Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 20STCV40739, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 20STCV40739, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV40739 Hearing Date: November 7, 2024 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 11/07/2024 – 9:00am

Case No: 20STCV40739

Trial Date: 03/03/2025

Case Name: RODOLFO ZARATE BLANCO v. KIRSTIE LEE WALKER; AT&T CORPORATION; PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY; and DOES 1-10

TENTATIVE RULING – MOTION TO QUASH/MOTION PROTECTIVE ORDER – RES ID 2112

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendants, Pacific Bell Telephone Company and Kirstie Lee Walker (Defendants)

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Rodolfo Zarate Blanco

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP § 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a, § 1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

RELIEF REQUESTED
“Defendants Pacific Bell Telephone Company and Kirstie Lee Walker’s (hereinafter “Defendants”) will and hereby do move for: 1) an order quashing the deposition notice and staying the deposition of Pacific Bell Telephone Company Employee Tim States pursuant to C.C.P. section 2025.410, pending determination of this Motion, and 2) a protective order to limit the scope of the deposition of Mr. States, including document production, to questions and documents related to issues of causation such as speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries and 3) monetary sanction against Mr. Raymond Feldman, Esq. and the Law Offices of Law Offices of John C. Ye, APLC in the amount of $1,810.00. This request for monetary sanctions is brought on grounds that, pursuant to Sections 2025.410(d) and 2025.420(h), Defendant has been forced to incur unnecessary fees and costs in having to bring this Motion when, pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2023 Order on Ms. Walker’s deposition, this deposition should also be limited in the same manner. If Defendants are successful in having this Motion to Quash and for Protective Order granted, Defendants seek reimbursement for their fees and costs in having to bring this Motion, as Plaintiff had no substantial justification for opposing this Motion, nor does any other circumstance make the imposition of this sanction unjust.

Defendants seek this protective order on grounds that, following Defendants’ Admission of Liability for the accident filed and served on June 13, 2023, any issues related to liability for the accident or negligent entrustment/hiring/retention are irrelevant and thus cannot be asked at Mr. States’ deposition. Liability for the accident is no longer relevant because Defendants have already admitted to being responsible for the accident. Pursuant to that Admission, and as stated by Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1154-1158, evidence of negligent entrustment/hiring/retention is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Pursuant to the Court’s Order dated September 18, 2023, granting Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order as to Ms. Walker’s deposition based upon the same issues raised herein, Ms. Walker’s deposition was limited to causation (speed of the vehicles, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries). Thus, Mr. States’ deposition and document production should also be narrowed to causation (speed of the vehicles, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries). (Declaration of S. Candice Shikai (“Shikai Decl.”), Ex. B.)

The deposition of Mr. States thus should be limited as enumerated above: to his observations about the nature of the impact, any conversations between the parties and observation of Plaintiff, and whether any party suffered any injury from this incident. These are the only issues that would go to causation and the issue of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. Despite meeting and conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel on this issue and Defendants pointing out that this deposition and documents should be limited in accordance with Diaz and the Court’s order of September 18, 2023, on the same issues relative to Ms. Walker’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel has not agreed to a limited scope for Mr. States’ deposition.

Defendants thus seek a protective order to limit Mr. States’ deposition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.420, as any questions related to liability for the accident, or negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention are irrelevant, unduly burdensome, and oppressive. Defendants also move to quash the deposition notice served September 17, 2024 for a deposition on October 1, 2023, and stay this deposition pursuant to Section 2025.410, pending determination of this Motion. Allowing this deposition to proceed would only serve to unnecessarily prejudice Defendants, as information beyond the scope of the Court’s September 18, 2023 Order on Ms. Walker’s deposition has no probative value and would not be admissible at trial.

This Motion is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of S. Candice Shikai, Esq., the documents on file in this action, and all pleadings, papers, and records on file in this action and on such further evidence and argument as may be properly received at or before the time of hearing.”

(Def. Mot. p. 2-4.)

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Rodolfo Zarate Blanco, filed the instant action against Defendants – Kirstie Lee Walker; AT&T Corporation; and Pacific Bell Telephone Company – on 10/23/2020.

