Judge: Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Case: 23GDCV00535, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 23GDCV00535    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: E

 

Hearing Date: 03/13/2025-8:30am
Case No: 23GDCV00535
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: WOO JUNG KIM, an individual; CHI HYON IM, an individual; v. SALLY KIM, an individual; JIMMY TOKESHI, an individual; and all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s title to the Property; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive

TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Woo Jung Kim and Chi Hyon Im, filed a Complaint on 3/16/2023 against Defendants, Sally Kim and Jimmy Tokeshi.

On 6/23/2023, a Cross-Complaint was filed. Cross-Complainants are: (1) Sally Kim, an individual and as Trustee of the Jimmy M. Tokeshi & Sally J. Kim Trust Agreement; and (2) JIMMY TOKESHI, an individual and as Trustee of the Jimmy M. Tokeshi & Sally J. Kim Trust Agreement. The named Cross-Defendants are: (1) Woo Jung Kim, an individual; (2) Chi Hyon Im, an individual; and (3) Nancy B. Hemstreet, an individual and as Trustee of the Hemstreet Trust; and Roes 1-15, inclusive.

On 12/12/2024, Roe 1 in the Cross-Complaint was named as Christopher Pakying Louie, as an individual and as Trustee of the Chris and Tippy Louie Family Trust dated January 7, 2024.

On 12/13/2024, Roe 2 in the Cross-Complaint was named as Tippy Tipnapa Thamsopit, as an individual and as Trustee of the Chris and Tippy Louie Family Trust dated January 7, 2024.

On 1/7/2025, Cross-Complainants, Sally Kim and Jimmy Tokeshi, dismissed Cross-Defendant, Nancy B. Hemstreet, without prejudice, from the Cross-Complaint.

Four motions to compel further are on hearing for 3/13/2025.

In all four motions, moving party is Defendant, Sally Kim, and opposing party is Plaintiff, Chi Hyon Im.

These two actions involve a dispute over a property line.

Plaintiffs allege they became owners of 4646 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA, 91011 on March 23, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants became owners of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 on February 25, 2013. (Compl. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants desire to add a room at the back of their house, as an ADU, which is adjacent to 4646 Palm Drive. (Comp. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that in order to add said ADU to Defendants’ home, Defendants have encroached on to the rear of Plaintiffs’ property through Plaintiffs’ driveway instead of accessing their property from Palm Drive. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

Defendants filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief regarding the boundary lines and use of the shared driveway.

MOTION 1 (Res ID 4181)

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant, Sally Kim, moves the Court for an order compelling further responses, without objections, to Form Interrogatories, Set One, numbers 15.1 and 17.1, within 10 days; from Plaintiff, Chi Hyon Im. Defendant also moves for an order imposing monetary sanctions of $2,856.70 against Plaintiff Chi Hyon Im and/or Russell Law Group.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.300(c).)

Here, Movant’s motion appears timely because the parties agreed to a 10/25/2024 deadline to file the instant motion, and this motion was filed on 10/25/2024.

Meet and Confer
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1).)

“A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP § 2016.040.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition argues that Defendant did not meet and confer before filing the instant motion.

The Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument availing.

A fair amount of ink was spilled over this minor issue by both parties. Both parties point blame at each other as to whether or not a meet and confer occurred. Ultimately, Defendant did in fact send a meet-and-confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Douglas Decl. ¶ 6.) Although the meet-and-confer declaration was only sent three days before the filing of this motion, it appears that Defendant’s counsel reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel on several occasions requesting an in-person or telephonic meet and confer regarding the responses. (See Douglas Decl. ¶ 4.)

Therefore, this Court will not deny this motion on grounds that Defendant did not meet and confer.

LEGAL STANDARD - COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1)   An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

(2)   An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

(3)   An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.

(CCP § 2030.300(a).

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following:

(1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered.

(2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings.

(3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.

 

(CCP § 2030.210(a).)

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

FROG 15.1
Identify each denial of a material allegation and each special or affirmative defense in your pleadings, and for each:

(a) state all facts on which you base the denial or special or affirmative defense;

(b) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and

(c) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your denial or special or affirmative defense, and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT.

Response to FROG 15.1
Responding Party’s investigation and discovery with respect to the pending matter are incomplete, and consequently, it is impossible at this time, to state all facts which Responding Party bases her denial of the allegations of the Cross-Complaint or her affirmative defenses. Further, documents and identifies of persons with knowledge of facts supporting Responding Party’s denials and affirmative defenses are not completely known to Responding Party at this time, except as set forth in Responses to other discovery concurrently served herewith. Some of the witnesses may included [sic] Responding Party’s expert witnesses. Additional investigation and discovery are necessary before Responding Party can provide the reference facts and documents and persons can be fully identified and ascertained, other than as set forth in other Responses.

Tentative Ruling FROG 15.1
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s response is evasive and incomplete. Defendant cites to Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 for the proposition that a party may not avoid providing a substantive response by claiming their investigation is incomplete.

The Court notes that Deyo does not explicitly state the proposition that Defendant alleges it does.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot rely on the excuse that there is an incomplete investigation or that discovery is ongoing as an excuse for failing to provide any facts, witnesses, or documents supporting her denials and affirmative defenses.

Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiff’s response may later need to be supplemented, she must provide the requested information to the extent it is presently known.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s response is evasive under CCP § 2030.220(a).

In Opposition, Plaintiff cites to CCP § 2030.220 which states:

(a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.

(c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.

(CCP § 2030.220(a)-(c).)

In Plaintiff’s Opposition separate Statement, Plaintiff states, “Plaintiff intends to provide a supplemental response to this form interrogatory; however, Plaintiff directed Defendant/Cross-Complainant to other responses with the information currently available, so Plaintiff’s response is substantially compliant CCP §2030.220.” (Pl. Sep. Stmt., FROG 15.1.)

The Court to hear argument.

On the one hand, it appears as if there could be a basis to grant this motion to compel further response as to FROG 15.1 because Plaintiff’s separate statement response in opposition did not justify the failure to respond.

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Opposition response in the separate statement stated, “Plaintiff intends to provide a supplemental response to this form interrogatory; however, Plaintiff directed Defendant/Cross-Complainant to other responses with the information currently available, so Plaintiff’s response is substantially compliant CCP §2030.220.” (Pl. Sep. Stmt., FROG 15.1.)

Since the Court has absolutely no idea what Plaintiff means by, “Plaintiff directed Defendant/Cross-Complainant to other responses with the information currently available, so Plaintiff’s response is substantially compliant CCP §2030.220,” the Court is inclined to find that Plaintiff did not justify any objections/failures to respond.

On the other hand, the Court does not understand Defendant’s argument as to how the response in FROG 15.1 is in violation of § 2030.220(a).

Additionally, as Plaintiff’s response in the separate statement indicated that Plaintiff intends to provide a supplemental response to this FROG, if Plaintiff provides a further, verified response before the hearing, the Court is inclined to find this interrogatory moot as to compelling further, but not moot as to sanctions.

Tentative Ruling FROG 17.1
Upon reviewing both parties’ moving, opposition, and reply papers, both parties’ arguments are incomprehensible as to FROG 17.1. The Court to hear argument.

Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2030.300(d).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a).)

Movant argues that sanctions in the amount of $2,856.70 should be imposed on Plaintiff and Russell Law Group for Plaintiff’s failure to provide adequate interrogatory responses.

Movant requests sanctions as follows:

10. I have spent approximately two (2) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion. I anticipate that an additional one (1) hour will be spent on a reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion and in preparation for the hearing on the Motion along with appearance on the Motion.

11. My Paralegal has spent three (3) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion.

12. My time is billed to the client at a rate of $675.00 per hour. My paralegal’s time is billed to the client at a rate of $250.00 per hour. My firm incurred costs in the amount of $81.70 for the Motion. The Total legal fees are therefore $2,856.70.

(Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 10-12.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the billing rate of $675 is unsupported as being a reasonable rate as there is no explanation of the customary rate for attorneys of the same years and experience practicing civil litigation. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s sanctions request should be denied as the motion was made without substantial justification. Plaintiff also argues the sanctions request should be denied because the rate is inflated and unsupported.

The Court to hear argument. Both parties’ papers were unclear and at times almost incomprehensible. The Court’s ruling will depend on how it rules with respect to whether or not it is compelling further responses for FROGs 15.1 and 17.1. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s motion was made without substantial justification is unavailing. The Court is unaware of any legal authority wherein the Movant has to have substantial justification in order to bring a motion to compel further responses.

 MOTION 2 (Res ID 4946)

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant, Sally Kim, moves for an order compelling code-compliant, further responses to Requests for Admissions, Set One, numbers 1-2, 5-7, 14-17, 19, 21-23, 25-26, within 10 days, from Plaintiff, Chi Hyon Im.

Defendant also moves to impose sanctions against Plaintiff Chi Hyon Im/or Russell Law Group in the amount of $3,356.70.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or any specific later date to which the requesting party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the requesting party waives any right to compel further response to the requests for admission.” (CCP § 2033.290(c).)

See analysis Motion 1.

Meet and Confer

“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2033.290(b)(1).)

See analysis Motion 1.

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER RFAs

Under CCP § 2033.290(a):

On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply:

(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete.

(2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.

(CCP § 2033.290(a).)

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

If Supplemental Responses are provided prior to the hearing
In Opposition, although Plaintiff argues that its responses are code-compliant, Plaintiff also states that it intends to serve supplemental responses prior to the hearing on this motion.

If Plaintiff provides supplemental, verified responses prior to the hearing on this motion, then the Court is inclined to deny Defendant’s motions as moot with respect to compelling further responses; however, the Court would not find the issue of sanctions moot.

If no Supplemental Responses are provided prior to the hearing

RFA 1
Admit that the original Survey prepared by Rick (Fredrick) Jones Jr., copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT A is genuine.

Response RFA 1
After reasonable inquiry, the information known or readily available to Responding Party is insufficient to enable Responding Party to admit or deny this Request for Admission.

RFA 2
Admit that the original Survey prepared by Rick (Fredrick) Jones Jr., copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT A is correct.

Response RFA 2
After reasonable inquiry, the information known or readily available to Responding Party is insufficient to enable Responding Party to admit or deny this Request for Admission.

