Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case Number: 23GDCV00056, Date: 2023-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV00056, Date: 2023-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV00056 Hearing Date: December 8, 2023 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 12/08/2023 – 10:00am
Case No: 23GDCV00056
Trial Date: 09/30/2024
Case Name: JOHN RAMSEYER and RONDA RAMSEYER v. B&W AUTOMOTIVE, INC., a California Corporation, dba BRAVO CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM OF ALHAMBRA; FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and Does 1-10 inclusive

2 - TENTATIVE RULINGS ON (2) MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

BACKGROUND
On 01/26/2023, Plaintiffs John and Ronda Ramseyer filed a Complaint against B&W Automotive, Inc, a California Corporation, dba Bravo Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Alhambra and FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company.

The first cause of action for Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty is alleged against FCA.

The second cause of action for negligent repair is alleged against Bravo Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Alhambra.

Plaintiffs allege that on October 23, 2016, they entered into a warranty contract with FCA regarding a 2016 Jeep Cherokee. (Compl. ¶15.)

MOTION 1 – Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories

RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff moves the Court for an order compelling further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,385.00 against Defendant FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro PC.

This motion is made on the grounds that Defendant FCA US LLC has not provided Code compliant responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories numbers 18-23, 25, 26, 29-31, and 43- 48, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (e) and 2023.030, subdivision (g).)

The Court notes that the relief requested in the Notice only referred to “Plaintiff,” despite the fact that there are two Plaintiffs.

Procedural

Moving Party: Movant simply refers to “Plaintiff” despite there being two Plaintiffs. The Court will presume that both Plaintiffs, John and Ronda Ramseyer are moving to compel further responses since Exhibit A in the Lopez Declaration states that the propounding party is Plaintiffs, John Ramseyer and Ronda Ramseyer.

Responding Party: Defendant, FCA US LLC

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Separate Statement; Proposed Order; Lopez Declaration

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

The Court notes that the Reply accurately pointed out that the Opposition was untimely; however, the Court will still consider the untimely Opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD - COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

(2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

(3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.

(CCP §2030.300(a).

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following:

(1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered.

(2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings.

(3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.

(CCP §2030.210(a).)

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (CCP §2030.300(c).)

Here, Movant’s motion appears timely. Movant explained how responding party never provided verifications.

Meet and Confer
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP §2030.300(b)(1).)

Here, Movant included the declaration of Lopez wherein a meet and confer was alleged in ¶5 of the declaration.

Opposition’s argument that Movant did not comply with the meet and confer requirement is unavailing. Opposition argues that Movant did not comply with Department E’s requirement that states, “The parties must first meet and confer in person, by video conference, or by telephone call to attempt to informally resolve all discovery issues. If the parties cannot agree, the Court requests that the parties schedule an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) with the Courtroom Assistant and participate in the IDC before filing any discovery motion.” Here, the Court does not find this sufficient to deny the motion because Movant attempted to meet and confer by email and Opposition did not respond.

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Opposition argues that Plaintiffs provided virtually no substantive discussion demonstrating good cause for further responses to Plaintiffs’ SROGs.

Here, the Court does not find this argument availing. The burden is not on the movant to demonstrate good cause. While a motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand requires good cause, a motion to compel a further response to an interrogatory does not. (Compare CCP §2031.310(b)(1) to CCP §2030.300(b).)

Movant argues that FCA has either completely refused to answer the questions asked, provided evasive responses, or provided responses that are not code compliant. Movant also mentions how verifications were not provided. Movant also argues that FCA’s objections in response are improper.

Here, the Court tentatively plans to GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses.

As a preliminary matter, FCA’s responses appear to either object entirely, or have objections interspersed with responses.

Unlike Movant, who submitted a separate statement, FCA did not submit a separate statement in Opposition. While the Court does not find that it is a requirement for FCA to submit a separate statement in Opposition, FCA does have the burden of justifying any objections and failure to respond to the interrogatories. With no separate statement in Opposition, much of FCA’s Opposition is boilerplate pertaining to discovery, generally speaking, that does not specifically justify its objections with respect to any of the individual SROGs at issue. Therefore, it is difficult to decipher Opposition’s arguments attempting to justify its objections.