The Complaint alleges one cause of action for “Motor Vehicle.”

The Complaint alleges that on 11/1/2018, on I-405, Defendants negligently, carelessly, and recklessly operated, controlled, maintained, and entrusted a motor vehicle, a 2011 Ford E350, and employed the operator of said motor vehicle, so as to cause a collision with the motor vehicle occupied by Plaintiff, a 2016 Ford F150, resulting in injuries and property damage to Plaintiff.

Further Plaintiff alleges in relevant part that: (a) The defendants who operated a motor vehicle are Kirstie Lee Walker; (b) The defendants who employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment are AT&T Corporation and Pacific Bell Company; (c) The defendants who owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission are AT&T Corporation and Pacific Bell Company; and (d) The defendants who entrusted the motor vehicle are AT&T Corporation and Pacific Bell Company.

ARGUMENTS
Defendants’ Arguments
Defendants’ “Introduction” section of their motion alleges the following:

This action arises from a three-vehicle collision that occurred on November 1, 2018. Pacific Bell Telephone Company (“PBTC”) employee Kirstie Lee Walker was driving a PBTC vehicle I-405 near Lennox Blvd. in Inglewood, CA, when traffic in front of her came to a sudden stop. Ms. Walker could not stop in time, and the front of her vehicle contacted the rear of the vehicle in which Plaintiff Zarate Blanco (“Plaintiff”) claims he was a passenger.

Defendants PBTC and Walker have admitted to liability for the accident, but do not admit: that the accident caused the injuries Plaintiff alleges were caused by the accident; the reasonableness and necessity of the medical care provided to Plaintiff; the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages asserted by Plaintiff, or anything beyond liability for causing the accident. One issue of dispute in this case is whether Plaintiff was actually in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and there is strong evidence that he was not, as he is not listed on the Traffic Collision Report (“TCR”), and Officer Inzunza testified, among many issues, that: 1) had he assisted Plaintiff out of the vehicle as Plaintiff alleges, he would have listed Plaintiff in the TCR, 2) if he had taken off Plaintiff’s seatbelt as Plaintiff alleges, he would have listed Plaintiff in the TCR, 3) if Plaintiff was disoriented at the scene as Plaintiff alleges, he would have listed Plaintiff in the TCR, and 4) if Plaintiff was a witness to the incident, such as being a passenger in a vehicle involved in the incident he would have listed Plaintiff in the TCR. Moreover, Ms. Walker testified she only saw two Hispanic men at the scene of the incident (this is a three-vehicle accident, and the driver of the other two vehicles were men, and had Plaintiff been a passenger in one of the involved vehicles there would have been three Hispanic men at the scene).

Plaintiff now seeks the deposition of Pacific Bell Telephone Company employee Tim States, and Defendants seek to quash the operative deposition notice (to stay the deposition until this Motion is heard), and to obtain a protective order limiting this deposition to only those questions and topics that are relevant to the issue of Plaintiff’s damages, including causation as it relates to his claimed injuries from the incident. Any topics and documents outside of that, including Mr. States’ employment history, his cellphone records, employment file, and any other topics and documents pertaining to liability for the accident and negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention, would be irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, unduly burdensome, and oppressive pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.420. Why would Mr. States’ employment history and his cellphone records be relevant? He is Ms. Walker’s supervisor who came to the scene of the incident, and he was not the driver of any vehicle involved in the incident.

In light of the Defendants’ Admission of Liability and the fact that it is undisputed that Walker was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the incident, issues beyond causation are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and Plaintiff is not entitled to question Mr. States on any of those issues that fall outside the scope of the Diaz case. Allowing this deposition to proceed without limitation would not only be irrelevant, but unduly burdensome and oppressive as this would allow Plaintiff’s counsel to elicit irrelevant information, which is a waste of time and resources. Allowing Mr. States’ deposition to proceed without limitation would also be inconsistent with the Court’s September 18, 2023 ruling limiting the scope of Ms. Walker’s deposition in accordance with Diaz. ¹

[The Court notes that footnote one states, “Plaintiff’s counsel argues that on September 18, 2023, Judge Lynne M. Hobbs was “bamboozled” by the defense. This could not be further from the truth. Judge Hobbs simply applied the law to the facts and issued the protective order limiting Ms. Walker’s deposition in line with the Court’s opinion in Diaz.”]