RFA 5
Admit that the original Survey prepared by Jesus T. Esparza, copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT C is genuine.

Response RFA 5
After reasonable inquiry, the information known or readily available to Responding Party is insufficient to enable Responding Party to admit or deny this Request for Admission.

RFA 6
Admit that the original Survey prepared by Jesus T. Esparza, copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT C is genuine.

Response RFA 6
After reasonable inquiry, the information known or readily available to Responding Party is insufficient to enable Responding Party to admit or deny this Request for Admission.

RFA 7
Admit that the Corner Marker 8 identified on Survey Prepared by Kevin Lai (also Known as Yoon Lai), attached as EXHIBIT B, is identical to Corner Mark 4 identified on Survey Prepared by Jesus T. Esparza, attached as EXHIBIT C.

Response RFA 7
After reasonable inquiry, the information known or readily available to Responding Party is insufficient to enable Responding Party to admit or deny this Request for Admission.

RFAs 1-2, 5-7
As to RFAs 1-2 and 5-7, Defendant argues that further responses are necessary because the RFA responses are evasive and fail to comply with CCP § 2033.220.

Defendant argues:

Given the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff should be sufficiently familiar with the property at issue to admit or deny the genuineness of the Jones survey or explain why they cannot do so. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(a), (b).) Simply stating that Plaintiff has insufficient information after reasonable inquiry, without more, is not a complete and straightforward response. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(c).) Plaintiff must make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information necessary to admit or deny the request. (Chodos v. Superior Court (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 318, 322; Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 430.) Therefore, the Court should compel Plaintiff to provide a further response to this request that complies with the Code.

(See Def. Sep. Stmt., RFAs 1-2 & 5-7.)

Plaintiff argues that further responses should not be compelled because:

A party cannot be forced to admit a fact or the genuineness of a document. The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial and therefore this response is full and complete and no supplement is required; however, Plaintiff will ensure that the response is fully code compliant and supplement as such prior to the hearing on this matter.

(See Pl. Sep. Stmt., RFAs 1-2 & 5-7.)

Tentative Ruling RFAs, 1-2 & 5-7
As a preliminary matter, neither party explains which party has the burden on a motion for compelling further responses to requests for admissions.

Further, as a preliminary matter, neither party gives any context to what these RFAs are referring to with respect to: (1) the original Survey prepared by Rick (Fredrick) Jones Jr; (2) original Survey prepared by Jesus T. Esparza; and  the (3) Corner Marker 8 identified on Survey Prepared by Kevin Lai (also Known as Yoon Lai), attached as EXHIBIT B, is identical to Corner Mark 4 identified on Survey Prepared by Jesus T. Esparza.

The Court has no idea who Rick, Jesus, or Kevin are, or what these documents are referring to.

The Court will hear argument.

On the one hand, the Court is inclined to compel further responses because Plaintiff’s arguments in the separate statement Opposition cite no legal authority. Further, the Court has no idea what Plaintiff is referring to with respect to “The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial and therefore this response is full and complete and no supplement is required[.]”

On the other hand, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not comply with § 2033.220(c).

Under CCP § 2033.220:

(a) Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) Each answer shall:

(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.

(2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.

(3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.

(c) If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.

(CCP § 2033.220(a)-(c).)

Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not comply with 2033.220(c), the Court fails to see how Plaintiff’s response did not comply with 2033.220(c).

Further, the Court will hear argument because for these RFAs, Plaintiff did not admit or deny under CCP § 2033.220(b)(1) or 2033.220(b)(2). Since Plaintiff did not admit or deny under 2033.220(b)(1) or (b)(2), would Plaintiff’s only option be responding in accordance with 2033.220(b)(3)? If so, Plaintiff did not appear to comply with 2033.220(b)(3).

RFA 14
Admit that the predecessor owner of 4646 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 had permission to use the part of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 beyond its fence.

Response to RFA 14
Objection. This Request for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of “beyond the fence.” Without waiving said objections and subject to said objections, Responding Party is informed and believes that the prior owner of Plaintiffs’ property had an easement for use of the driveway running from the street to Plaintiffs’ property.

Defendant’s reason to compel a further response to RFA 14
Plaintiff's response to Request for Admission No. 14 is evasive and fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. The phrases "beyond the fence" and "side of the fence" have a clear and intuitive meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue in this case. Plaintiff's objection that these phrases are vague and ambiguous is improper and renders the response evasive, as it is unclear whether Plaintiff answered any differently based on the objection. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(a).) Furthermore, the response fails to "admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(b)(1).) Therefore, the Court should compel Plaintiff to provide a further response to this request that complies with the Code.

Plaintiff's objection that the phrase "beyond the fence" is vague and ambiguous lacks merit. The phrase has a clear meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue. Plaintiff's evasive response violates the requirement to admit the parts of the request that are true, without equivocation. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(b)(1).) At minimum, Plaintiff must make a good faith effort to admit or deny the request in part or explain in detail why it cannot do so. (Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 430.) Failure to show such good faith effort renders the objection invalid. (Ibid.) The Court should compel Plaintiff to provide a complete response that fairly addresses the substance of the request.