The most specific the Opposition gets with respect to discussing individual SROGs, is when Opposition states:

The amount at issue concerning Plaintiffs’ single vehicle does not warrant requiring Defendant to conduct a search for (#25) training materials, (# 26 and 31) policies and procedures for complying with Song-Beverly, (#45 & 46) anticipated and actual repair rates and (#47 & 48) most common symptoms or complaints regarding all 2016 Jeep Cherokee vehicles. There are hundreds of agents that process Song Beverly claims for the State of California and each one operates on a case-by-case basis with their own methodology as per FCA US policies and procedures delineated in the Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and CAC Policies & Procedures, as already produced months ago subject to a protective order.

(Oppo. p. 4-5.)

As to the statement above by Opposition, the Court isn’t sure what Opposition is even trying to explain.

FCA further responds as follows: “Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, please see the copy of the Dealer Policy Manual, the copy of the policies and procedures of its Customer Assistance Center regarding handling of customer complaints and requests for refund or replacement of their vehicle, produced by FCA US in response to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production of Documents No. 19.” (See response to SROG 18.) As to those responses with reference to 2030.230, the Court does not see how those responses are appropriate in the instant scenario.

CCP §2030.230 states, “ If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. This specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained. The responding party shall then afford to the propounding party a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect these documents and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries of them.”

The Court fails to see how 2030.230 is applicable in the instant scenario, and Opposition makes no cognizable argument as to how that response is appropriate in the circumstances.

FCA further responds as follows: “In California and pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA US would offer to repurchase or replace a new motor vehicle if it contained a non-conformity covered by the applicable limited express warranty that substantially impaired its use, value or safety that was not repaired after a reasonable number of attempts to do so.” (See SROG 19.) As to those responses, the Court fails to see how that response is responsive to the interrogatories, thus those responses appear evasive.

Further, in several of FCA’s responses, FCA stated that the SROGs were not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Opposition also brings these objections up, presumably in an attempt to justify those objections, but FCA doesn’t explain in any cognizable manner as to how the requests are not relevant, overly broad, or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 1

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to SROGs 18-23, 25, 26, 29-31, and 43-48 is GRANTED.

FCA did not justify its objections. Further, it is entirely unclear how § 2030.230 is applicable in the instant scenario, and several of FCA’s responses seemed evasive as it is unclear how several of the responses are responsive to the SROGs.

FCA is to provide verified, code compliant responses, without objections in 10 days. The Court directs FCA to CCP §§ 2030.210 and 2030.220.

Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP §2030.300(d).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a).)

Movant request monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,385.00 imposed against FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro PC.

Movant explains its sanctions request as follows:

10. As a result of Defendant’s failure to provide Code-compliant responses and the time and effort it took Plaintiffs to meet and confer, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court award monetary sanctions for the costs associated with Plaintiffs’ preparation of this motion. The total legal fees incurred of preparing the motion and supportive papers will be as follows:

a. I spent 2.6 hours drafting the instant motion, separate statement, proposed order, notice of motion, and declaration, at my normal billing rate of $375.00 per hour, for a total of $825.00.

b. It is also reasonably anticipated that I will spend an additional two hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply at my normal billing rate of $375.00 per hour, for a total of $750.00.

c. Finally, it is reasonably anticipated I will spend an additional two hours preparing for and attending the scheduled hearing on this matter at my normal billing rate of $325.00, for a total of $750.00 d. In all, legal fees will total $2,475.00.

11. Our office will be forced to spend $60.00 in filing the instant motion.

12. Adding up the figures above equals a total of $2,535.00. These sanctions are sought against Defendant FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro P.C.

(Lopez Decl. ¶¶10-12.)

Opposition argues against sanctions by stating:

Based upon Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the Court’s requirements for discovery motions, i.e. meeting and conferring in person, by video conference or by telephone, and for requesting an IDC prior to filing any discovery motion, there is simply no justification for sanctions in this case. In fact, the court “shall” sanction the moving party if the moving party files a Motion to Compel before attempting a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to meet and confer with the responding party. (See CCP §§ 2023.010 (i) and 2023.030.)

(Oppo. p. 8.)

The issue of sanctions will be taken up at the hearing.