As further detailed below, Defendants thus respectfully request this this Court grant this Motion and: 1) quash the deposition notice served on September 17, 2024, so that this deposition is stayed pending resolution of this Motion, and 2) issue a protective order limiting the deposition and documents requested of Mr. States to questions related to limited issues of speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived) and conversations at the scene and 3) monetary sanctions as set forth above in the Notice, below, and in the Declaration of S. Candice Shikai.

(Pl. Mot. p. 5-6.)

Further, Defendants submitted the declaration of Defendants’ counsel, Shikai, which stated:

3. Defendants now seek a protective order to properly limit the deposition of Mr. States’, as an unlimited deposition would be irrelevant, burdensome, and oppressive in light of Defendants’ admission of liability.

4. Defendants filed and served their Admission of Liability on June 13, 2023. Defendants’ Admission of Liability expressly provides that Defendants admit that Ms. Walker was in the course and scope of her employment with PBTC at the time of the incident, and Defendants admit to “liability for causing the accident that occurred on November 1, 2018, which is the subject of this lawsuit. Defendants will not assert any comparative fault upon Plaintiff for the accident.” The Admission of Liability further provides that “Defendants DO NOT stipulate that the accident caused each of the injuries Plaintiff alleges were caused by the accident, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical care provided to Plaintiff, the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages asserted by Plaintiff, or anything beyond liability for causing the accident as set forth” in the first paragraph of this Admission. In other words, Ms. Walker was at fault for hitting the Farias vehicle that Plaintiff alleges he was in. However, if a trier of fact determines that Plaintiff was not in the Farias vehicle at the time of the incident, then his alleged injuries could not have been caused by the incident. A true and correct copy of Defendants’ Admission of Liability is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5. On September 18, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order as to Kirstie Walker’s deposition and documents, limiting the scope of her deposition and documents to questions and information related to limited causation - issues of speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived) and conversations at the scene. A true and correct copy of the Court’s Order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

6. In Ms. Walker’s deposition on March 15, 2024, she testified that her supervisor Tim States had come to the scene of the incident. And although she initially testified that her colleague Mark Martin had driven by the scene of the incident, Ms. Walker later corrected her testimony on record in the deposition, stating that it was actually Michael Jenkins, not Mark Martin, who had happened to drive by the scene of the incident. A true and correct copy of the relevant portions of Ms. Walker’s deposition are attached hereto as Exhibit C.

7. On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff counsel Mr. Raymond Feldman emailed defense counsel stating that “def walker [sic] testified inconsistently as to which of two supervisors came to the scene of the subject accident” and demanding that by the next day at noon, Defendants provide the correct name of the supervisor and a deposition date or Plaintiff will unilaterally notice the deposition. He also stated that if Defendants would stipulate that Plaintiff “was in the truck,” that Plaintiff would not depose the supervisor. A true and correct copy of this September 10, 2024 email is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

8. On September 11, 2024, Mr. Feldman emailed again, correcting his prior email. He asked for the depositions of Tim States, Mark Martin, and Michael Jenkins and said that if Defendants offered deposition dates within 21 days by noon that day, that Plaintiff will try and work with Defendants, and if not, Plaintiff would unilaterally set these deposition dates. A true and correct copy of Mr. Feldman’s September 11, 2024 email is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

9. I responded on this same date, stating that as Ms. Walker stated in her deposition, the correct employee was not Mark Martin, but Michael Jenkins. I further stated that Defendants were not opposed to producing Tim States and Michael Jenkins for deposition, but defense counsel asked what information they are expected to have. I also pointed out that these depositions would need to be limited in accordance with Diaz and in the same manner Ms. Walker’s deposition was limited. A true and correct copy of my response email from September 11, 2024 is attached hereto as Exhibit F.