Plaintiff’s reason that no further response is needed for RFA 14
A party cannot be forced to admit a fact. The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial. This response is full and complete because the term “beyond the fence” clearly spans some undefined space of land; however, despite this clear deficiency, Plaintiff still provided a response. Plaintiff will ensure that the response fully complies with the code and will supplement both this response and any corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1 response prior to the hearing on this matter.

Tentative Ruling RFA 14
The Court will hear argument.

On the one hand, Plaintiff’s objection that the meaning of “beyond the fence” being vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible appears as if it could have some merit as it is not entirely clear what that phrase means. Likewise, opposition accurately points out that the phrase spans some undefined space.

On the other hand, Plaintiff’s objection also seems boilerplate because despite Plaintiff objecting, Plaintiff simultaneously asserted a response, which would give validity to Defendant’s argument that the term has a clear and intuitive meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue in this case. Additionally, the Court has no idea what Plaintiff means by “The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial.”

RFA 15
Admit that YOUR usage of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 was willful.

Response RFA 15
Responding Party admits that Plaintiffs used the driveway pursuant to the easement granted to them in the Grant Deed pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their property.

RFA 16
Admit that YOUR usage of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 was negligent.

Response RFA 16
Responding Party admits that Plaintiffs used the driveway pursuant to the easement granted to them in the Grant Deed pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their property.

RFA 17
Admit that YOUR usage of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 was intentional.

Response RFA 17
Responding Party admits that Plaintiffs used the driveway pursuant to the easement granted to them in the Grant Deed pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their property.

Reason to compel further response to RFAs 15, 16, and 17
Plaintiff's responses to Request for Admission Nos. 15, 16, and 17 are evasive and fail to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. The responses do not unequivocally admit or deny whether Plaintiff's usage of Defendant's property was willful, negligent, or intentional. Instead, it provides an unresponsive statement about an alleged easement. This violates the requirement that admissions "admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(b)(1).) Therefore, the Court should compel Plaintiff to provide a further response to this request that complies with the Code.

Plaintiff’s reason that no further response is needed for RFA 15, 16, 17
A party cannot be forced to admit a fact. The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial. This response is full and complete; however, Plaintiff will ensure that the response fully complies with the code and will supplement both this response and any corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1 response prior to the hearing on this matter.

Tentative Ruling RFAs 15, 16, & 17
The Cour to hear argument.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not comply with 2033.220(b)(1).

“Each answer shall: Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.” (CCP § 2033.220(b)(1).)

The Court does not understand Defendant’s argument as to how Plaintiff’s response did not comply with § 2033.220(b)(1). Plaintiff’s responses appear to admit so much as true as qualified by the responding party. Plaintiff’s responses appear to admit, then qualify its admissions as explained in § 2033.220(b)(1). The Court does not understand Defendant’s argument, because as Plaintiff explained, a party cannot be forced to admit a fact that is not true.

However, on the other hand, the Court also wonders if Defendant’s argument has validity and whether or not Plaintiff’s responses are evasive. The Court has concerns because why did Plaintiff not just deny the RFA instead of stating they admit yet, adding qualifications?

RFA 19
Admit that YOU claim the right to use of the part of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 beyond its fence for a driveway.

Response RFA 19
Objection. The Requests for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of “beyond the fence.” Without waiving said objections and subject to said objections, Responding Party responds as follows: Plaintiffs have an easement to use the driveway pursuant to the easement granted to them in the Grant Deed pertaining to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their property, and thus admit that they have the rights, among others, to use the driveway pursuant to said easement.

Reason to compel further response to RFA 19
See reason to compel further response to RFA 14

Plaintiff’s reason that no further response is needed for RFA 19
See reason no further response is needed re: RFA 14.

Tentative Ruling RFA 19
The Court will hear argument.

On the one hand, Plaintiff’s objection that the meaning of “beyond the fence” being vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible appears as if it could have some merit as it is not entirely clear what that phrase means. Likewise, opposition accurately points out that the phrase spans some undefined space.

On the other hand, Plaintiff’s objection also seems boilerplate because despite Plaintiff objecting, Plaintiff simultaneously asserted a response, which would give validity to Defendant’s argument that the term has a clear and intuitive meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue in this case. Additionally, the Court has no idea what Plaintiff means by “The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial.”

RFA 21
Admit that YOU recognize, that Jimmy Tokeshi owns the land beyond the fence of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 that YOU claim to use for a driveway.

Response RFA 21
Objection. The Requests for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of “beyond the fence.”

Reason to Compel Further for RFA 21
Plaintiff's objection that the phrase "beyond the fence" is vague and ambiguous lacks merit. The phrase has a clear meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue. Simply claiming a request is ambiguous without attempting to respond is an insufficient objection. (Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 430.) At minimum, Plaintiff must make a good faith effort to admit or deny the request in part, or explain in detail why it cannot do so. (Ibid.) Failure to show such a good faith effort renders the objection invalid. (Ibid.) The Court should compel Plaintiff to provide a complete response that fairly addresses the substance of the request.

Reason no further response is needed for RFA 21
A party cannot be forced to admit a fact. The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial. This response is full and complete because the term “beyond the fence” clearly spans some undefined space of land; however, despite this clear deficiency, Plaintiff still provided a response. Plaintiff will ensure that the response fully complies with the code and will supplement both this response and any corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1 response prior to the hearing on this matter.

