Judge: Armen Tamzarian, Case: BC720986, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC720986 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling:
Defendants
Ladera Crest Homeowners Association and Lordon Management’s Motion to Strike
Fifth Amended Complaint
Defendants Ladera Crest
Homeowners Association and Lordon Management move to strike plaintiff Donnie
Muldrow’s entire fifth amended complaint or, in the alternative, paragraphs 13-72, 75-77, 80-81, 83-105, 107, 111, 117,
118, 121, 124-127, 129-40, 142-150, 164-203, paragraphs 1(a), 1(c)-(f), and 2-9
of the prayer for relief, and Exhibit B.
Courts may strike portions of an amended pleading
that are outside the scope of the order granting leave to amend. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB
(2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1023.) On
the final status conference on June 10, 2022, the court granted plaintiff’s
oral motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint. The court’s order permitted plaintiff to
amend the complaint to add two additional theories of his case. At the hearing, the court stated, “The other stuff doesn't matter. Those are just arguments. They don’t have to put every argument in their
complaint. There’s two issues. There’s two theories. They didn’t own the property during those two
years, and you didn’t apply the payments right. That’s it.” (McCliman Decl.,
Ex. 1, June 13 FSC Transcript, 50:23-28.)
The court further stated, “Make your arguments at the trial.” (Id., 51:5-6.)
Plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint includes
numerous amendments beyond the scope of the court’s order. Plaintiff added dozens of new paragraphs of
factual allegations, new prayers for relief, and a new exhibit. Plaintiff contends these amendments are within
the scope of the order granting leave to amend because they merely clarify plaintiff’s
preexisting legal theories rather than adding new theories. The court’s reference to “mak[ing] it clear”
(Opp., p. 3) did not mean plaintiff could rewrite the complaint as to his prior
theories. In context, that statement
meant plaintiff could clarify the complaint by removing theories from
it.
Plaintiff filed this action in September 2018. He has amended the complaint five times. The trial is set for August 17, 2022. At this stage, plaintiff may not substantially
rewrite the complaint.
The court denies defendants’ motion as to striking the entire fifth
amended complaint.
The motion is granted
in part. The court hereby strikes the following
portions of plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint: paragraphs 13-72, 75-77, 80-81, 83-105, 107, 111, 117,
118, 121, 124-127, 129-40, 142-149, 164-203, paragraphs 1(a), 1(c)-(f), and 2-9
of the prayer for relief, and Exhibit B.
Defendant
Pamela Abbott Moore’s Motion to Strike Fifth Amended Complaint
Defendant Pamela Abbott Moore moves to strike
portions of plaintiff Donnie Muldrow’s fifth amended complaint. Courts may strike “any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter” (CCP § 436(a)) including allegations that are “not essential
to the statement of a claim or defense,” “neither pertinent to nor supported by
an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” or “[a] demand for judgment
requesting relief not supported by the allegations” (CCP § 431.10(b)).
Pre-Lien Letter
Moore moves to strike portions of the fifth amended
complaint referring to a “pre-lien notice” sent to plaintiff on October 26,
2016. (5AC, ¶¶ 66-71.) The pre-lien notice is not essential or
pertinent to any claim in plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint.
Plaintiff contends the letter supports his eighth
cause of action for violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) and ninth cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal FDCPA. Both causes of action have a statute of
limitations of one year. (15 U.S.C. §
1692k(d); Civ. Code, § 1788.30(f).)
Plaintiff filed this action on September 6, 2018, more than one year
after the pre-lien notice was allegedly sent in 2016. The statute of limitations bars any claim
under the federal and Rosenthal FDCPA arising from the pre-lien notice. The pre-lien notice therefore is not
essential or pertinent to any claim.
Ninth Cause of Action: Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
Moore moves to strike the ninth cause of action for several
reasons. Plaintiff does not allege a
“consumer credit transaction” as required for her to be liable under the Rosenthal
FDCPA.
To be liable, Moore must be a “debt collector.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.30.) A “debt collector” is a person who “engages
in debt collection.” (Civ. Code, §
1788.2(c).) “‘[D]ebt collection’ means any
act or practice in connection with the collection of consumer debts.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2(b).) “Consumer debts” applies to money or property
due “by reason of a consumer credit transaction.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2(f).) Finally, “consumer credit transaction” means
a transaction “in which property, services, or money is acquired on
credit.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2(e).)
The debt plaintiff alleges Moore attempted to
collect was overdue homeowners’ association assessments. Those assessments do not arise from any
“consumer credit transaction” because Muldrow did not obtain anything “on
credit.” “[T]he phrase ‘on credit’ can
be stated as obtaining something of value without immediate payment on the
promise to make a payment or payments in the future.” (Davidson v. Seterus, Inc. (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 283, 296.) Ladera Crest
Homeowners Association’s governing document provides that regular assessments are
made “to meet anticipated authorized expenditures of the Association.” (5AC, Ex. A, § 4.4, p. 23.) Thus, rather than plaintiff acquiring
something on the promise to pay in the future, the assessments represent
payments due in advance for services to be acquired later.
Disposition
The court declines to rule on this motion now because
of additional issues not briefed by the parties, which are discussed below.
The court hereby continues defendant Pamela Abbott Moore’s motion to strike to
August 17, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.
Order to Show Cause
Though
not briefed by the parties, the court raises the following questions about plaintiff’s
eighth and ninth causes of action:
1.
Is Ladera Crest Homeowners
Association exempt from the federal FDCPA because it collected its own
debts?
The federal FDCPA defines “debt collector” as one
who regularly collects “debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).) The federal FDCPA thus “does
not apply to creditors seeking to collect their own debts; however, the Rosenthal
Act does.” (Best v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 568, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 74; accord MacDermid v. Discover
Financial Services (6th Cir. 2007) 488 F.3d 721, 734 [defendant “is
clearly not a ‘debt collector’; rather, it is the very party to whom the debt
is due”].)
Plaintiff
alleges Ladera Homeowners Association sought to collect homeowners’ association
assessments he owed to Ladera. Based on these allegations, Ladera may be
exempt from the federal FDCPA (though not the Rosenthal FDCPA) because it was
collecting its own debts.
2.
Is attorney Moore exempt from the
applicable version of the Rosenthal FDCPA?
Plaintiff
filed this action in 2018. Before 2020, the Rosenthal FDCPA explicitly
provided that attorneys are not “debt collectors.” (Former Civ. Code, §
1788.2(c) [“The term ‘debt collector’ … does not include an attorney or
counselor at law.”]; see also Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1526 [the Act “specifically exempts attorneys from its
coverage”].)
If
that version of the statute applies instead of the current version, Moore would
not be a “debt collector” under the Rosenthal FDCPA. In enacting that
amendment, the Legislature stated, “The amendments of subdivision (f) of
Section 1788.2 of the Civil Code made by this act do not constitute a change
in, but are declaratory of, existing law.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 545, §
1.) The Legislature made no such statement about the amendment to
subdivision (c), which removed the attorney exception.
The
court hereby sets an order to show cause re: plaintiff’s eighth and ninth
causes of action for August 17, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff must file
any response to this order to show cause at least nine court days before the
hearing. Defendants must file any reply at least five court days before
the hearing.