10. Mr. Feldman responded on the same date, stating that there will be no limitations. He further stated that “your side bamboozled judge hobbs [sic] & plaintiff” by moving for the subject protective order. He makes this statement even though the Motion had been granted. He further included other baseless accusations about Defendants, and he stated that the deposition notices would be served that day. A true and correct copy of Mr. Feldman’s response is attached hereto as Exhibit G.

11. On September 17, 2024, Plaintiff unilaterally noticed the depositions for all three employees: Tim States, Michael Jenkins, and Mark Martin. The deposition notices also contain document requests, which seek documents Defendants have already produced in discovery and for Ms. Walker’s deposition, or seek each employee’s personnel files, cellphone records, driver’s license, and other personal, confidential records for these witnesses who were not driving the PBTC vehicle. A true and correct copy of the deposition notice for Tim States served on September 17, 2024 is attached hereto as Exhibit H.

12. Defendants timely objected to Mr. States’ deposition, including document requests, on September 24, 2024. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s objections to this deposition notice is attached hereto as Exhibit I.

13. On September 25, 2024, Defendants were served with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel these depositions with an unjustified request for sanctions. Defendants are not refusing to produce Tim States/these witnesses for deposition. Defendants are seeking the Court’s guidance first on the scope of Mr. States’ deposition before this deposition proceeds, so that time and resources are not wasted on arguing extensively about the scope of this deposition during the deposition, and there is a Court Order in place as to the scope of this deposition. While Defendants anticipate that Plaintiff’s counsel will still resist such a Court Order exactly as he did during Ms. Walker’s deposition, Defendants still need the Court to decide this issue for clarity before this deposition can proceed.

14. Although the parties have had a mediation scheduled for November 5, 2024, which has been on calendar since July 10, 2023, Mr. Feldman’s email of September 10, 2024 is the first time Mr. Feldman has requested these depositions. Mr. Feldman is now attempting to move this mediation out another month and a half.

(Shikai Decl. ¶¶ 3-14.)

Further, Defendants argue that under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1154-58, it is well established that where an employer admits that an employee was in the course and scope of his employment when causing an incident, plaintiff cannot then attempt to obtain evidence of negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention because it is irrelevant.

Opposition’s Arguments
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that in order to determine if Defendants can benefit from the Kirstie Lee Walker protective order at the deposition of Tim States, the Court should resolve whether Defendants have admitted Plaintiff was a passenger that they rearended.

Plaintiff argues in relevant part:

Defendants filed an admission of liability to Plaintiff on June 13, 2023, Exhibit A: “2. Defendants admit to liability for causing the accident that occurred on November 1, 2018, which is the subject of this lawsuit. Defendants will not assert any comparative fault upon Plaintiff for the accident.” This unequivocally admits Defendants caused the accident that is the subject of the instant lawsuit in which Plaintiff claimed he was a passenger whose vehicle was struck by Defendants. There is no disclaimer that Defendants' admission of liability is limited to rearending the F-150, as opposed to also rearending the claimed occupant Plaintiff. Indeed, any ambiguity would have to be construed against Defendants as drafters under Civil Code Section 1654.

Defendants filed a motion for protective order on June 20. 2024, Exhibit C [exhibits omitted) that admits: “This action arises from a three-vehicle collision that occurred on November 1. 2018. Pacific Bell Telephone Company (“PBTC”) employee Kirstie lee Walker was driving a PBTC vehicle 1-405 near Lennox Blvd, in Inglewood, CA when traffic in front of her came to a sudden stop. Ms. Walker could not stop in time, and the front of her vehicle contacted the rear of the vehicle in which Plaintiff Zarate Blanco 9 "Plaintiff”) was a passenger. Defendants PBTC and Walker have admitted to liability for the accident, but do not admit that the accident caused each of the injuries Plaintiff alleges were caused by the accident, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical care provided to Plaintiff', the nature and extent of Plaintiff's injuries and damages asserted by Plaintiff, or anything beyond liability for causing the accident.” Exhibit C at 4:3-10. This passage in the moving papers unequivocally admits that the filed admission. Exhibit B. conceded that Plaintiff was a passenger in the truck when Defendants rearended it.

