Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: BC584994, Date: 2023-01-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC584994 Hearing Date: January 9, 2023 Dept: 52
Plaintiff
Codie Rael’s Motions to Compel Deposition of Danaher Corporation’s Person Most
Knowledgeable and Ormco Corporation’s Person Most Knowledgeable
Plaintiff Codie Rael moves to compel the
depositions of the persons most knowledgeable regarding statistical data of the
employment practices of defendant Ormco Corporation and defendant Danaher
Corporation.
Meet and confer
Defendants
Ormco and Danaher argue plaintiff failed to meet and confer as required before
filing this motion. “A determination of
whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate … involves the exercise
of discretion.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) Plaintiff made an adequate attempt to meet
and confer. Though plaintiff filed these
motions shortly after counsel agreed to hold a phone call two days later, plaintiff
had to do so to provide timely notice of the motions before available the
hearing date.
Matters of examination and requests
for documents
At
issue in these motions are the following equivalent matters of examination for
both Ormco and Danaher, along with corresponding document requests: (a) “Statistics about the hiring and firing of all
employees in California between January 1, 2011 and June 23, 2017,” including
various details; (b) the same statistics for employees throughout the United
States during that period; (c) the same statistics for employees in California
from June 24, 2017 to December 31, 2019; and (d) the same statistics for
employees throughout the United States during that period.
Danaher Corporation
Danaher
Corporation contends that evidence about its patterns and practices is not
relevant because Danaher has only a tenuous connection to California and the
relevant events did not involve Danaher employees. In the initial trial, however, plaintiff
testified, “We were all part of Danaher.
We were all following the same processes.” (Reply, Ex. 3, 2435:26-27.) Danaher appraised her performance. (Reply, Ex. 4, 2253:3-5.) Witness Mark Valiquette, a “senior director
of supply chain” for Sybron Dental Specialties (Reply, Ex. 10, 5102:26-27,
5107:5-14) testified that Danaher is “the parent company” of Sybron (id., 5107:19). The jury found
Danaher liable for over $3,000,000 in damages.
(Reply, Ex. 13.) Discovery about
Danaher is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
Danaher’s
objections on this ground are overruled.
Expert testimony
Defendants
argue that discovery of these statistics improperly calls for expert testimony,
not percipient witness testimony. “[C]ourts
regularly have employed statistics to support an inference of intentional
discrimination.” (Everett v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 388, 393.) “All numerical evidence... does not mandate
an expert witness.” (Ibid.) In
contrast with, for example, performing a “Z test,” “[a] simple comparison of
percentages … does not mandate use of an expert.” (Id. at pp. 393-394.)
“Generally, parties try to establish the facts on which their theory of
the case depends by calling witnesses with personal knowledge of those
case-specific facts. An expert may then
testify about more generalized information to help jurors understand the
significance of those case-specific facts.”
(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 676.)
These
deposition notices seek the underlying numbers: how many people were hired and
fired, when they were hired and fired, their ages, their supervisors, and so
on. That information is lay testimony by
witnesses with personal knowledge of case-specific facts. It is not expert testimony explaining the
significance of those facts.
Defendants’
objections that the deposition notices call for expert testimony is overruled.
Geography
Defendants
argue information about employees throughout the United States is not
discoverable because plaintiff worked in California only. Plaintiff, however, presents evidence that
decisions about her employment were influenced, at least in part, by high-ranking
employees whose duties and influence went throughout the United States. (Reply, Ex. 10, 5113:12-5116:26, 5118:14-27
[Mark Valiquette]; Reply, Ex. 11 5423:18-5424:3 [Vicki Perry].) Defendants’ nationwide patterns and practices
are discoverable because they may lead to evidence supporting discriminatory
intent.
Defendants’ objections on geographic scope are overruled.
Time period
Finally,
defendants argue the matters and document requests regarding employees from
June 24, 2017, to December 31, 2019, are overly broad because they extend for
years before and after plaintiff’s employment.
Plaintiff’s employment in October 2014.
Discovery of what happened three to five years later is too attenuated
to lead to admissible evidence.
Though such evidence “may be admissible to prove a
defendant’s motive or intent even where the conduct occurred outside the
plaintiff’s presence and at times other than when the plaintiff was employed” (Meeks
v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 871), there are
limits. In Meeks, the evidence was about how the plaintiff’s
supervisor treated other employees. (Id. at p. 872.) The trial court
erred in “instructing the jury to disregard evidence of [the supervisor’s]
behavior unless Meeks was ‘party’ to the interaction.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff also relies on the following quote from Andrews v. City and County of San Francisco (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 938, 945: “[T]here is no logical reason
to discriminate between prior and subsequent incidents.” In that case, too, the other incidents were
admissible to prove the intent of an individual, not corporations. Moreover, the other incidents ranged from nine months before
to six months after defendant allegedly battered and wrongfully arrested the
plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 942-943.)
Here, plaintiff seeks discovery of what corporations did three to five
years after she stopped working there.
Defendants’ objections to
the matters of examination and document requests about employees from June 24, 2017, to December 31, 2019, are sustained.
Disposition
Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of
Ormco Corporation’s person most knowledgeable is denied as to matters of
examination Nos. 5 and 6 and document requests Nos. 3 and 4.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of
Ormco Corporation’s person most knowledgeable is granted as to matters
of examination Nos. 3 and 4 and document requests Nos. 1 and 2. Defendant Ormco Corporation is ordered
to produce its person most knowledgeable on those matters and to produce the
requested documents at deposition within 15 days.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of
Danaher Corporation’s person most knowledgeable is denied as to matters
of examination Nos. 3 and 4 and document requests Nos. 3 and 4.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of
Danaher Corporation’s person most knowledgeable is granted as to matters
of examination Nos. 1 and 2 and document requests Nos. 1 and 2. Defendant Danaher Corporation is ordered
to produce its person most knowledgeable on those matters and to produce the
requested documents at deposition within 15 days.