Tentative Ruling RFA 21
The Court will hear argument.

On the one hand, Plaintiff’s objection that the meaning of “beyond the fence” being vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible appears as if it could have some merit as it is not entirely clear what that phrase means. Likewise, opposition accurately points out that the phrase spans some undefined space.

On the other hand, Plaintiff’s objection also seems boilerplate. Additionally, the Court has no idea what Plaintiff means by “The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial.”

RFA 22
Admit that YOU recognize, that Sally Kim owns the land beyond the fence of 4652 Palm Drive, La Canada, CA 91011 that YOU claim to use for a driveway.

Response RFA 22
Objection. The Requests for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of “beyond the fence.”

Reason to Compel Further for RFA 22
See RFA 21.

Reason to not compel further for RFA 22
See RFA 21.

Tentative Ruling RFA 22
The Court will hear argument.

On the one hand, Plaintiff’s objection that the meaning of “beyond the fence” being vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible appears as if it could have some merit as it is not entirely clear what that phrase means. Likewise, opposition accurately points out that the phrase spans some undefined space.

On the other hand, Plaintiff’s objection also seems boilerplate. Additionally, the Court has no idea what Plaintiff means by “The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial.”

 

RFA 23
Admit that Letter dated August 22, 2022, by J. Andrew Douglas, copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT D is genuine.

Response to RFA 23
Admit that Exhibit "D" appears to be a true and correct copy of the document it purports to be.

Reason to compel further response to RFA 23
Plaintiff's response to Request for Admission No. 23 is incomplete, nonresponsive, and evasive. Plaintiff fails to provide a direct admission that the letter dated August 22, 2022 by J. Andrew Douglas, attached as Exhibit D, is genuine. Instead, Plaintiff merely admits that Exhibit D "appears to be a true and correct copy of the document it purports to be."

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section § 2033.220(a), each answer in response to a request for admission "shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits." Furthermore, the answer shall "[a]dmit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(b)(1).)

Here, Plaintiff's equivocal admission that Exhibit D merely "appears" to be a true copy fails to directly admit the authenticity and genuineness of the August 22, 2022 letter as requested. Given the clear relevance of this letter to the disputed property usage at issue in this case, Plaintiff should have sufficient information to unequivocally admit or deny its genuineness. At minimum, Plaintiff must explain what reasonable inquiry, if any, it made that left it without sufficient information to admit or deny the genuineness of the letter. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(c).)

By qualifying its response with the word "appears," Plaintiff leaves open the possibility that the letter is not in fact genuine, without providing any explanation for its failure to directly admit or deny the request as framed. This is an incomplete and evasive response that does not fairly meet the substance of the request. The law requires Plaintiff to admit the parts of the request that are true, without equivocation or evasion. Therefore, Plaintiff should be compelled to provide a further response that directly admits the genuineness of the August 22, 2022 letter or states the specific reasons why it cannot do so.

Reason no further response is needed for RFA 23
This response is unequivocal. It clear [sic] admits that the document attached as Exhibit D appears to be a true and correct copy.

Tentative Ruling RFA 23
Defendant’s motion to compel further response to RFA 23 is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s response is unresponsive and evasive. Plaintiff to provide a further, code-compliant, verified response without objection within 10 days of this order.

RFA 25
Admit that YOU were informed of the Defendants’ ownership of Defendants’ land beyond its fence that YOU claim as part of the driveway.

Response to RFA 25
Objection. The Requests for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of “beyond the fence.” The Requests for Admission is vague as to time and the manner in which Responding Party was informed of the subject matter of this Requests for Admission.

Reason to compel further response RFA 25
Plaintiff's objections that the request is vague as to time, manner of being informed, and the meaning of "beyond the fence" lack merit. The request seeks a straightforward admission regarding notice of Defendants' ownership of the disputed property. Plaintiff should be able to admit or deny receiving such notice, or state the reasons it cannot do so, without needing more specifics. Simply claiming a request is ambiguous without attempting to respond is an insufficient.

Reason no further response is needed to RFA 25
A party cannot be forced to admit a fact. The remedy for an unreasonable and bad faith refusal to do so is payment of costs associated with authenticating the document or proving the truth of a fact for evidentiary use at trial. This response is full and complete because the term “beyond the fence” clearly spans some undefined space of land; however, despite this clear deficiency, Plaintiff still provided a response. Plaintiff will ensure that the response fully complies with the code and will supplement both this response and any corresponding Form Interrogatory 17.1 response prior to the hearing on this matter.

Tentative Ruling RFA 25
The Court to hear argument.

RFA 26
Admit that YOU did not pay all taxes assessed on Defendants’ land on your side of the fence that you claim for a driveway.

Response RFA 26
Objection. The Requests for Admission is vague, confusing, ambiguous, and unintelligible as to the meaning of Plaintiffs’ “side of the fence.” Responding Party admits that Plaintiffs did not pay property taxes with respect to Defendants’ property.

Reason to compel further response to RFA 26
Plaintiff's response to Request for Admission No. 26 is evasive and fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. The phrases "beyond the fence" and "side of the fence" have a clear and intuitive meaning in the context of the bordering properties at issue in this case. Plaintiff's objection that these phrases are vague and ambiguous is improper and renders the response evasive, as it is unclear whether Plaintiff answered any differently based on the objection. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(a).) Furthermore, the response fails to "admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220(b)(1).)