Defendants then used their filed admission of liability, including the concession just noted at page 4 of their moving papers, to obtain a protective order on Sept 18. 2023 that limited the scope of testimony, but not documents, so as to preclude evidence of negligent entrustment or hiring, but not evidence of causation of injury or of Walker’s sobriety. Plaintiffs relied upon such passage in interpreting the admission of liability and Judge Hobbs no doubt also relied upon such passage when Her Honor granted the protective order in part. It should be noted that Defendants had attached the CHP report of the subject accident in their reply in support of their motion for protective order for the Walker deposition, demonstrating that they had made their concession that Plaintiff had been a passenger in the truck they rearended Plaintiff even though they had the CHP report omitting mentioning him being in the truck.

…

If the Court rules that Defendants have conceded that Plaintiff was a passenger they rearended, then Plaintiff agrees that the protective order should carry over to the Tim States deposition.

If the Court rules that Defendants have not conceded that Plaintiff was a passenger, then the protective order should be stricken as obtained by mistake or fraud, and the benefit should not carry over to the Tim States deposition.

(Pl. Oppo. p. 2-4.)

Defendants’ Arguments in Reply
In Reply, Defendants argue that Defendants’ admission of liability does not admit Plaintiff was in the vehicle and that background facts in a prior motion brought by Defendants do not amount to an admission.

ANALYSIS
Meet and Confer
“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2025.420(a).)

Here, Defendants’ counsel’s declaration does not allege that a meet and confer occurred.

CCP § 2025.420(b)

Under CCP § 2025.420(b):

The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:

(1) That the deposition not be taken at all.

(5) That the deposition be taken only on certain specified terms and conditions.

…

(9) That certain matters not be inquired into.

(10) That the scope of the examination be limited to certain matters.

(11) That all or certain of the writings or tangible things designated in the deposition notice not be produced, inspected, copied, tested, or sampled, or that conditions be set for the production of electronically stored information designated in the deposition notice.

…

(CCP § 2025.420(b)(1), (5), (9), (10), & (11).

Here, Defendants move for a protective order to limit the scope of the deposition of Mr. States, including document production, to questions and documents related to issues of causation such as speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries.

Further, Defendants seek a protective order on the grounds that any issues related to liability for the accident or negligent entrustment/hiring/retention are irrelevant and thus cannot be asked at Mr. States’ deposition.

Good Cause
Determining whether or not the Court should grant or deny this motion is primarily difficult because neither moving nor opposing papers submitted arguments that were particularly helpful to the Court.

Therefore, in light of that, the Court first notes that Defendants, as the moving party, have the burden to establish good cause on this motion. “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense….” (CCP § 2025.420(b).)

Vague Relief Sought
Defendants move for a protective order to limit the scope of the deposition of Mr. States, including document production, to questions and documents related to issues of causation such as speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries.

In the deposition notice at issue, there are 12 categories of documents listed in the deposition notice that Plaintiff seeks to be produced. Even assuming that Defendants demonstrated good cause that the deposition questions and documents should be related to issues of causation such as speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), and conversations at the scene about the nature of the impact and injuries, Defendants’ motion does not indicate which of the 12 categories of documents listed in the deposition notice fall within these categories. Therefore, drafting a protective order would be difficult for the Court when Movants don’t even explain which 12 categories of documents in the deposition notice should be limited.

Again, even if the Court assumes the truth of Defendants’ argument – that any issues related to liability for the accident or negligent entrustment/hiring/retention are irrelevant – Defendants fail to identify which of the 12 categories of documents that are requested to be produced in the deposition notice fall under the category of “issues related to liability for the accident or negligent entrustment/hiring/retention.”

September 18, 2023
Defendants state:

On September 18, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order as to Kirstie Walker’s deposition and documents, limiting the scope of her deposition and documents to questions and information related to limited causation - issues of speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived) and conversations at the scene. (Shikai Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. B.)

