Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 19GDCV00388, Date: 2024-06-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19GDCV00388    Hearing Date: June 25, 2024    Dept: E

19CDCV00388

RICARDO CANALES vs. IDEAL KITCHEN SUPPLY, INC.

Dept. E, Glendale Courthouse

Final Status Conference: Rulings on motions in limine

                As a general note, the Court notes that it appears that many of these motions in limine were prepared by the parties with the understanding that this matter would proceed to trial before a jury. Both parties have now waived their right to a jury trial and have requested a bench trial.

                On today’s date, the court heard argument from counsel on the various motions in limine and took the matter under submission.  The parties did not arrange for a court reporter to record the proceedings.

                The Court now issues its rulings on the motions in limine:

1.      Plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 1: The motion is DENIED without prejudice.  This is a tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling. (Cf. People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 134.)    

The Court is unpersuaded at this time by the plaintiff’s motion. The Court will hear testimony as to the parties’ intent in entering into this contract. 

The plaintiff is free to renew this motion at a later time.  The Court may sua sponte revisit this motion.  (See id.)

2.      Defendant’s motion in limine no.1: The motion is DENIED without prejudice.  This is a tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling. (Cf. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 134.) The Court is unpersuaded by the defendant’s motion.  (See discussion infra.) The Court will hear testimony as to the parties’ intent in entering into this contract. The defendant is free to renew this motion at a later time. The Court may sua sponte revisit this motion.

The Court does not consider itself bound by any specific ruling made by Judge Hofer in Department D prior to the Remittitur in this matter from the Court of Appeal  on 1/23/24 and the Defendant’s subsequent filing of a CCP § 170.6 challenge to Judge Hofer on 2/13/24, which was granted on that same date. 

During briefing and argument on these motions, the defense initially pointed to Judge Hofer’s ruling on the Writ of Attachment on 11/12/21 and argued that those findings were binding, but then reversed course and withdrew that argument after the plaintiff pointed to CCP § 484.100, which precludes later reliance on such a ruling: “The court's determinations under this chapter shall have no effect on the determination of any issues in the action other than issues relevant to proceedings under this chapter nor shall they affect the rights of the plaintiff or defendant in any other action arising out of the same claim of the plaintiff or defendant. The court's determinations under this chapter shall not be given in evidence nor referred to at the trial of any such action.” (CCP § 484.100.)

The defense then argued that the tentative decision announced by Judge Hofer on 4/18/22, the “direction of the case” and various other rulings required that this Court be bound by Judge Hofer’s prior rulings, and that to rule otherwise would encourage “forum shopping.” (Def.’s Mot. In Lim. No. 1 at p. 6.) 

Putting aside the tangled procedural history in this case, this Court does not agree that it is bound by what Judge Hofer described as an “announce[ment of] a tentative ruling to grant [the] motion.”   (4/21/22 Minute Order.)   Judge Hofer made clear that  “[t]he Court [did] not adopt its tentative ruling as a final ruling and [did] not enter any ruling on Defendant’s Motion in Limine #1.” (Id.; cf. People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 736.)

The defense’s argument that this Court is in some way bound by the “law of the case” based on a tentative that was not in fact issued appears to have no foundation in the case law.

3.      Plaintiff’s motions in limine no. 2-9 are DENIED without prejudice.  The Court understands that motions 7-9 are moot, given Defendant’s representations.

The Court makes clear that it is ruling on the evidentiary motions in limine before it. The Court does not have a motion for judgment on the pleadings before it and the Court does not sua sponte construe any of the motions in limine as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

As a general matter, as to both parties’ motions in limine no. 1, the Court finds that the arguments of both sides appear to rely on extrinsic or parol evidence. 

For example, the defense has maintained that the Guaranty provision was “surreptitiously” inserted into the contract, and that the individual defendants initialed the documents only in the “official” positions, and not as individuals. How those contentions can be supported without reference to extrinsic evidence is unclear to the Court.  (See, e.g., Def.’s Opp. to Pl’s MIL No. 1 at p. 4 [“The purpose of placing initials at the bottom of each page is the custom and practice to reflect that each page was part of the executed document at the time it was properly executed in the place and manner indicated on the document. Defendants Barseghian and Gharibians initialed each page of the lease and addenda (and guaranty because it was surreptitiously inserted between addenda where it clearly did not belong) in their representative capacity [sic] as officers of Ideal, not personally [sic] as reflected by the lease agreement and addenda specifically made part of the lease, unlike the Guaranty. Had they intended to be bound by the guaranty, [Barseghian and Gharibians], as they always do, would have signed their full name where intended”]. [emphasis in original].) (See also id. at p. 2 [“It is objectively clear from the documents and language of the lease agreement, as well as their signatures [sic] on the lease that they were initialing and signing the lease as officers of the corporation, Ideal, not in their individual capacities. Although the pages of the lease are initialed at the bottom of each page, it is not contended that Plaintiff or ideal manifested their intent to be bound by the lease agreement by initialing each page.”].)

How can the Court make a determination as to what the “custom and practice” of the initialing here was from the face of the document at issue? Or whether the guaranty was placed “surreptitiously”? Or how Barseghian and Gharibians regularly sign their names—or what “they always do”? (There has been no request from either party to take judicial notice of anything with regard to these motions, as far as the Court can determine.)

And, in the Court’s view, it is not “objectively clear” from the document in question that Barseghian and Gharibians were “initialing and signing the lease as officers of the corporation . . . and not in their individual capacities.” How is that made clear in the document? Does anything in the document explain what the initials are meant to convey? The defense’s answer appears to be  that the initials simply show that the pages were present, but did not manifest any agreement—but if the initials did manifest agreement, it was only on behalf of defendants as officers, not as individuals.  How these humble initials can bear such freighted complexity is currently unclear to the Court from the face of the document.  And the defense’s argument that the plaintiff is not contending “that Plaintiff or Ideal manifested their intent to be bound by the lease agreement by initialing each page” is, as far as the Court can tell, flatly incorrect: Plaintiff is so contending.

The answers to the questions posed above do not appear to be within the four corners of the contract. The arguments made by defense itself regularly point to evidence outside the four corners of the contract.

At the heart of this matter is the meaning of initials on the document and the meaning of the absence of full signatures on the signature lines on the guaranty portion. It may be that parol and/or extrinsic evidence is necessary to clarify what these ambiguous marks and blanks may or may not mean. (See George v. Auto. Club of S. Cal. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121.)

And it may be that this Court will ultimately agree with the tentative ruling issued by Judge Hofer on 4/18/22.  The Court may revisit the question of whether it should consider testimony or extrinsic or parol evidence in interpreting the contract, depending on further argument and the presentation of the evidence. (See Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 134.) Again, this is not a jury trial.

The bench trial in this matter will proceed at 10:30 a.m. on June 25, 2024 in Department E of the Glendale Courthouse.

Notice has been given to the parties via electronic posting of this ruling and the posting of this ruling in a minute order of today’s date.