Reason no further response is needed for RFA 26
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition separate statement did not address RFA 26. Plaintiff’s separate statement ended at RFA 25.

Tentative Ruling RFA 26
The Court to hear argument.

Sanctions
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2033.290(d).)

Defendant requests sanctions should be imposed against Plaintiff and/or Russell Law Group in the amount of $3,356.70.

Defendant argues for sanctions as follows:

12. I have spent approximately two (2) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion. I anticipate that an additional one (1) hour will be spent on a reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion and in preparation for the hearing on the Motion along with appearance on the Motion.

13. My Paralegal has spent four (5) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion.

14. My time is billed to the client at a rate of $675.00 per hour. My paralegal’s time is billed to the client at a rate of $250.00 per hour. My firm incurred costs in the amount of $81.70 for the Motion. The Total legal fees are therefore $3,356.70.

(Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the billing rate of $675 is unsupported as being a reasonable rate as there is no explanation of the customary rate for attorneys of the same years and experience practicing civil litigation. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s sanctions request should be denied as the motion was made without substantial justification. Plaintiff also argues the sanctions request should be denied because the rate is inflated and unsupported.

The Court to hear argument. The Court’s ruling will depend on how it rules with respect to whether or not it is compelling further responses to the RFAs. At the very least, the Court compelled a further response with respect to RFA 23. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s motion was made without substantial justification is unavailing. The Court is unaware of any legal authority wherein the Movant has to have substantial justification in order to bring a motion to compel further responses.

MOTION 3 (Res ID 8417)

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant, Sally Kim, moves for an order compelling further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, against Plaintiff Chi Hyon Im.

Defendant also moves to impose sanctions against Plaintiff Chi Hyon Im and/or Russell Law Group in the sum of $3,356.70.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.” (CCP § 2031.310(c).)

See analysis Motion 1.

Meet and Confer

“The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).)

See analysis Motion 1.

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL FURTHER – REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

 

CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that:

“(1)   A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

  (2)   A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

  (3)   An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” 

 

Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” 

 

“In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show “good cause” for the request—but unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

 

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

Tentative Ruling RFPs 1-42
Defendant moves to compel further responses to RFPs 1-42. Despite the fact that Defendant’s motion seeks to compel further responses to RFPs 1-42, Defendant does not once explain what is improper about Plaintiff’s responses. In fact, after reading Defendant’s motion and 57-page separate statement, Defendant does not appear to take issue with any of Plaintiff’s responses. What Defendant seeks from this motion is for Plaintiff to produce documents responsive to RFPs 1-42.

Therefore, the Court will hear argument as to whether Defendant brought the proper motion.

Although the notice to the motion seeks further responses, the motion and separate statement simply argue that Plaintiff has not provided a single responsive document.

The Court wonders whether a motion to compel further responses was the proper motion. Since Defendant simply wants responsive documents produced, should Defendant have filed a motion to compel compliance under CCP § 2031.320(a)?

“If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance.” (CCP § 2031.320(a).)

Likewise, Plaintiff’s Opposition and Plaintiff’s Opposition Separate Statement don’t address the issue of compelling further responses.

In Plaintiff’s Opposition Separate Statement, Plaintiff used the exact same reason for all 42 RFPs as to why further responses were not necessary for RFPs 1-42:

As set forth in Robert Kent’s declaration regarding the Informal Discovery Conference, Mr. Kent explains that he was unaware that responsive documents have not been produced, as he was under the belief that such production had been made. He also states that there are very few responsive documents in Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s possession, custody, and/or control. Upon further review of the file, it has been confirmed that this statement is truthful, and in fact all such documents are already in Defendants/Cross-Complainants’ possession, custody, and/or control and are only in Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s possession because of their production by Defendants/Cross-Complainants or are publicly recorded documents, all of which are equally available to Defendants/Cross-Complainants.

One of the reasons for the misunderstanding regarding the production of responsive documents is due to the fact that both Mr. Russell and Ms. Duane have been dealing with significant health issues. In fact, Ms. Duane was released from her latest hospital stay of over five weeks on or about October 28, 2024, and she is only just now catching up with work in order to assume responsibility for a number of cases, including this one. Ms. Duane has thus far been hospitalized for three months in total throughout 2024 (and in fact did a court appearance in this case from her hospital room in January or February 2024). Her last two hospital admissions spanned almost then entirety (with the exception of one week in September) of September and October and resulted in an emergency exploratory surgery and subsequent intubation which lasted several days. She only recently became aware that documents had not been produced, so she will be producing them before the end of the week.

(See Pl. Oppo. Sep. Stmt.)

As can be seen from Plaintiff’s reason that no further responses are needed for RFPs 1-42, that reason does not address why further responses are not needed. Just like Defendant’s motion, it only addresses production itself, and not the responses.

If this motion is an appropriate tool to compel compliance of documents based on Plaintiff’s responses stating that all responsive documents would be produced, Plaintiff is ordered to produce the documents that Plaintiff stated it would produce in RFPs 1-42.