(Def. Mot. p. 7.)

Defendants argue that the scope of this deposition and document production should be limited in the same manner that Ms. Walker’s deposition was limited in the September 18, 2023 Minute Order.

For background, the Court notes what the 9/18/2023 Minute Order stated:

Having reviewed and considered the moving papers, opposition, reply, and argument presented, the Court adopts its modified Tentative Ruling as follows:

The Court GRANTS the motion for a protective order. The scope of this deposition is to be limited to questions related to issues of speed, damage to the vehicles, injuries (received and perceived), conversations at the scene, sobriety at time of accident, and whether defendant suffers from addictions to illegal drugs. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Discussion: From the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that the deposition should be limited according to the liability already conceded by Defendant. The Court is unpersuaded that the area of inquiry is relevant to the claims against the Defendant Employee Kirstie Walker given the current posture of the case.

(9/18/2023 Min. Order, p. 1.)

Defendants also argue that the issues involved in this motion have already been decided through the Court’s September 18, 2023 Minute Order on Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order for Ms. Walker’s deposition.

Here, the Court notes that to the extent that Defendants are arguing that this Court must rule the same as it did in accordance with the 9/18/2023 Minute Order, the Court does not find that argument availing.

Defendants come forward with zero legal authority for the proposition that this Court is somehow bound by a Minute Order pertaining to discovery propounded on a different individual.

This Court has no reason to believe that moving Defendants do not have to establish good cause as to this specific motion under 2025.420(b).

Good Cause Revisited
Defendants point this Court to Exhibit A of the moving papers. Exhibit A is Pacific Bell Telephone Company and Kirstie Lee Walker’s Admission of Liability dated 6/13/2023.

This admission states:

PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY and KIRSTIE LEE WALKER (collectively “Defendants”), by and through their attorneys of record, hereby admit to the following:

1. Defendant PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY (“PBTC”) admits that Defendant Kirstie Lee Walker was an employee of PBTC and acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident.

2. Defendants admit to liability for causing the accident that occurred on November 1, 2018, which is the subject of this lawsuit. Defendants will not assert any comparative fault upon Plaintiff for the accident.

3. Defendants DO NOT admit that the accident caused each of the injuries Plaintiff alleges were caused by the accident, the reasonableness and necessity of the medical care provided to Plaintiff, the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages asserted by Plaintiff, or anything beyond liability for causing the accident on November 1, 2018, which is the subject of this lawsuit.

(Shikai Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)

Defendants then explain how Plaintiff now seeks the deposition of Pacific Bell Telephone Company employee Tim States, and Defendants seek to quash the operative deposition notice (to stay the deposition until this Motion is heard), and to obtain a protective order limiting this deposition to only those questions and topics that are relevant to the issue of Plaintiff’s damages, including causation as it relates to his claimed injuries from the incident.

Defendants argue that any topics and documents outside of that, including Mr. States’ employment history, his cellphone records, employment file, and any other topics and documents pertaining to liability for the accident and negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention, would be irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, unduly burdensome, and oppressive pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.420.

Here, the Court does not follow Defendants’ arguments/line of reasoning.

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense….” (CCP § 2025.420(b).)

Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

At the hearing, if Defendants want this motion granted, Defendants should be expected to explain their argument(s) to the Court, as the Court does not follow Defendants’ argument, and thus the Court fails to see how Defendants established good cause.

Further, Defendants should be prepared to address each of the 12 groups of documents requested to be produced in the deposition notice in order to establish good cause for a protective with respect to the 12 categories sought. Further, if Defendants establish good cause for the protective order, Defendants should be prepared to explain how they want the protective order drafted with respect to each of the 12 categories of documents sought in the document production in the deposition notice.

Diaz
Defendants argue that under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1154-58, it is well established that where an employer admits that an employee was in the course and scope of his employment when causing an incident, plaintiff cannot then attempt to obtain evidence of negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention because it is irrelevant.