MOTION 2 – Compel Further – Requests for Production

RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiffs move the Court for an order compelling responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,535.00 against Defendant FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro P.C.

This motion is made on the grounds that Defendant FCA US LLC has not provided Code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production numbers 16-32 and 45-46 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310.

Procedural

Moving Party: Plaintiffs, John Ramseyer and Ronda Ramseyer
Responding Party: Defendant, FCA US LLC

Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b): Ok

Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Separate Statement; Proposed Order; Lopez Declaration

Opposition Papers: Opposition

Reply Papers: Reply

The Court notes that the Reply accurately points out that the Opposition was untimely; however, the Court will still consider the untimely Opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER – REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”

“In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show “good cause” for the request—but unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (CCP §2031.310(c).)

Here, Movant’s motion appears timely. Movant explained how responding party never provided verifications.

Meet and Confer
“The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP §2031.310(b)(2).)

Here, Movant included the declaration of Lopez wherein a meet and confer was alleged in ¶5 of the declaration.

Opposition’s argument that Movant did not comply with the meet and confer requirement is unavailing. Opposition argues that Movant did not comply with Department E’s requirement that states, “The parties must first meet and confer in person, by video conference, or by telephone call to attempt to informally resolve all discovery issues. If the parties cannot agree, the Court requests that the parties schedule an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) with the Courtroom Assistant and participate in the IDC before filing any discovery motion.” Here, the Court does not find this as sufficient grounds to deny the motion because Movant attempted to meet and confer by email and Opposition did not respond.

ANALYSIS

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16.

All of YOUR warranty claims policy and procedure manual(s) from 2018 to the present.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 16:

FCA US will comply in part with this request and produce, subject to protective order, a copy of the current Warranty Administration manual. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 16
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 16.

Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”

For the most part, Movant has demonstrated good cause with respect to the instant request by explaining how this request is relevant to FCA’s policies and procedures and whether FCA complied with the Song-Beverly Act. However, Movant’s motion states that the instant action pertains to a 2016 Jeep Cherokee. The Court is unclear as to why the request pertains to the years 2018 to the present. Further, the Court is unclear as to why the request isn’t limited to warranty claims policy and procedure manuals that are limited to the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle.

If the Movant can demonstrate good cause with respect to “from 2018 to the present,” and why the request isn’t limited to warranty claims policy and procedure manuals of the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle, the Court is inclined to grant this motion with respect to this RFP and overrule FCA’s objections. If Movant cannot demonstrate good cause, then the Court is inclined to Deny this motion with respect to this RFP.

Further, if Movant demonstrates good cause, the Court does not find FCA’s response with respect to the protective order to be compliant. The Movant explains that the code does not allow a party to unilaterally condition production on a protective order. The Court finds Movant’s argument availing because §§ 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230 and 2031.240 explain how responding party is to respond. Responding party’s response did not comply with those code sections. Further, if responding party were to move for a protective order, it appears that FCA would have had to have complied with § 2031.060, and here, FCA did not move for a protective order.

Lastly, if the Movant demonstrates good cause, the Court does not find FCA’s objections justified as they are boilerplate and FCA does not explain in a cognizable fashion how the objections are justified.

FCA did not submit a separate statement in Opposition. While the Court does not find that it is a requirement for FCA to submit a separate statement in Opposition, FCA has the burden of justifying any objections after Movant first establishes good cause. The burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117. Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (See Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

With no separate statement in Opposition, much of FCA’s Opposition is boilerplate pertaining to discovery, generally speaking, that does not specifically justify its objections with respect to any of the individual RFPs at issue. Therefore, it is difficult to decipher Opposition’s arguments attempting to justify its objections.

The most specific the Opposition gets with respect to talking about individual requests, Opposition states:

(Oppo. p.5.)

As to the statement above in Opposition, the Court is unclear what Opposition is trying to say.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17.

YOUR workshop manual(s) for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 17:

FCA US will comply in full to this request and produce, subject to protective order, a copy of the Service Manual applicable to the SUBJECT VEHICLE. FCA US objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad, compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US as well as individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US nor within FCA US’ control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 17
Here, the Court finds that Movant demonstrated good cause.