RFP 46

Produce ANY AND ALL other non-privileged DOCUMENTS not otherwise demanded hereunder that YOU intend to use to support YOUR contentions made in YOUR Complaint filed on March 16, 2023, in the Los Angeles Superior Court as case number 23GDCV00535, at the time of trial.

Response RFP 46
Objection. This Request calls for information and documents protected by the attorney work-product doctrine. The Request is also premature in that Plaintiffs have not yet determined the full extent of documents to support allegations made in the Complaint.

Tentative Ruling RFP 46
RFP 46 is the only RFP wherein Defendant attacks Plaintiff’s response and argues why a further response is necessary.

Defendant argues that the objection is without merit, that the RFP requested non-privileged documents, and that to the extent that Plaintiff is withholding responsive documents on the basis of privilege, Plaintiff must provide a privilege log.

In response, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s arguments with respect to compelling a further response.

Plaintiff provided the exact reason it provided with respect to RFPs 1-42 as to why a further response was not necessary. As explained previously, that argument did not address further responses, it only addressed why the documents were not produced.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion to compel a further response with respect to RFP 46 is GRANTED. Plaintiff objected, but Plaintiff did not comply with 2031.240; therefore, Plaintiff did not provide a code-compliant response. Plaintiff is ordered to provide a code-compliant, further response without objection, within 10 days of this order.

Sanctions
Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2031.310(h).)

Defendant requests monetary sanctions imposed against Plaintiff and/or Russell Law Group in the amount of $3,356.70.

Defendant requests sanctions as follows:

20. I have spent approximately two (2) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion. I anticipate that an additional one (1) hour will be spent on a reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion and in preparation for the hearing on the Motion along with appearance on the Motion.

21. My Paralegal has spent four (5) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion.

22. My time is billed to the client at a rate of $675.00 per hour. My paralegal’s time is billed to the client at a rate of $250.00 per hour. My firm incurred costs in the amount of $81.70 for the Motion. The Total legal fees are therefore $3,356.70.

(Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 20-22.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s counsel’s billing rate of $675.00 is unsupported as being a reasonable rate as there is no explanation of the customary rate for attorneys of the same years and experience practicing civil litigation.

Further, Plaintiff argues that it believed that the documents had been sent to the opposing parties and such confusion was due to several personal and medical issues. Plaintiff argues it will produce all such documents no later than December 20, 2024, and that due to the mitigating circumstances and the fact that all documents to be produced are already in Defendant’s possession, custody and/or control, and/or are publicly recorded documents, making all such documents equally available to all parties, the Court should deny or reduce sanctions.

The Court will hear argument.

Plaintiff provides no legal authority for the argument that it does not have to produce documents if they are already in the other party’s possession, custody, or control, or are equally available to both parties. Therefore, the Court is unlikely to find this argument availing.

MOTION 4 (Res ID 5872)

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant, Sally Kim, moves the Court for an order compelling further responses, without objections, to Special Interrogatories, Set One, numbers 10, 31-39, 99, 112, 113 and 116, within 10 days; from Plaintiff, Chi Hyon Im. Defendant also moves for an order imposing monetary sanctions of $3,356.70 against Plaintiff Chi Hyon Im and/or Russell Law Group.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

45-Day Requirement
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (CCP § 2030.300(c).)

See analysis Motion 1.

Meet and Confer
“A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1).)

See analysis Motion 1.

LEGAL STANDARD - COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Under CCP § 2017.010, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  The Section specifically provides that “[d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action,” and that discovery “may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.”

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply:

(4)   An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.

(5)   An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate.

(6)   An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.

(CCP § 2030.300(a).

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, California’s liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)

The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following:

(1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered.

(2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings.

(3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.

 

(CCP § 2030.210(a).)

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

Tentative Ruling SROG 10
As to SROG 10, Plaintiff responded with “??????”

Plaintiff’s response is not a code-compliant response.

Defendant’s motion to compel a further response with respect to SROG 10 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to provide a further, code-compliant, verified response without objection within 10 days of this order.

SROG 31
State ALL facts that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to diminish the property value … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 31
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: The threatened action by Defendants that could impact Plaintiffs’ access to their property and potentially result in a loss of part of Plaintiffs’ property would clearly reduce the desirability of Plaintiffs’ property threby [sic] reducing the value of Plaintiffs’ property.

SROG 32
IDENTIFY ALL PERSONS with knowledge of the facts set forth in YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to diminish the property value … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 32
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: Plaintiffs, Woo Jung Kim and Chi Hyong Kim; Defendants, Sally Kim and Jimmy Tokeshi.

SROG 33
IDENTIFY ALL DOCUMENTS that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to diminish the property value … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 33
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: Please see response to Special Interrogatory Number 3, which is incorporated herein by reference.

SROG 34
State ALL facts that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to decrease Plaintiff’s Lot size and boundary lines … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 34
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: The threatened action by Defendants could impact Plaintiffs access to their property and potentially result in a loss of part of Plaintiffs’ property.

SROG 35
IDENTIFY ALL PERSONS with knowledge of the facts set forth in YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… to decrease Plaintiff’s Lot size and boundary lines … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 35
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: Plaintiffs, Woo Jung Kim and Chi Hyong Kim; Defendants, Sally Kim and Jimmy Tokeshi; Kevin Lai of Caliland Engineering, Inc.

