragraph 46, (2) paragraph 52, and (3) prayer for relief, paragraph 3.

            Plaintiff shall file any first amended complaint within 20 days.