Further, the Court does not find FCA’s response with respect to the protective order to be compliant. The Movant explains how the code does not allow a party to unilaterally condition production on a protective order. The Court finds Movant’s argument availing because §§ 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230 and 2031.240 explain how responding party is to respond. Responding party’s response did not comply with those code sections. Further, if responding party were to move for a protective order, it appears that FCA would have had to have complied with § 2031.060, and here, FCA did not move for a protective order.

The Court does not find FCA’s objections justified as they are boilerplate and FCA does not explain in a cognizable fashion how the objections are justified. Again, FCA did not submit a separate statement in Opposition. While the Court does not find that it is a requirement for FCA to submit a separate statement in Opposition, as noted FCA has the burden of justifying any objections after Movant first establishes good cause.

The more specific statement is identical to the one discussed above in re RFP 16.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further response to RFP 17 is GRANTED. FCA is to provide a verified, code compliant, further response, without objection.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18.

The operative Franchise Agreement, if any, on the date of sale of the SUBJECT VEHICLE between YOU and the dealership that sold the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Plaintiffs.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 18:

FCA US objects to this request because it is overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 18
Here, Movant’s separate statement demonstrated good cause as to the request. The Court incorporates its prior reasoning as explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 17” with respect to its explanation on overruling the instant objections in RFP 18.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further response to RFP 18 is GRANTED. FCA is to provide a verified, code compliant, further response, without objection.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19.

All DOCUMENTS which describe the procedures used by YOU for evaluating and responding to complaints by California consumers regarding vehicles YOU manufactured or distributed since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 19:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOU” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 19
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 19. The Court also adopts the further reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 16,” into this ruling as the Court is unclear as to why 2018 is relevant when the Subject Vehicle is a 2016. Further, the Court is unclear why the request is not limited to the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle. If the Movant demonstrates good cause, the Court is inclined to grant the motion with respect to this request as explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 16.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20.

All DOCUMENTS which describe policies, procedures, and/or instructions since 2018 that YOUR employees and agents should follow when evaluating a customer request for a refund of their money paid towards or owed on a motor vehicle manufactured or distributed by YOU.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 20:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the terms “YOU” and/or “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 20
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 20. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, or guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 21:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 21
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 21. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22.

All training materials regarding the handling of consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase in California since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US further objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 22
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 22. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23.

All training materials for YOUR employees or agents tasked with determining whether a vehicle is eligible or a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 23:

FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US further objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 23
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 23. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24.

All scripts and flow charts that YOU utilize in handling California consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase or replacement since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 24:

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 24
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 24. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a repair presentation to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 25:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 25
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 25. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a “non-conformity” to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 26:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 26
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 26. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a “substantial impairment” of a vehicle’s use, value, or safety to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 27:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 27
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 27. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for defining what constitutes a “reasonable number of repair attempts” to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 28:

FCA US does not utilize a single definition of what constitutes a reasonable number of repairs when considering whether a vehicle qualifies for repurchase under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. California Civil Code section 1793.2 does not define what constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts. Whether a vehicle was repaired within a reasonable number of repair attempts will vary depending on myriad factors including, but not limited to, the mechanical component being repaired, the nature of the mechanical problem, the ability of the customer to accurately describe the mechanical problem, the availability of diagnostic information identifying the mechanical problem, the availability of replacement parts, if needed, and the existence of more than one mechanical problem with similar presentations, considerations of whether the problem is related to an earlier mechanical problem, and considerations of whether the problem is related to a component that is covered by an applicable warranty. FCA US will nonetheless comply in full with this request and will produce, subject to protective order, a copy of its Warranty Administration Manual, Dealer Policy Manual, and Customer Assistance Center Policies and Procedures for the Subject Vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 28
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 28. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for establishing the turn-around time to respond to a vehicle repurchase request pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 29:

FCA US objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US further objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine or attorney- client privilege. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 29
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 29. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30.

All DOCUMENTS that YOU utilize to determine whether a vehicle is eligible for a repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2018.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 30:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and produce, subject to protective order, all responsive documents within its possession, custody, and control, namely, a copy of the portion of the Dealer Policy Manual that relates to state lemon laws. FCA US will also produce, subject to protective order, a copy of the policies and procedures of its Customer Assistance Center regarding handling of customer complaints and requests for refund or replacement of their vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOU” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 30
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 30. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31.

