Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: BC691362, Date: 2023-02-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC691362 Hearing Date: February 27, 2023 Dept: 52
Defendants’ Motion for
Attorney Fees
Defendants
Phillip T. Thong, Andrea L. Thong, Ly Hua, Wendy Lam, Newport Seafood
Restaurant, Inc., Newport Seafood Group, Inc., Hua Culinary Group, Inc., and
Heng Henry Hua move for $250,412 in attorney fees from plaintiff
Unified Real Estate Investments, LLC.
Background
Plaintiff brought this action for
breach of contract and conversion against nine defendants: the eight moving
defendants and the first named defendant, New Port@Beverly Hills, Inc. The court held a bench trial in July
2019. After trial, the court entered
judgment for plaintiff against New Port@Beverly Hills, Inc. only, and in favor
of the eight moving defendants. In
November 2019, the court awarded defendants $239,962.50 in attorney fees.
Plaintiff appealed the judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment,
with one exception—it reversed the judgment as to plaintiff’s cause of action
for conversion against defendant Heng Henry Hua. The Court of Appeal remanded the case to
determine plaintiff’s damages against Heng Henry Hua and vacated the trial
court’s order of attorney fees.
The case is set for jury trial on
April 12, 2023, regarding the amount of damages for conversion against Heng
Henry Hua.
Timeliness
Plaintiff contends the motion was
untimely. Strict compliance with
procedural rules on costs and fees is not required, particularly when any
deviation from the rules does not prejudice the opposing party. (See Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993)
15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1305 [affirming award of attorney fees claimed via
memorandum of costs instead of noticed motion].) Courts have “substantial latitude in allowing
fees to be awarded without strict compliance with statutory temporal and
procedural limitations.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff
claims no prejudice. To the contrary,
plaintiff does not argue that the initial motion filed in 2019 was
untimely. The present motion primarily
concerns by how much the court should reduce the $239,962.50 in fees awarded
pursuant to that motion. In its opinion
vacating the attorney fee award, the Court of Appeal stated, “The parties may
seek fees and costs anew in the trial court.”
(Opinion, p. 49.) It was no
surprise that the moving defendants again wanted to recover attorney fees. As to the $239.962.50 in fees incurred before
trial, the parties are fighting over whether those fees were reasonably
incurred and over how much should be apportioned.
Aside
from reducing fees previously incurred and formerly awarded (in an order now
vacated), defendants’ only new fees are those incurred on the appeal and in
making this motion—which amount to about 10% of the total fees claimed. The court, in its discretion, shall consider
the motion on the merits instead of finding the moving defendants forfeited
their right to any fees.
Specific
Reductions
In
calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed
by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each
task was reasonable. (Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
775, 793.)
Plaintiff
argues for various reductions for vague entries or block billing. (Opp., pp. 9-14.) For two reasons, the court finds those
reductions (with one exception) are not warranted. First, the present motion starts by using the
fees of $239,962.50 (607.5 hours at $395 hourly) as awarded by the court, Judge
Susan Bryant-Deason presiding, on November 13, 2019 (Wong Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. D)
and later vacated by the Court of Appeal.
That award already reduced defendants’ lodestar from 625 hours (id.,
p. 2) to 607.5 hours (id., p. 3).
Some of plaintiff’s proposed reductions would be duplicative.
Second,
after reviewing the billing records, the court finds only one entry was not
reasonably incurred. As the court stated
in its now-vacated order, “[W]hile Defendants’ counsel could have been more
descriptive in its billing entries,” they are sufficient. The hours spent were reasonable for the tasks
described. The court will reduce the
lodestar by 0.3 for an entry for “scanning company documents” on July 20,
2018. (Wong Decl., Ex. B, p. 16.) “[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a
paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.” (Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989)
491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.)
Apportionment
“In determining the lodestar amount, a
prevailing party generally may not recover for work on causes of action on
which the party was unsuccessful.” (Mann
v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342.) However, “attorney’s fees need not be
apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause
of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111, internal quotes and alterations omitted.) Courts have discretion not to apportion fees
where the claims are “inextricably intertwined,” such that it is
“impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the multitude of conjoined
activities into compensable or noncompensable time units.” (Ibid., internal quotes omitted.)
Defendants propose reducing the lodestar by
5.6% because Hua’s testimony regarding the conversion claim amounted to 19 of
342 pages of the trial testimony.
Plaintiff’s opposition proposes reducing the lodestar by 11% (aside from
other reductions) because 40 of 342 pages of trial testimony were devoted to
the conversion claim.
Plaintiff’s argument relies on the premise
that defendants can only recover fees for work done on the cause of action for
breach of contract, but not conversion. The
conversion claims, however, were intertwined with the cause of action for
breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged
defendants “removed 33 items from the Premises belonging to” plaintiff. (Comp., ¶ 29.) They contended doing so breached the lease:
“New Port was also required not to remove property, including business and
trade fixtures, furniture or personal property, from the Premises while in
default.” (Id., ¶ 41.) “New Port breached the terms of the Lease
Agreement by, among other things, … removing property belonging to
Unified.” (Id., ¶ 42.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion
was for removal of the 33 items. (Id.,
¶ 50.)
Seven of eight moving defendants prevailed on
the entire action against them. Only
fees incurred for Heng Henry Hua’s unsuccessful defense of the conversion claim
should be apportioned—so long as doing so is practicable. The court finds that, for the bulk of the
fees incurred, it is impracticable to determine which fees are recoverable
(i.e., for defending the other seven defendants or defending Heng Henry Hua on
breach of contract) and which are not (i.e., those incurred only for defending
Heng Henry Hua on conversion). The court
finds the moving defendants’ proposed apportionment of 5.6% is reasonable. Plaintiff’s argument for 11% apportionment is
not persuasive.
Adjusted
Lodestar
As
discussed above, the court adjusts defendants’ lodestar of 607.5 hours by 0.3
hours. The result is a total of $239,844 (607.2 hours at $395 hourly). Defendants shall also recover the $20,000
incurred on the appeal. This results in
a subtotal of $259,844, which the court will reduce by 5.6% to apportion the fees
incurred for the unsuccessful defense of Heng Henry Hua to the conversion claim. Finally, defendants shall recover the
$4,999.50 in fees incurred for this motion.
Their recoverable fees therefore total $250,292.24.
Disposition
Defendants
Phillip T. Thong, Andrea L. Thong, Ly Hua, Wendy Lam, Newport Seafood
Restaurant, Inc., Newport Seafood Group, Inc., Hua Culinary Group, Inc., and
Heng Henry Hua’s motion for attorney fees is granted in part.
Defendants
Phillip T. Thong, Andrea L. Thong, Ly Hua, Wendy Lam, Newport Seafood
Restaurant, Inc., Newport Seafood Group, Inc., Hua Culinary Group, Inc., and
Heng Henry Hua shall recover $250,292.24 in attorney fees from plaintiff Unified
Real Estate Investments, LLC.