SROG 36
IDENTIFY ALL DOCUMENTS that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to decrease Plaintiff’s Lot size and boundary lines … by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 36
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: Please see response to Special Interrogatory Number 3, which is incorporated herein by reference.

SROG 37
State ALL facts that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to peaceably use and enjoy Plaintiff’s property by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 37
Defendants’ threatened actions as described in responses to Special Interrogatory Numbers 1 and 19 would create a nuisance of carried out and if Plaintiffs had not filed this litigation to deter or stop Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: said threatened actions. The threats by Defendants have been very stressful for Plaintiffs and have adversely affected Plaintiffs’quiet enjoyment of their property.

SROG 38
IDENTIFY ALL PERSONS with knowledge of the facts set forth in YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… to peaceably use and enjoy Plaintiff’s property by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 38
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: Plaintiffs, Woo Jung Kim and Chi Hyong Kim; Defendants, Sally Kim and Jimmy Tokeshi; Kevin Lai of Caliland Engineering, Inc.

SROG 39
IDENTIFY ALL DOCUMENTS that support YOUR contention that “[t]he effect of Defendants’ conduct… has produced irreparable damage to Plaintiff … to peaceably use and enjoy Plaintiff’s property by said encroachments” as alleged in paragraph 18 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 39
Please see response to Special Interrogatory Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objection and subject to said objection, Responding Party responds as follows: tory Number 3, which is incorporated herein by reference.

SROG 112
As per YOUR Ninth cause of action, state ALL facts that support YOUR claim for Violation of Los Angeles County Zoning Ordinance.

Response SROG 112
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests an expert opinion.

SROG 113
State ALL facts that support YOUR contention that “[b]y erecting the current ADU, Defendants have violated said code section with setback violations along Plaintiff’s true property line with only a two (2) foot setback and a one-half foot setback violation and, on information and belief, other code violations” as alleged in paragraph 72 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 113
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests an expert opinion.

SROG 116
State ALL facts that support YOUR contention that “Defendants are also in violation of said setback zoning requirements if any fence, wall or other construction is conducted within four (4) feet of Plaintiff’s boundary line as established by Plaintiffs’ easement in the driveway area as depicted in Exhibit C” as alleged in paragraph 72 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

Response SROG 116
Objection. This Interrogatory prematurely requests an expert opinion.

TENTATIVE RULING SROGs 31-39, 112, 113, & 116
If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

As to why a further response was not needed, Plaintiff argued as follows with respect to all of the instant SROGs, “Plaintiff is not required to produce expert reports or opinions at this time and therefore this response is full and complete; however, Plaintiff will attempt to provide a supplemental response prior to the hearing on this matter.”

Here, the Court does not find Plaintiff met its burden in justifying its objections.

The Court does not understand Plaintiff’s argument that these SROGs prematurely request expert information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, §2034.010 et seq.

Under CCP § 2034.010, “This chapter does not apply to exchanges of lists of experts and valuation data in eminent domain proceedings under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 1258.010) of Title 7 of Part 3.” (Ibid.)

Not only does the Court not understand Plaintiff’s argument with respect to 2034.010, Plaintiff did not produce any legal authority for its argument that Plaintiff is not required to produce expert reports or opinions at this time.

Since Plaintiff had the burden of justifying its objections, and since the Court either found Plaintiff’s arguments to be incomprehensible or Plaintiff failed to provide legal authority for its argument, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not justify its objections.

Defendant’s motion to compel further response to SROGs 31-39, 112, 113, & 116 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to provide further, code-compliant responses, without objection, within 10 days of this Court’s order.

TENTATIVE RULING SROG 99
There was no response provided for SROG 99. Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to SROG 99 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to provide a code-compliant, verified, further response without objection to SROG 99.

Sanctions
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2030.300(d).)

Defendant moves for sanctions to be imposed against Plaintiff and/or Russell Law Group in the sum of $3,356.70.

Defendant explains the sanctions request as follows:

8. Based on the insufficient responses and the unsuccessful meet and confer efforts, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Sally Kim has no choice but to seek court intervention to compel Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Chi Hyon Im to provide complete and code-compliant responses to the special interrogatories. I have spent approximately two (2) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion. I anticipate that an additional one (1) hour will be spent on a reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion and in preparation for the hearing on the Motion along with appearance on the Motion.

9. My Paralegal has spent four (5) hours drafting the Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this Declaration of J. Andrew Douglas, and the Separate Statement in support of the Motion.

10. My time is billed to the client at a rate of $675.00 per hour. My paralegal’s time is billed to the client at a rate of $250.00 per hour. My firm incurred costs in the amount of $81.70 for the Motion. The Total legal fees are therefore $3,356.70.

(Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the billing rate of $675 is unsupported as being a reasonable rate as there is no explanation of the customary rate for attorneys of the same years and experience practicing civil litigation. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s sanctions request should be denied as the motion was made without substantial justification. Plaintiff also argues the sanctions request should be denied because the rate is inflated and unsupported.

The Court to hear argument. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s motion was made without substantial justification is unavailing. The Court is unaware of any legal authority wherein the Movant has to have substantial justification in order to bring a motion to compel further responses.