All DOCUMENTS which evidence or describe YOUR policies, procedures and/or instructions since 2018 which YOUR authorized repair facilities should follow regarding customer requests for a refund of the price paid for a vehicle pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 31:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and produce, subject to protective order, all responsive documents within its possession, custody, and control, namely, a copy of the portion of the Dealer Policy Manual that relates to state lemon laws. FCA US will also produce, subject to protective order, a copy of the policies and procedures of its Customer Assistance Center regarding handling of customer complaints and requests for refund or replacement of their vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 31
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 31. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.”

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32.

All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies and procedures from 2015 to the present for proactively complying with the Song-Beverly Act in California by offering a repurchase or replacement of a qualifying vehicle without a consumer request to do so.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 32:

FCA US will comply in full with this request and produce, subject to protective order, all responsive documents within its possession, custody, and control, namely, a copy of the portion of the Dealer Policy Manual that relates to state lemon laws. FCA US will also produce, subject to protective order, a copy of the policies and procedures of its Customer Assistance Center regarding handling of customer complaints and requests for refund or replacement of their vehicle. FCA US otherwise objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 32
The Court will hear argument as to RFP 32. See reasoning explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 19.” The difference the Court notes with this RFP is that it pertains to 2015 to present. However, the Court still has concerns as to the RFP not pertaining to the same make, model, and year of the subject vehicle and why the RFP extends all the way “to the present,” when the instant vehicle is a 2016.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 45.

All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of 2016 Jeep Cherokee vehicles regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 45:

FCA US objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 45
Here, Movant’s separate statement demonstrated good cause as to the request. The Court incorporates its prior reasoning as explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 17” with respect to its explanation on overruling the instant objections in RFP 45.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further response to RFP 45 is GRANTED. FCA is to provide a verified, code compliant, further response, without objection.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 46.

All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2016 Jeep Cherokee vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 46:

FCA US objects to this request because it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and seeks information neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or proportional to the needs of this case. FCA US also objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the terms “YOU” and/or “YOUR” because it is overly broad and compound, and includes entities not owned or operated by FCA US and individuals or entities who are not agents of FCA US and not within FCA US’s control.

TENTATIVE RULING RFP 46
Here, Movant’s separate statement demonstrated good cause as to the request. The Court incorporates its prior reasoning as explained in “Tentative Ruling RFP 17” with respect to its explanation on overruling the instant objections in RFP 46.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further response to RFP 46 is GRANTED. FCA is to provide a verified, code compliant, further response, without objection.

OVERALL AS TO ALL TENTATIVE RULINGS
For those RFPs in which the Court is compelling a further response, FCA is to provide a verified, code compliant, further response, without objection, within 10 days of this hearing.

Sanctions
Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2031.310(h).)

Movant requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,535.00 against Defendant FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro P.C.

Movant explains its sanctions request as follows:

10. As a result of Defendant’s failure to provide Code-compliant responses and the time and effort it took Plaintiff to meet and confer, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court award monetary sanctions for the costs associated with Plaintiff’s preparation of this motion. The total legal fees incurred of preparing the motion and supportive papers will be as follows:

a. I spent a total of 2.6 hours drafting the instant motion, separate statement, proposed order, notice of motion, and declaration, at my normal billing rate of $375.00 per hour, for a total of $975.00.

d. In all, legal fees will total $2,475.00.

11. Our office will be forced to spend $60.00 in filing the instant motion.

12. Adding up the figures above equals a total of $2,535.00. These sanctions are sought against Defendant FCA US LLC and its attorneys of record, Ongaro P.C.

(Lopez Decl. ¶10-12.)

In Opposition, FCA argues that sanctions should not be imposed because Plaintiffs did not comply with Department E’s discovery requirements pertaining to an IDC and that Plaintiffs did not make a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer.

The Court finds Opposition’s argument against imposing sanctions to be weak considering that FCA never responded to Plaintiffs’ letter attempting to meet and confer.

The issue of sanctions will be taken up at the hearing.