Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV00001, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV00001, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV00001 Hearing Date: September 29, 2023 Dept: E

Case No: 23GDCV00001
Hearing Date: 09/29/2023 – 10:00am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: CAMERON STALLONES, an individual; ERICA RYAN STALLONES, an individual, v. WILLIAM LEE, in individual; and DOES 1-10 inclusive

[TENTATIVE RULING ON DEMURRER]

RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant William Lee will demur to the Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Cameron Stallones and Erica Ryan Stallones, filed on July 20, 2023, on grounds that the statute of limitations for negligence bars the Second Amended Complaint (Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) [“The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”]) and that the Plaintiffs have failed to join an indispensable party to the action, a receiver in possession with exclusive control over the subject property (Id., at subdivision (d) [“There is a defect or misjoinder of parties”]).

For the reasons set out below, and subject to further discussion at the hearing, the Court’s tentative is to OVERRULE the demurrer.

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Defendant, William Lee

Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Cameron Stallones and Erica Ryan Stallones

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on 01/03/2023. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on 04/18/2023. On 06/30/2023, the Court heard Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC and sustained it with 20 days leave to amend.

On 07/20/2023, Plaintiffs, Cameron Stallones and Erica Ryan Stallones filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against Defendant, William Lee, alleging seven causes of action for: (1) Negligence, (2) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Use and Enjoyment, (4) Breach of Contract, (5) Nuisance, (6) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and (7) Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS
Demurrer – Sufficiency
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Demurrer – Uncertainty
A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s demurrer is somewhat unclear, in the Court’s view.

Several times throughout the demurrer, Defendant’s arguments are either difficult to follow, or Defendant cites case law out of context.

In fairness, Plaintiff’s Opposition is equally difficult to follow.

Defendant argues that every single cause of action in the SAC has a statute of limitations of two years because negligence has a statute of limitations of two years and, because the gravamen of the SAC is negligence, the two-year statute of limitations applies to all causes of action in the SAC.

The Court does not agree. Even under the case law quoted by Defendant in Hensler, Defendant’s own quote does not support that assertion. Defendant’s quote from Hensler references determining the statute of limitations to a cause of action, not an entire complaint. Defendant’s quote does not state that a single cause of action in a complaint determines the statute of limitations for the entire complaint when the complaint alleges several different causes of action.

Both Defendant and Plaintiff discuss Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 44 Cal.4th 1185. However, the Court does not find it necessary to address that case based on the lack of clarity in Defendant’s demurrer.

In Plaintiff’s SAC, Plaintiff has a section titled “General Allegations” located at ¶¶1-37 of the SAC. These General Allegations are incorporated into every cause of action in the SAC.

Defendant groups several of the allegations in the General Allegations section of the SAC into categories in its demurrer as “Allegations from More than Ten (10) Years Ago,” “Allegations within the Past (5) Years,” and “Allegations within the Past Three (3) Years.”

It appears, although it is not entirely clear, that Defendant is arguing that these allegations are barred based on Defendant’s assertion that negligence has a two-year statute of limitations.

The Court does not find Defendant’s argument availing for several reasons.

First, even if the Court were to assume that the allegations that Defendant refers to are barred based on the two-year negligence statute of limitations, the allegations that Defendant refers to are incorporated in every single claim in the SAC since they are part of the General Allegations. Therefore, even if one of those groups of allegations referred to by Defendant was barred under a negligence theory, it does not mean they are barred under different causes of actions with different statute of limitations. Since Defendant did not even attempt to explain what the statute of limitations is for every cause of action, the Court will not attempt to do the Defendant’s job and determine what the statute of limitations is for every claim and try to decipher what conduct in the general allegations is time barred as to every cause of action.

Further, even if some of the conduct in the general allegations is time barred, that does not establish that an entire cause of action is time barred.

For example, if a single paragraph referenced time-barred allegations in the General Allegations with respect to negligence, that does not mean that the entire negligence action is time barred because the SAC could contain other conduct that is not time barred; therefore, the entire negligence action wouldn’t be barred as a whole. The General Allegations section is not alleged to pertain to a singular cause of action.

“The defense of statute of limitations may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) “In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred. ((E-Fab, Inc., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 1315-16 citing McMahon v. Republic Van & Storage Co., Inc. (1963 59 Cal.2d 871, 874.)

Further, the Court notes that although the notice of demurrer mentions failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, nowhere in Defendant’s demurrer did Defendant provide any arguments on this issue.

Defendant also argues that this demurrer should be sustained with leave to amend for Plaintiff’s failure to join an indispensable party.

Defendant argues as follows:

Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to join a necessary party, the current property manager and receiver. The SAC alleges that “On or about December 14, 2021 the Court appointed Eric P. Beatty as receiver of the real property located at 11408-1410 Rock Glen Ave. The Court granted Mr. Beatty with the powers and responsibilities of operating, managing, controlling, and maintaining the Property. These responsibilities included keeping the Property in good repair. The Order restricted Mr. Lee’s ability to enter the Property or take any action to interfere with the Receiver or to use, operate, manage, or control the Property.” (SAC, ¶¶ 29-30).

In other words, Lee no longer has possession or control over the subject Property. In other words, it has been legally impossible for Lee to comply with any maintenance requests since December 14, 2021.

Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a) requires that Plaintiffs join the receiver as a Defendant, for the following reasons:

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.

The receiver is subject to service of process, since this Court has personal jurisdiction over the receiver and subject matter jurisdiction over the Property. Although Plaintiffs should seek leave of the court appointing the receiver, (the Los Angeles Superior Court, Department A, Burbank Courthouse), the receiver may be joined without depriving this Court of “jurisdiction.” (Ostrowski v. Miller (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 79, 85.)

(Dem. p. 9-10.)

For clarity, the Court cites CCP §389(a)-(d) below:

(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.

(b) If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

(c) A complaint or cross-complaint shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.

(d) Nothing in this section affects the law applicable to class actions.

(CCP §389(a)-(d).)

As to Defendant’s joinder argument, the Court requests that both parties address this issue at the hearing. Plaintiff did not address the issue of joinder in its Opposition. Further, what the Court is concerned about with respect to Defendant’s argument is whether the Court has to sustain a demurrer for this issue. Both parties should be prepared to address the issue of the alleged indispensable party at the hearing.

TENTATIVE RULING DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant’s arguments as to sustaining the demurrer based on the statute of limitations is unavailing. Both parties should be prepared to address the issue of the alleged indispensable party at the hearing and how the parties intend to deal with this potential issue. On eCourt, this hearing is titled “Hearing on Demurrer – with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) To Second Amended Complt. Filed by Deft. (5428)”; however, no motion to strike was filed with this demurrer.

The Court’s tentative—subject to further discussion at the hearing—is to OVERRULE the demurrer.