Defendants thus argue that documents, evidence, or testimony relating to negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, or negligent retention are irrelevant, and Plaintiff cannot seek to discover this in Plaintiff’s deposition or requests for production contained in the deposition notice.

The Court does not find Defendants’ argument on this issue availing.

Defendants’ admission states:

PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY and KIRSTIE LEE WALKER (collectively “Defendants”), by and through their attorneys of record, hereby admit to the following:

(Shikai Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)

Based on the Court’s reading of Defendants’ admission, and based on Defendants’ moving papers, Defendants explain how they have admitted liability for the accident, but have not admitted that the accident caused the injuries Plaintiff alleges were caused by the accident. Defendants even clarify in their moving papers how one issue of dispute in this case is whether Plaintiff was actually in the vehicle at the time of the accident.

The fact that Defendants have not admitted to liability for causing the injuries to Plaintiff seems to be relevant here.

As stated in Diaz v. Carcamo:

If, as here, all of a plaintiff's causes of action depend on a contention that an employee's negligent driving in the scope of employment was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and if the defendant-employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee's negligent driving, then that offer will “remove[ ] from the case” the issue of the employer's liability for any damage caused by its employee's negligent driving, leaving no “material issue” to which negligent entrustment evidence can be relevant.

(Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1157-58.)

Diaz seems to be inapposite in the instant context because Defendants here are not admitting to liability with respect to causing Plaintiff’s injuries. Diaz did not address the instance here where Defendants are admitting liability to the accident, but did not admit liability as to causing Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants attempt to use Diaz for a proposition that Diaz does not support because Diaz did not address Defendants’ scenario here wherein Defendants are not admitting liability to causing Plaintiff’s injuries. Further, the Court notes that Diaz was not a discovery case. Diaz was at a completely different procedural posture; the case had gone to trial.

TENTATIVE RULING
The Court will hear argument.

Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2025.420(h).)

Defendants seek a total of $1,810.00 in sanctions against Raymond Feldman and the Law of Offices of John C. Ye, APLC for Defendants’ their fees and costs associated with having to bring this motion. Defendants argue that Defendants have been forced to incur unnecessary fees and costs in having to bring this Motion when, pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2023 Order on Ms. Walker’s deposition, this deposition should also be limited in the same manner.

Further, Defendants’ counsel’s declaration states:

My hourly rate is currently $275.00. Approximately 0.5 hour was spent meeting and conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel on this Motion; 2.5 hours were spent preparing this Motion; and I anticipate an additional 2.0 hours will be spent preparing the Reply, and preparing for and appearing at the hearing on this Motion. This totals 5.0 hours, and Defendants thus request reimbursement of attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,375.00. The filing fee for this Motion is $435.00. Thus, Defendant seek a total of $1,810.00 as reimbursement for this Motion. This request for monetary sanctions is brought on grounds that, pursuant to Sections 2025.410(d) and 2025.420(h), Defendants have been forced to incur unnecessary fees and costs in having to bring this Motion when, pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2023 Order on Ms. Walker’s deposition, this deposition should also be limited in the same manner. If Defendants are successful in having this Protective Order granted, Defendants seek reimbursement for their fees and costs in having to bring this Motion, as Plaintiff had no substantial justification for opposing this Motion, nor does any other circumstance make the imposition of this sanction unjust.

(Shikai Decl. ¶ 15.)

The Court will hear argument, as the Court’s ruling on sanctions is dependent on the Court’s ruling on the merits of Defendants’ motion. Of particular note, the Court would like an explanation as to how Defendants’ counsel alleges that the filing fee for this motion is $435.00.

COMBINED TENTATIVE RULINGS FOR MOTIONS WITH Res IDs: 2112, 0011, 5166, 7236
Motions 0011 and 5166 are nearly identical to Motion 2112. Motion 0011 pertained to Defendants seeking to quash the deposition/production of documents of Mark Martin, and Motion 5166 pertained to Defendants seeking to quash the deposition/production of documents of Michael Jenkins. Further, both Motions 0011 and 5166 sought sanctions. Further, the Replies in Motion 0011 and 5166 clarified and adjusted their sanctions request and specified the protective order should apply to RFPs 8, 9, 11, and 12 for the motions to quash.

As previously indicated in the Court’s analysis re: Motion 2112, this Court does not follow Defendants’ reasoning on how the requested information is irrelevant, and Defendants had the burden to show good cause with respect to their three motions – 2112, 0011, and 5166. Therefore, the Court does not find that Defendants demonstrated good cause for granting Defendants’ motions.

Additionally on hearing today is Motion 7236, and that motion pertains to Plaintiff seeking to compel the deposition testimony and production of documents at deposition of Defendant’s (Pacific Bell Telephone Company) employees Tim States, Michael Jenkins, and Mark Martin.

Or to phrase it differently, what Plaintiff seeks to compel in Motion 7236 are the exact things that Defendants filed motions to quash directed at.

As noted in Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Motion 7236), Plaintiff’s motion improperly combined three motions into one.

A motion must be brought separately as to each discovery method at issue. Plaintiff’s Motion 7236 should have been filed as three separate motions and three filing fees paid. Instead, Plaintiff filed only one motion to compel the deposition/requests for production at deposition for three different employees of Defendant. “[P]ayment of filing fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional.” (Hu vs. Silgan Containers Corp. (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4^th 1261, 1269.)

Therefore, if Plaintiff wants his three motions to compel the deposition testimony and requests for production heard, Plaintiff should be prepared to pay the two additional filing fees before the hearing.

Defendants’ argument in Opposition that CCP 2025.450 is not applicable to compelling depositions is unavailing. CCP § 2025.450(a) mentions “without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410,” and Defendants did not serve a valid objection under that code section.

However, equally as problematic as Defendants’ motions, is that for Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff also has the burden to show good cause under CCP § 2025.450(b) for his motion.

And just like Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff’s motion also fails to establish good cause for what he seeks to compel.

Both parties fail to explain their arguments in an understandable manner.

Defendants seem to argue that Mark Martin shouldn’t be deposed even though his name came up in Ms. Walker’s deposition because Ms. Walker eventually corrected herself.

The Court does not find that argument availing. If Plaintiff were to take Ms. Walker’s word for it, and in fact it turned out she wasn’t telling the truth, Plaintiff’s failure to depose a witness with potentially discoverable information would fall on Plaintiff’s shoulders.

However, overall, neither party explains how what they seek to compel/quash is relevant/irrelevant in a legally understandable manner.

One would think the parties would state what the causes of actions are, what the elements to those causes of actions are, what the asserted defenses are, and how the information sought is applicable to those elements or affirmative defenses.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants do as such, and this makes deciphering Plaintiff and Defendants’ arguments on relevance/irrelevance borderline incomprehensible, as they don’t root their arguments in legal authority.

Thus, the Court is left in the conundrum of both Plaintiff and Defendants failing to meet their burden on each of their motions.

If the Court were to deny all motions on this ground, then both parties are left in limbo, and this makes no practical sense for any of the parties.

Therefore, the Court is left to examining the requests in the deposition notice and attempting to guess how Plaintiff believes those requests are relevant and how Defendants believe those requests are irrelevant.

Upon the Court’s examination of those requests, there does not appear to be a blatantly irrelevant request that causes the Court to think that the sought after information is not discoverable.

Therefore, since both parties fail to meet their burden on their motions, the Court believes the only practical thing to do is to revert to the standard for discovery in § 2017.010:

Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.

(CCP § 2017.010.)

Therefore, in light of the liberal discovery standard, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s three motions to compel the deposition testimony/production of documents and DENIES Defendants’ three motions to quash/protective order.

To the extent that the responses to the requests in the deposition notice were objected to, those objections were boilerplate, and to the extent that the objections asserted a claim of privilege/work product doctrine, the objections were not code-compliant with CCP § 2031.240.

Plaintiff also sought sanctions for his motions to compel under 2025.450(g)(1) in the amount of $1,710.00.

“If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2025.450(g)(1).)

The Court will hear argument as to Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ requests for sanctions on all three motions since Defendants’ motions were unavailing.